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Human rights and security, are frequently managed as detached concepts. This thesis 
unites them in a relationship that implies that there has always been an underlying 
association between keeping humans safe whilst securing their space through the use 
of force. International norms, like the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), have this human rights 
and security relationship in their core. Theoretically, I stem from a constructivist 
stance that cross-borders with the English School and adds to the growing literature 
on non-state actors that seek to improve arms control and to inflict change in the 
global governance of international humanitarian law. By deconstructing and 
reconstructing through a genealogical constitutive framework of analysis of the 
relationship, I argue that the actors and actions of the ATT implementation 
demonstrate that the relationship is constructed by a complex nexus of moral and 
material interests.  
 
I analyse three case studies: Control Arms-ATT Monitor, an NGO pushing for Treaty 
fulfilment; the UK, as a large arms exporter being held accountable by an independent 
NGO for apparent failure to implement the Treaty; and Norway, a small arms 
exporting state intertwined with diverse actors to achieve Treaty implementation. 
Empirically, I claim that the norm implementation dynamics of the Treaty expose a 
human rights and security relationship that reflects the constant change and strains 
amongst its actors, between morality and materialism and between human rights and 
security. I introduce norm implementers as key actors that can go beyond the typical 
state and non-state limits exposing their semi-permeated boundaries and that can 
also operate within the state. I demonstrate the multilayer realm where the human 
rights and security relationship develops and how its construction implies material 
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Chapter 1- Introduction 
 
 
 Whether in times of peace or crisis, the way in which actors manage security 
matters. Often it seems like security issues outweigh other topics, like human rights. 
In fact, these two concepts, human rights and security, seem to be frequently 
managed in detached approaches. This thesis seeks to add to the notion of change of 
this logic into a modified view that should not be security-based, or human-rights 
based, but human rights and security based. This approach allows for the creation of 
an understanding of a relationship between human rights and security. This concept 
is not entirely new. It could be said that since the times of the Greeks, security and 
human rights issues have been entangled and plenty of tangible and intangible norms 
have been created in its name. The best example being the First Geneva Convention 
of 1864, which marks the birth of the contemporary human rights and security 
relationship. In International Relations literature, for example, Gwendolyn Sasse 
(2005) has defined this as a security and rights nexus, she uses it in terms of minority 
and migration issues. Other scholars have been, directly or indirectly working on the 
nexus of human rights and security without expressly knowing it in relation to the 
refugee policies (Lavenex, 2001),  humanitarian arms control (Cooper, 2011; Greene, 
2010; Hynek, 2007; Wisotzki, 2010), humanitarian disarmament (Borrie, 2009; Borrie 
and Randin, 2006; Krause, 2011),  and controlling the means of violence (Cooper and 
Mutimer, 2011). Denise Garcia (2006, 2011, 2014, 2015, 2017) works indirectly on the 
relationship in relation to the conception, negotiation and creation of conjugated 
human rights and security norms or humanitarian security norms (2015), like the Mine 
Ban Treaty, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). 
There have also been studies written on the achievement of full compliance of similar 
norms, like the Power of Human Rights and the Consistent Power of Human Rights  
(Risse, 2008; Risse et al., 2013).  
 
The human rights and security relationship is important because it builds upon the 
study of norms, specially of norms that have been created under its name. This thesis, 
will focus on going beyond the aforementioned studies to focus on the 
implementation of a human rights and security based norm, the ATT. The unification 
of human rights and security will imply understanding that there has always been an 
underlying association between keeping humans safe whilst securing their space 
through the use of force. In fact, in many languages, there is only one word for safety 
and security; seguridad in Spanish, sicurezza in Italian, securite in French and 
sicherheit in German. Although in English, safety and security have separate 
definitions; safety is the condition of being free from natural harm or risk, and security 
is quality or state of being free from social harm or danger. Both definitions stem from 
the same root and therefore have a clear overlapping meaning.  
 
In a similar fashion to a Venn Diagram, the human rights and security relationship is 
defined by the juxtaposition of two circles, human rights and security, where the 
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common elements of the two are represented by their intersection. The human rights 
and security relationship is composed by the nexus of moral and material interests 
that each actor has.1 Such interests are constructed as can be understood through 
cultural, social, historical and other pertinent values making the relationship a classic 
case of constructivism. These values construct but are also being constructed by the 
human rights and security relationship. In this way, the relationship acquires meaning 
and becomes a representation of the practical and political implications of each 
actor´s preferences in relation to human rights and security, separately and in 
conjunction. The relationship is also site of negotiation and contestation, particularly 
influenced by the nexus of material and moral interests that each actor has. The 
relationship becomes a negotiation between leaders of the state, within the state, or 
outside the state. The human rights and security relationship turns out to be a 
platform where actors, directly or indirectly, consciously or subconsciously are 
influenced by cultural, social and historical facts to manipulate or accommodate the 
situations whilst constructing a defined connection between security and human 
rights.2   
 
As will be seen throughout this thesis, the human rights and security relationship is 
continuously being changed by the actors it involves, while at the same time changing 
them in return. It is a constant case of deconstruction and construction, a continuous 
two way process (Onuf, 1998) like the constructivist theory of international relations. 
Due to its ever-changing nature, the human rights and security relationship is never a 
finished product, and therefore inherent part of constructivist theory. The 
construction of the human rights and security relationship takes place in the realm of 
international norms where the interaction between agents involves diverse state and 
non-state actors that through socialization seek to advance their interests in order to 
achieve preponderance. Today, several international norms have the human rights 
and security relationship in their core. Such is the case of the 2014 Arms Trade Treaty 
that through the control of security measures it seeks to alleviate human suffering, as 
it states for the first time in the Treaty itself. These type of treaties have become 
highly significant, because of the way they challenge the core philosophy of human 
rights and security and defy state understandings of national security and sovereignty. 
They also express the latest trends in the evolution of the relationship between 
human rights and security. The ATT and its implementation, reflect the push for 
greater attention of the humanitarian aspect of security issues, they exemplify the 
complexity that exists between actors, that juxtapose to create a new sort of 
dynamism between civil society, states, and national and international mechanisms 
that impulse human rights in a typically security led arena.  
 
1 This Thesis will borrow Rogers Brubaker´s (1996) nexus concept to introduce it into the moral and 
material interests that affect the implementation of the ATT and the human rights and security 
relationship. In a similar manner, in which Rogers Brubaker´s 1996 book reframed how nationalism and 
minorities interact.  
2 The human rights and security relationship will more thoroughly explained chapter 2 where the 
actors, interests and values will be better understood.  
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In this sense, what this thesis seeks to answer is: What is the relationship between 
human rights and security and what does the Arms Trade Treaty, particularly its 
implementation, reflect about this relationship? In answering this question this 
thesis will focus on the hypothesis that the ATT´s implementation demonstrates that 
the human rights and security relationship is defined and defines the complex nexus 
of moral and material interests that an actor exerts upon human rights and/or 
security. Through this thesis, I seek to reframe how the actors of human rights based 
security treaties, specifically the ATT, interrelate. Also, how actors accommodate to 
the situation depending on the constructed values shaped by the nexus of moral and 
material interests. Finally, this thesis will also argue how the particular overlay of the 
human rights and security relationship of diverse actors and the dynamics that lead 
to such overlap, intensely demonstrate that state actors give rights whilst “controlling 
the means of violence” (Cooper & Mutimer, 2011, p. 9). In this, non-state actors, 





To answer the research question, this thesis focuses on these main theoretical 
strands: constructivism, the English School (ES), theories on global civil society and 
theories on global governance. Constructivist literature will aid in understanding 
norms (Finnemore, 1996; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Katzenstein, 1996; Klotz, 1995, 
etc) and the involved actors, as well as the complex construction of the actor´s actions 
and attitude towards the human rights and security relationship. The mutually 
constructed social conditions that define the relationship, the norms based on it and 
the pertinent actors will also be explicated by the use of constructivism. A key 
constructivist theoretical focus of this thesis will be building upon Margaret Keck and 
Kathryn Sikkink´s work on transnational advocacy networks (TANs) (1998, 1999) and 
the growing literature focused and based around these networks (Bieler, Higgott, & 
Underhill, 2004; Burgerman, 2001; Clark, 2001; Florini, 2000; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; 
Khagram, Riker, & Sikkink, 2002; Matthew, 1999; Price, 1998, 2003, etc). Diverse 
studies have stemmed from Keck and Sikkink´s work and will be used directly or 
indirectly to explain the evolution of the ATT and the pertinent actors in the context 
of a human rights and security relationship. For example, Keck and Sikkink have 
influenced and been influenced: how non-state actors are increasingly improving 
their role in the evolution of norms (Boli and Thomas, 1999a; Khagram et al., 2002; 
Price, 2003; Risse et al., 1999; Risse et al., 2013), how norms are shaped (Jepperson 
et al., 1996), what their causal effects are (Berger, 1998; Jepperson et al., 1996; Kier, 
1996; Price et al., 1996) and their strengths and challenges (Kowert and Legro, 1996).  
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Keck and Sikkink´s “boomerang effect”3 referring to the TANs has also led the way for 
studies on humanitarian or human rights security regimes and their creation (Garcia, 
2006; Garcia, 2011; Garcia, 2014; Garcia, 2015; Garcia, 2017) as well as the power of 
human rights and the persistent power of human rights (Risse et al., 1999; Risse, 
2008). The studies on TANs or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have led to 
further specialization of the role of these actors. Particularly fitting for this thesis is 
the literature on these actors and their relationship with norms of arms control and 
disarmament (Bolton and James, 2014; Garcia, 2011; Knopf, 2012; Mathur, 2011), and 
international control of small arms and light weapons (SALW) (Garcia, 2006; Grillot et 
al., 2006; Krause, 2001; Krause, 2002; Sears, 2012). Most of these studies based on 
TANs and on their impact on norms, assume that these actors are completely 
independent from the state. In opposition, other scholars have focused on the Neo-
Marxist/Gramscian understanding of civil society, where these non-state actors have 
no independence from the state or from corporations. Anna Stavrianakis´s work 
focuses on NGOs constrained and enabled by the historical and structural grounding 
of hegemonic social formations due to the organization’s lack of independence from 
the state (2011, 2012, 2013, 2016). Her main focus are NGOs involved in arms trade, 
particularly on the creation of ATT. Stavrianakis´s focus becomes important for this 
thesis, to further appreciate non-state organizations, their impact and their agency or 
lack thereof. Throughout this thesis, I will use these theories to show that NGOs hold 
real power in the implementation of norm, particularly those based on human rights 
and security as a whole, like the ATT. Through this thesis and its case studies I will 
focus on building upon the growing number of scholars mentioned above. More on 
the specific contributions I will make to the field of International Relations, will be 
further explained with the chapter descriptions further below.  
 
Whether directly or indirectly, TANs have also been explained from different 
viewpoints, one of them being English School scholars, like Tim Dunne, Thomas Reiss, 
etc. This stems from the commonalities that constructivism and the English School 
have: where norms are key factors and actors evolve through history and time. Those 
commonalities come from scholars from both strands gathering inspiration from each 
other since the beginning. Both theories talk about society, and some belief that the 
ES does so in a more structured way (Buzan, 2001). The power of Keck and Sikkink´s 
argument and how and when TANs produce improvements in the behavior of states 
can be better understood when acknowledging normative aspects of ES and the 
recognition for the empirical and ethical scope of moral action in a world of sovereign 
states (Reus–Smit, 2002). This because ES scholars have focused, on something that 
constructivist might have overlooked: “systematic reflection on the nature of 
international social and political life, what constitutes ethical conduct in such a world, 
and how this might be realized” (Ibid., p. 501). Precisely this is why, further along, I 
will be introducing topics along the lines of morality to comprehend state and non-
state interaction in the implementation of the ATT. TANs are not the only topics both 
 
3 Which will be explained with detail in chapter 3.  
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types of scholars have studied, there is constant cross-fertilization between the two 
(Ibid.) and this study will also reflect it. As will be seen throughout this thesis, the 
nature of the human rights and security relationship is constructivist but it has tints 
of the ES as will be exposed further along.  
 
The two other theoretical strands that I will focus on, global civil society and global 
governance, will further explain the interaction between structure and agency that 
occurs within the jurisdiction of the human rights and security relationship and 
particularly within human rights and security norms like the ATT and their 
implementation in the referred case studies. Global civil society has numerous 
definitions which will be analyzed in successive chapters, however they refer to non-
state actors that operate beyond the confines of national societies, politics and 
economics (Anheier et al., 2005) and influence global norms and values (Chandler, 
2004b; Chandler, 2004a).  The activities of this so called global civil society have 
allowed for the shift from formal national institutions to new local and cross-border 
spaces (Kaldor, 2013a, p.148). Such is the case of the landmark initiatives that NGOs 
have started and led, like the Ottawa Treaty, the Cluster Munitions Ban and the Arms 
Trade Treaty. Reviewing another perspective on NGOs global civil society literature, 
will aid in the better understanding of the actors involved in the case studies 
presented in this thesis. Further than that, these works empower more non- state 
actors. Additionally, to understand the new interactions between state and non-state 
actors that are a combination of domestic, international and everything-in between 
circumstances, theories on global governance will be needed (Avant et al., 2010). 
Particularly, those focus on governing globally through norm dynamics in multilateral 
arms control (Muller and Wunderlich, 2013). The compounded understanding of the 
theoretical works on global governance, global civil society and norm change as 
viewed from a constructivist formation will give vitality to the understanding of reality 
that actors, particularly those represented in this study, create through their nexus of 
key material and moral interests to influence norm evolution and the relationship 
between human rights and security.   
 
The way in which this thesis is mobilising Cooper and Mutimer´s concept of control of 
the means of violence (CMV) is based on their 2011 work. It is argued that the long 
term-indirect effect of controlling the means of violence should be “to reduce 
militarism and promote cultures of peace or… avoid further embedding cultures of 
militarism”(Cooper and Mutimer, 2011, p.11).4 Controlling the means of violence 
needs to include more radical and inclusive forms of global-local action in order to 
avoid this embedding. Precisely this is what this thesis intends to do, by focusing on 
the action of those global-local NGOs and other non-state or mixed actors who aim to 
reduce the embedded militarism of the Arms Trade Treaty. In this sense, CMV places 
“a premium on the adoption of strategies that are underpinned by processes of 
 
4 For more details on different positivist arms control points of view and on CMV please chapter 3 where the 
interspace of the human rights and security relationship is explained. 
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dialogue and mutual understanding”(Ibid. 2011, p.12), processes like the ones that 
the actors, like CAAT, Redd Barna, the SV and ATT Monitor,  on the case studies 
presented aim to achieve.  
  
This differs from positivists accounts on arms control because it focuses on bottom-
up power of civil society actors, as opposed to arms control from below with the 
militarism logic from above (Turner et al., 2010).The positivist/ problem-solving 
orientation of academic arms control does not really “attempt to critically reflect on 
the relationship between practice and traditional arms control theory, on the security 
framings underlying current policies or on the functions served by the current global 
architecture of arms control”(Ibid., 2011, p.3).  
 
States give rights because they are international legal entities and have duties given 
by the international system of law. Rights seek to limit the authority of the 
government over the governed and established under the context of an International 
Treaty may comprise obligations for the signatory states. Taking into consideration 
the Western point of view on adoption of international law (as opposed to states 
whose focus was not the individual but the state, like the Soviet Union) the rights that 
are given within the context of this thesis’ hypothesis refer to international human 
and humanitarian rights. States are giving rights to their population through 
supporting, creating and internalizing human rights based security laws, like the Arms 
Trade Treaty. They are also giving rights to the world´s population by signing and 
ratifying biding international agreements. They give rights to NGOs, through their 
power as State Parties of the ATT, of managing, monitoring and verifying the Treaty.  
In some sense, they also give rights to other entities within the state, like the special 
advocates for example, to confront and freely engage with local and international 
opposing forces.  
 
In a way, stemming from the understanding that states are a sum of actors and are 
not unitary forms, when a state gives rights it is giving rights to itself. This because 
typical definition of a state implies that it is formed by territory, population and 
government.  Then, the state-government part is giving rights to the population-
society part of its whole. This connects to with regard to what are the states giving 
rights in the thesis’ hypothesis. States are “by far the most important legal persons 
and are therefore the primary focus for the social activity of humankind and thus for 
international law” (Shaw, 2008, pp.196–197). Legal entities possess rights and duties 
enforceable to law, according to the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and other instruments that are not binding but have influenced the creation 
and implementation of the latter, like the Montevideo Convention on Rights and 
Duties of States 1933 and the Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States. 
Particularly, the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration establish obligations 
regarding human rights. With regards to humanitarian rights, states are connected to 
the Geneva Conventions and to Protocol I, 1977 to respect and ensure the 
Conventions.  In a more detailed sense, the rights that this thesis´ hypothesis refers 
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to come from the local law that in principle should be based upon a compilation of 
international human rights based security law like the Arms Trade Treaty. For 
example, in the case of the UK, this local law is regarded as the consolidated criteria 
and will be explained further in Chapter 6. 
 
In the evolution of human rights and security in international politics the birth of the 
concept of human security broaden the understanding of the focus of analysis of 
security in general. In fact, “the human security agenda made significant inroads to 
international public policy and social science scholarship, and was an explicit driver of 
the ATT” (Stavrianakis, 2019, p.75). Human security, its origins and evolution will be 
further discussed in chapter 2. In the meantime, it important to point that there exists 
a clear divide between those scholars that feel that human security is a distinct 
evolution from previous explanations of state centric security and therefore a gain for 
instruments like the ATT (Garcia, 2014; Garcia, 2015; Bolton and James, 2014) and 
those that believe that human security is not dissimilar from previous security 
understandings and actually in many ways it is an accommodation with state 
militarism (Cooper and Mutimer, 2011; Cooper, 2011; Stavrianakis, 2019). This 
because human security has lost its way, specially in relation to arms control where 
arms are controlled from below but with the logic of militarism from above (Turner et 
al., 2010). This divide helps to appreciate the nature of this thesis´ argument, 
especially when speaking about states giving rights whilst controlling the means of 
violence. Theoretically, the definition of this hypothesis, as explained in the previous 
paragraphs differs from human security in the next way.  
 
First of all, it is important to consider that there is more than one definition of human 
security and because of this its critics have been wary to fully consider it (Paris, 2001). 
Second of all, it is true that that human security has aimed to change how security is 
seen and more importantly who should lead it. It has altered the state as sole owner 
of security, however because of its nature it has been used to accommodate certain 
beliefs. Finally, although “human security has chipped away at some of the most 
egregious manifestations of militarism it has been silent on others, and proved to be 
an accommodation with global militarism in its various forms”(Stavrianakis, 2019, 
p.75). When comparing human security to Cooper and Mutimer´s concept of 
controlling the means of violence, the latter considers embedded militarism, whilst 
human security does not (Cooper and Mutimer, 2011; Stavrianakis, 2019). Human 
security has been criticised for being complacent with a military agenda where the 
state is the key and only actor, as opposed to CMV and how it will be used in the case 
studies. In this context, what states give rights whilst controlling the means of violence 
is trying to do is to elucidate what goes on behind the screen. That is, what other 
actors, non-state and those related to the state or within the state, do to promote 
cultures of peace and take actions in a global-local manner. With only the human 
security lens, and its embedded militarism, states have the key and only role in 
advancing the law, by adding the CMV lens, then other actors seek peace whilst 
pushing for greater advancement on law implementation from the bottom –up. These 
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different perspectives will be seen throughout this thesis, through its actors, like ATT 
Monitor in the Control Arms case, the special advocates, the Appeal Court and CAAT 
in the UK case, or like the SV and Redd Barna in the Norway case. Effectively this is 
what the human rights and security relationship represents in each case: how non-
state actors balance out state action that is based largely on material interests. 
Material interests of state actors tend to overcome moral interests, where moral 
interests are almost always tainted with materiality creating false moral interests. 
Human security tends to be concerned with the material aspects of the human rights 
and security relationship, whilst this thesis with the CMV lens allows for a further 
focus into moral issues and the moral constellation of the relationship, its actors and 
its interspace. Examples of how moral quality will be juxtaposed with materiality will 
be found throughout the case studies and their construction of each cases human 
rights and security relationship.  
 
As will become evident throughout this thesis, but in particular within the theoretical 
explanation of chapters 2 and 3, this study focuses on moral action more so than it 
does on materiality. The aim of this being that moral action in constructivist theory 
lacks explanation and a genealogical overview of the human rights and security 
relationship will seeks to change this. Particularly, the concept of false morality and 
its link to other theoretical concepts, outside of constructivism, like organised 
hypocrisy, will built a perspective that will further elucidate the real nuances of 
morality and the way in which actors use it within the context of normative 
implementation of arms control instruments. As will be seen below, and also further 
into this thesis, morality as rationalised here will compensate for the limits and faults 
of constructivism, principally false morality.  
 
In the context of this thesis, false morality implies the use of a moral interests in the 
name of a further non-moral one, or simply moral interests used in a falsely moral 
way. The concept of false morality is inspired by several opposing concepts used 
throughout International Relations theory and beyond. First and foremost, false 
morality is morality based on Mill´s consequentialism where the use of morality 
without it being naturally moral or ethical leads to it being used as an ends to a mean, 
as a cloak for interests, therefore as being used falsely. This in opposition to a Kantian 
conception of morality, where actions derive from the action itself and not from the 
consequences it produces. Second, it could be seen as a combination of a Realist view 
of morality (Carr, 1945) and a Grotian/English School perspective of Hedley Bull (Bull, 
1977). For Carr, morality was seen only as a cloak for great power interests, while Bull 
criticised Carr for this cynical expression of interest and asked to focus on moral 
beliefs as influencing the entire evolution of the international society (Carr, 1945; Bull, 
1977; Hoffman, 1986). Bull believed that morality could not be generalized, due to 
the complexity of the situations in which states are involved in (Hoffman, 1986). This 
of course, based on states but used here as valuable for non-state actors given the 




Viewing morality, or false morality, under the umbrella of these opposing theoretical 
notions, leads to see differences and similarities to a well-known concept: Stephen 
Krasner´s organised hypocrisy (Krasner, 1999). Organised hypocrisy is originally used 
to acknowledge that sovereignty is in theory utopian but used as an instrument to 
achieve forceful mechanism where norms that have been institutionalized are 
vulnerable to material interests (Ibid.). Organised hypocrisy, “allows states and 
organisations to meet inherently contradictory normative demands simultaneously; 
thereby, can be seen as a safety valve that helps preserve the credibility of states and 
organisations, while at the same time preserving order within the international 
system”(Egnell, 2010, p.467). Actors, specifically states are inclined to pursue a logic 
of consequences as opposed to a logic of appropriateness. Krasner, through his 
organised hypocrisy, concludes that the international system is an environment 
where the logic of consequences is valued more that of appropriateness. The logic of 
consequence relates to a rationality where actions serve as efficient means to 
accomplish a clear target. The logic of appropriateness assumes that actors uphold 
norms because they are seen as natural, rightful, expected and legitimate (March and 
Olsen, 2011). This opposing concepts are precisely a similarity with the divergent 
views of Carr vs. Bull or Mill vs. Kant, explained above and therefore with false 
morality.  
 
To some extent false morality is a different way of reflecting upon organised 
hypocrisy, however the concept has also particularities that make it unique and a 
contribution to International Relations Theory, in particular to constructivist 
weaknesses in the realm of arms control. False morality springs first and foremost 
from a philosophical understanding of utilitarian consequentialism as opposed to 
deontology. This allows for the concept to be in tune with the human rights tradition, 
as this tradition is embedded in both concepts (Langlois, 2009b). Moreover, it focuses 
directly on International Relations by standing within realism represented by Carr and 
Grotian society represented by Bull. False morality, as will be appreciated throughout 
the case studies in this thesis, exists within a spectrum and is based upon the 
appreciation of actor´s moral and material interests in a detailed manner which allow 
for a deeper recognition of its source and its development. False morality, focuses on 
actors within the realm of arms control, mainly on a constructivist understanding of 
it. In the literature, Krasner´s organised hypocrisy has already been used to specifically 
relate to arms control by Susan Hansen and Nicholas Marsh and by Richard Perkins 
and Eric Neumayer (2015; 2010). Nonetheless, in constructivist work it has not been 
used. Hypocrisy on its own does figure in constructivist accounts as “a mechanism on 
the road to compliance with norms” (Price, 2008, p.205) within the setting of the 
Power of Human Rights (Risse et al., 1999; Risse et al., 2013). The issue is that 
hypocrisy leaves much to desire, in the way it is used in constructivism. This because 
“condoning it must be delicate, lest it contribute to a culture that undercuts the very 
ontological basis of moral change”(Price, 2008, p.205). Also, because constructivist 
norms literature requires “a move beyond interests-based explanations” 
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(Stavrianakis, 2016 referring to: Price, 2008; Florini, 1996; Sikkink, 1998).5 Although 
then, false morality is based on the comparison of moral and material interests it does 
move beyond these by interlocking with controlling the means of violence and 
therefore including a more radical and inclusive form of global-local action to reduce 
the embedded militarism of the Arms Trade Treaty. Also, organised hypocrisy 
originally focuses on sovereignty whereas false morality focuses on moral aspects of 
terminological power. 
 
Because of the nature of the human rights and security relationship and its state and 
non-state actors, its interspace and its elements, that fall within a spectrum, 
contingency and complexity accompany many of the claims made in this thesis.6 This 
is precisely because of this nature, but also due to a contingent view within 
constructivist theory. Also, as will be explained further below, contingency appeals to 
this thesis´s methodology and analytical framework based on genealogy. 
 
Oliver Kessler recently claimed that contingency is actually at the core of 
constructivists theories because “norms are not the starting point of constructivism, 
but a specific solution to the problem of contingency” (Kessler, 2016, p.50).7 This 
belief stems from the literature where constructivist theory in international relations 
states from: Nicholas Onuf´s work.8 Onuf states, in an effort to counter-act positivists 
accounts, that contingency is utilized as the co-constitution of human beings and 
societies, because people make societies and societies make people (Onuf, 2012; 
Kessler, 2016). Onuf´s conceptual framework of rules and rule intermediates and 
allows us to trace the constructions of social relations (Onuf, 2012; Onuf, 2009). 
Another major exposer of constructivist theory, Alexander Wendt, also touches upon 
contingency. For him, contingency is only through interaction within the parts that 
identity is formed and cultures merge (Wendt, 1999). Further along the constructivist 
scholars, Friedrich Kartochwill is interested in contingency and how it is created and 
how the structure of exchange of reasoning is formed (Kratochwil, 1989). “Neither 
Kratochwil nor Onuf are primarily interested in ‘norms’ in themselves, rather they use 
norms to open IR up for social and political theory… hence, their aim is not to test the 
validity of norms empirically, but to ask how – through a critical engagement with 
speech act theory – norms relate to contingency and thus to rule”(Kessler, 2016, 
p.52). In this sense, norms are not the starting point of constructivism, contrary to 
 
5 Under Marxist theory, Stavrianakis mentions that in order to move away from this she makes more robust the 
concept of liberal militarism (Stavrianakis, 2016).  
6 By contingent I refer to Kessler´s definition of single contingency: “contingency is familiar to anyone acquainted 
with the notion of ‘rational choice’, it refers to the way in which one actor has to make an informed decision in 
the face of a contingent reality” (Kessler, 2016) 
7 Kessler, makes a further division within contingency between single, double and triple contingency. Double 
contingency is also known as inter-subjectivity and is the one that Wendt and Kratochwill refer to. For purposes 
of this thesis all contingencies are englobed into one.  
8 Coincidentally, it is also where a great understanding of how the human rights and security relationship is 
constructed stands.  
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popular belief, but they are a solution to contingency because contingency tends to 
accumulate and therefore law is a “method for controlling contingency” (Onuf, 2009, 
p.375). Thus, this thesis´s outcomes result contingent because they are based upon a 
theory that by default has a contingent nature. This can be seen further within the 
definition of the human rights and security relationship at the end of chapter 2. Also, 
below, when methodology and analytical framework are explained, it will become 
apparent that genealogy has also a contingent basis.  
 
Methodology and analytical framework  
 
The method used in this thesis will be content analysis. Content analysis, is currently 
living its second wave in International Relations and it consists on analyzing 
documents and communication artifacts- like speeches, graphics and data in general- 
to address research questions in a robust and systematic manner (Pashakhanlou, 
2017). The current method of content analysis combines quantitative, qualitative, 
manual, and computer- assisted analyses which allow for a fully integrated manner of 
addressing demanding research questions (Ibid.). I will study White Papers, Treaties, 
speeches, data on diverse topics taken from diverse research institutions, content 
within webpages of pertinent actors, etc. Also, some interviews were carried out, to 
further clarify certain actors’ actions and to add on to a better understanding of the 
research question. 
 
Interviews validated the empirical understanding from this thesis and therefore below 
is a reflection on their research design. Four interviews were carried out, via skype. 
The interviewees were selected because of their relation to the case, weather as 
crucial part in the actor´s campaign and/or due to their knowledge and understanding 
of the actor and the Treaty. Initially I would have liked to have one interviewee per 
case study, however I realised that what I was particularly interested was the way in 
which these actors´ interacted with international law and the dynamics in between. 
Because of this, it became difficult to identify which individuals where at the forefront 
and therefore not as contactable. Unfortunately, I ran into other access issues. These 
issues span from the fact that my funding did not cover these and therefore finding 
interviews that could only be carried out through phone or video calls became a 
challenge. Other access matters came with the case study of chapter 5, Control Arms. 
I met with one the organisation´s assessors at a talk in the University of Bath. He 
offered his card and to contact via email. After emailing him and his assistant several 
times for a more detailed talk, I never received a response. Nevertheless, I did have 
several successful cases. When discussing the Arms Trade Treaty to validate chapter 
4, I was fortunate to have the help of one of my supervisors who knew former ATT 
President Klaus Korhonen who then got me in touch with the Policy Support Officer 
at the ATT Secretariat, Sarah Parker. For chapter 6, I talked to Ann Feltham, 
Parliamentary Coordinator for Campaign Against the Arms Trade and for chapter 7, I 
spoke with Irene Dotterud-Flaa, Senior Advocacy Adviser for Redd Barna, or Save the 
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Children Norway. All specialists were interviewed in a semi-structured manner next 
described.  
 
A semi-structured interview guided the process in a way that research questions were 
planned but allowed conversational aspects to be incorporated to explore additional 
details. Also, it became useful to supplement and add depth to my research 
(Newcomer et al., 2015). The planning of the research questions was based upon the 
main argument presented on this thesis, especially taking into consideration the 
human rights and security relationship.  
 
Not all the questionnaires looked the same, “every interview and focus group 
required its own preparation, thought and practice”(Longhurst, 2003, p.106). I made 
the conscious decision to modify the interview questions and agenda depending on 
who I was interviewing, in order to allow the flexibility that the semi-structured 
interview carries (Newcomer et al., 2015). I created a flexible agenda and prepared 
for unexpected turns, as adviced (Ibid., p.498). In most questions I wanted to give the 
interviewee a chance to give me his/her point of view without influencing their 
answers through charged questions. This in reference to literature on semi-structured 
interviews where “the interviewer prepares a list of predetermined questions, semi-
structured interviews unfold in a conversational manner offering participants the 
chance to explore issues they feel are important”(Longhurst, 2003, p.103). Before 
starting the questions, I would give a small overview of my research and hypothesis, 
again without giving too much away or influencing the interviewee´s way of 
answering. I focused on having prompts ready to allow for the interview to flow 
(Leech, 2002, pp.667–668). In some cases, like Sarah Parker, I stuck to my questions 
and there was not that much left to have an unstructured discussion. In other cases, 
like Irene Dotterud-Flaa, the discussion carried on which then led to her sharing data 
bases of Redd Barna´s research for a better understanding of the case study.  
 
While I interviewed them I wrote down their answers and also recorded them in case 
I needed to go back. During the analysis and interpretation phase of the interview, 
and basing on the fact that semi-structured interviews are flexible then my analysis 
became flexible and a hybrid between a structured report and a non-structured one 
(Newcomer et al., 2015, p.505). I came to the realization that my argument on how 
states give rights whilst controlling the means of violence was being confirmed. All 
the interviews gave me food for thought, at least in the sense of proving my argument. 
However, two cases, due to their semi-structured nature, resulted in a clear 
contribution towards the analysis of my argument. Specifically, in the further research 
that they enticed me to do. In the interview with Ann Feltham, I learned more about 
the special advocates and about the close court sessions. The talk with Ann Feltham, 
gave me good pointers as to finding out more about the special advocates that later 
became part of my mixed actors for the case study in chapter 6.  
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In my interview with Irene Dotterud-Flaa, also allowed me to interpret Norway´s case 
study better. I found out more about the dynamic between an NGO and the 
government and an NGO and the SV. Also, because the research I had done on the 
topic was in English or with Google Translate translations of Norwegian reports I had 
the chance to confirm or further expand my thoughts on why the government did the 
halt of arms. The interview allowed me to settle that my thought of Norway 
consistently aiming to abide by European and global diplomatic, military and strategic 
standards was true. Also, to confirm and further investigate the position the 
government has sought to have with respect to the UN. I believe that these interviews 
enriched and validated my understanding and my thoughts of the case studies, but it 
also gave me leads to carry out further research that proved valuable to the strength 
of my argument.      
 
Genealogy linked with constitutive causation will be used as the analytical framework. 
Genealogy, as explained below is different from historical narration because it allows 
for contingency (Bevir, 2008) and therefore mixes well with this thesis´s main 
theoretical stands: constructivism. This in Onuf´s sense of the ever-changing, and 
therefore contingent, nature of International Relations and in the sense that norms 
are actually a solution for contingency within constructivist theory, as explained 
above. It also connects well with the nature of the human rights and security 
relationship, as will be seen throughout this thesis, and with the deconstructive and 
constructive dynamics represented in the case studies. The following paragraphs 
detail the importance of genealogy and the tensions, focuses and the causal analysis 
required for the development of this thesis.  
 
Genealogy, by its name, can be understood as a historical narration. This depends 
upon which focus is given to the concept of historical narration. For example, historian 
Hayden White classifies it as “generally poetic, and specifically linguistic, in 
nature”(White, 1973, p.xxix). Genealogy as used in this thesis is far from focusing on 
poetry or literature. However, a genealogy is a historical narrative in that it explains 
an aspect of humanity by showing how it came into being (Bevir, 2008). Genealogy as 
historical narrative does not necessarily have a clear origin, but it has been correlated 
largely to Friedrich Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals (Nietzsche, 1887) and more 
recently Michel Foucault´s Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1979). For these authors, 
genealogy serves by “exposing the contingent and shameful origins of cherished ideas 
and entrenched practices”(Bevir, 2008). According to Mark Bevir, genealogy is 
actually something further than historical narration but actually an expression of 
radical historicism, rejecting both appeals to transcendental truths and principles of 
unity or progress in history and embracing nominalism, contestability and most 
importantly for this thesis: contingency (Bevir, 2008). Contingency appeals to 
genealogy (or radical history) because it cannot explain change by focusing on set 
principles. History, then becomes a series of contingent events, open to contestability 
and suggesting that there are countless ways in which an action may be interpreted. 
Due to contingency, genealogy and those who practice it continually question. This 
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does not mean that by questioning there is a rejection or a denial of its validity, unless 
it is actually incompatible with recognition of its own particularity. Both Nietzsche and 
Foucault search for contingency and complexity. Foucaldian genealogy, especially as 
used in International Relations, appeals to the use of questions in certain ways, as 
explained below by Srdjan Vucetic. Foucault´s work can be actually seen as 
developmental historicism, as opposed to a radical one, and studies of 
governmentality often owe more to modernist sociology than to genealogy 
(Biebricher, 2008).  
 
Genealogy in IR, has been used since the early 1990s (Campbell, 1992; Bartelson, 
1995; Price, 1995; Jackson, 2006; Vucetic, 2011; etc) based on Michel Foucault´s work, 
specially his early “archaeological” analysis of discourse and discursive regimes, his 
later work, a more explicitly “genealogical” study of power/knowledge relations and 
governmentality, and finally his examination of processes of  “ethics,” focusing on 
sexuality (Foucault, 1972, 1973, 1979, 1980, 1985 in Clifford, 2018). As a 
methodology, genealogy is deeply entrenched in construction and deconstruction and 
therefore in the constructivist theory by focusing on conceptions bound to discursive 
order and on the creation or “genesis of modern political identity” through a historical 
analysis of its constitution and emergence (Clifford, 2001, p.151). Political genealogy, 
as used in the social sciences, traces the forgotten origins of our present in the 
institutions of government and the forms of identity constructed therein (Clifford, 
2018). Genealogy is political because it focuses on the established ideas and 
institutions of traditional theory, like government, power, freedom, rights, etc 
(Clifford, 2018). In its effects, genealogy is also political, by revealing the historical 
contingency of established values and practices and with it destabilizing the 
mechanisms of government (Ibid.). This creates a deconstruction that traces the roots 
of identities and reveals the historical contingencies of emergence (Ibid.). In IR, a 
genealogical methodology is equipped to carry multiple narratives, because it can 
simultaneously be “political, ontological, epistemological and ethical” (Vucetic, 2011, 
p.1312) and because by reshaping and expanding the terms of debate, it enables 
different questions to be asked, enlarging the space of legitimate contestation (Rose, 
1999 in Clifford, 2018).  
 
When seeking to understand the human rights and security relationship and the 
particularities that implementation of the ATT reflects about the relationship, 
genealogy becomes an effective method of analysis. This is because of the 
constructivist nature of the relationship and the range of values that give it its 
meaning. Genealogy will give the human rights and security relationship its genesis 
and identity through a historical, cultural and social analysis of its constitution of each 
state and non-state actor in each of the cases presented in this study. This framework 
of analysis will allow to see the constructedness and deconstructedness of the 
relationship, through the revelation of the roots and historical contingencies of the 
nexus of moral and material interests that conform each actors` particular 
relationship. However, because of the further inquisitive nature of the research 
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question of this study and due to the causal foundation that constructivist theory of 
IR is based upon, constitutive causation is needed to further complete the analytical 
framework of study.  
 
Genealogy will respond to questions like “how did X get here?” or “how did Y become 
possible?” (Foucault, 1980 in Vucetic, 2011, pp. 1302–1303). In doing so, the answers 
will be inclined towards a causal analysis. Causal and non-causal analytical approaches 
have been part of IR theory for many years, according to some scholars (Hollis and 
Smith, 1990). Constructivism has been set to the side of non-causality (Ibid.). This has 
affected constructivism which has resulted in various explanations to prove 
otherwise. Milja Kurki (2006, 2008)  argues that the reason causality has been rejected 
is due to an uncritical acceptance of the Humean conception of causation and that it 
needs to be broken to reach a more holistic and encompassing understanding of 
causal relations in IR.9 Kurki concludes that constructivists have actually not yet 
rejected causality, but do see norms as constitutive and not as causal (Koslowski and 
Kratochwil, 1994). For her, Alexander Wendt is the only openly constructivist theorist 
to have made efforts to understand causation (Wendt, 1998), although he placed 
causal and constitutive in parallel sections. Today, more constructivists are further 
understanding causation and seeing it in both a constitutive and causal way. Richard 
Lebow (2009) has developed constitutive causation, that directs attention to the 
social processes and interactions, confluences, accidents and agency that mediate 
between them and the outcomes that interest us (Ibid.). Lebow´s constitutive 
causality directs our attention to the mechanisms by which causes have effects and 
like Kurki, have a more comprehensive cause than the Humean conception. Lebow´s 
approach heightens our sensitivity to causal chains and provides an analytical 
framework for studying them (Ibid., p.5). Constitutive causality has the potential to 
lead us step-by-step to ‘deep’ causes of political outcomes (i.e., identities and other 
frames of reference), and forward again to an ever-widening, more comprehensive 
search for connections and causes (Ibid., p. 5). Like this, a much richer method to this 
study is set: founded on following content analysis method with an analytical 
framework based on genealogical constitutive causality that will allow for a holistic 
view and will coincide with constructivist theory to give a fuller approach to answer 
my research question.  
 
The genealogical constitutive analysis of the human rights and security relationship 
will pave the way for a unique contribution to the field of International Relations and 
particularly to constructivist theory, as it is “never finished product” (Onuf, 1989). 
First and foremost, I will add a new, more defined view of the human rights and 
 
9 According to Kurki: “The question that Hume was grappling with was “how can we really say we know 
anything for certain, how can we justify science and knowledge?”. For Hume the solution to the 
problem of knowledge lies in recognising that all knowledge arises purely from experience; the bases 
of knowledge and the limits of our knowledge are defined by what our perceptions transmitted to us” 
(Kurki, 2008, p.34). It is important to mention that David Hume´s work is not delved in its entirety due 
to lack of space and also to the focus of this thesis.   
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security relationship that will give it strength and preponderance to understand the 
relationship as a whole, as opposed to separately. What will be gained from this view 
will be a more holistic perspective, with a deeper genealogical analysis that considers 
all the possible causes, from different realms of reality, different levels of analysis and 
from different sources. Also, a better view of the continuing deconstruction-
construction process of actors` actions and with it, a better predictability of the 
situation´s future. This because, similarly to what Sasse concludes in relation to the 
security-rights nexus (2005, p. 689), the recognition of the human rights and security 
relationship will aid in the further development of the interpretation and further 
implementation of the norm. This will aid those actors who are interested in 
advancing the norm, whether directly or indirectly. I will add onto the literature of IR 
by going beyond previous studies of human rights and security norms to focus directly 
on the human rights security nexus. I will encompass existing constructivist theory to 
understand the nexus of key material and moral interests that compose the human 
rights and security relationship and define further the implementation of the ATT. The 
analysis of actors, state and non-state, will also further contribute to viewing the 
overall implementation dynamics of a human rights and security norm with a clear 
human rights and security lens.  
 
I use the genealogical approach as a way of problematizing the relationship between 
human rights and security and how the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty is 
understood through this lens. Genealogy allows me to see the deconstructive and 
constructive nature of the relationship, the actors and the dynamics that take place 
in between solid, permeable and semi-permeable boundaries. The construction and 
contingency of morality in relation to structured and un-structured forces that 
surround the human rights and security relationship are better understood through a 
genealogical set of questions that connect to causality and to multilayer definitions of 
the relationship itself. Therefore, genealogy is important because as a philosophical 
stance it conceptualizes the problem between human rights and security in its ever- 
changing and construed way.  
 
Genealogy as an analytical framework will be operationalised first through how the 
chapters are divided and how I go about explaining the human rights and security 
relationship, through how I divided the philosophical and theoretical, and in many 
ways historical, views of human rights and security whether within International 
Relations or otherwise. It is also operationalised simply by relating contingency as an 
element that coincides in both genealogy and constructivism. That is, methodology, 
analytical framework and theoretical stance work in unison. Also, by the division, for 
example in chapter 3 into the interspace and then the actors and interactions of the 
relationship and by englobing the background with a chapter on the actual 
mechanisms and implementing particularities of the Arms Trade Treaty in chapter 4. 
Furthermore, the genealogical methodology will be operationalised in the empirical 
chapters by the way each of these was divided in a similar fashion: setting of the 
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challenge, then the construction of moral and material interests and the particular 
overlap of the human rights and security relationship.  
  
In a more detailed way, the methodology will be operationalised by utilising its 
contingent nature and applying it to the case studies. This was achieved through 
questioning: “how did X get here?” or “how did Y become possible?” (Foucault, 1980 
in Vucetic, 2011, pp. 1302–1303). The answers to these questions brought about a 
causal analysis, that along with the contingency of genealogy and the contingent 
nature of constructivism followed results that landed along the spectrum of the 
human rights and security relationship. These internal questions and their results gave 
hence to answering the main research question set for this thesis.  
 
Also, the types of actors that have been found and defined throughout this work, like 
mixed actors, in chapter 5 and 6, or within state actors, in chapter 7, show the 
genealogical result of the analytical framework used, particularly in their contingent 
nature as well as in the multilayerness of actors and activities and in the semi-
permeated boundaries of state and non-state actors in norm dynamics. The same can 
be said for the way in which false morality developed in each case study. In chapter 
5, Control Arms through the ATT Monitor Project was found to be flirting with false 
morality and therefore displaying the complexity and contingency of morality. In 
chapter 6, mixed actors and the state as a non-unitary entity intertwine to emphasize 
the complexity of state actors utilising false morality to give rights whilst controlling 
the means of violence. In chapter 7, within state actors and state actors use a 
paradoxical morality deeply related to a certain model of approaching civil society 
within the state. The above will better detailed within the framework of each case 
study. Through a genealogical and constitutive causal analysis, the evolution of 
changes and the tension between state and non-state actors within the realm of the 
human rights and security relationship became apparent and allowed for the 
nuisances of NGOs and other actors involved in treaty implementation, directly or 
indirectly, to show. By operationalising through questioning actors and their nexus of 
moral and material interests where demonstrated to be ever-changingly constructed 
and therefore, contingent. As will be seen by the end of this thesis, a genealogical 
advancement within a constructivist theory will demonstrate the hypothesis that 
states give rights whilst controlling the means of violence. 
 
Description of chapters  
 
The chapters described below will touch upon the delineated contributions of this 
study. This thesis is divided into two main parts: theoretical and case studies. 
Theoretically and in order to coincide with constructivist theory, I will begin by 
deconstructing the human rights and security relationship. Chapter 2 will do so by 
concentrating on the genealogy of security and human rights. I will delve on the 
threat-safety axis that puts the two ideas together and further connects with 
sovereignty. I will look at the evolution of the axis by engaging with IR topics like the 
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Responsibility to Protect and human security. The understanding of the universality 
and cultural relativism will come into play followed by the views of 20th century 
philosophers. Human rights norms and security norms tied to human rights will clarify 
the birth of humanitarian norms as well as the evolution of human rights within 
International Relations theory. This chapter will end with the reconstruction of the 
two concepts and how it leads to defining the human rights and security relationship. 
Chapter 3 will be about continuing the deconstruction of the interspace and the type 
actors involved in the human rights and security relationship. First it will focus on the 
interspace in relation to arms control, specifically in humanitarian security regimes, 
disarmament diplomacy, contemporary arms control, controlling the means of 
violence, humanitarian arms control and finally small arms and light weapons. 
Second, this chapter will focus on the key agents for the advancement of the 
relationship. Firstly, by looking at state´s actions in dialogue, then by explaining TANs. 
The rise in importance of non-state actors will become apparent and with it the 
explanatory parts focused on global civil society and global governing through 
multilateral arms control. Chapter 4 sits somewhere in between theory and practice 
and it will be dedicated to the ATT and the theory that surrounds it. This chapter is an 
opportunity to understand how the treaty came into being and how its 
implementation or lack thereof works. This chapter delves into the practicality of the 
Treaty and focuses on explaining its inner workings. This will be crucial for 
understanding subsequent chapters.     
 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 are the case study chapters. Three cases have been chosen: an 
NGO pushing for Treaty fulfilment, a large arm exporting state being held 
accountable, for apparent fail to implement the Treaty, by an independent NGO, and 
a small arm exporting state intertwined with state and non-state actors to achieve 
Treaty implementation. They have been chosen to exemplify important sides of the 
argument presented on this thesis and to shed light on how the human rights and 
security relationship involves actors beyond the state, and beyond the international 
level of analysis. The different combination of actors in each case will also allow to 
appreciate how the nexus between moral and material interests are used as handles 
to construct, subconsciously or consciously, norm implementation dynamics.  Chapter 
5, focuses on the NGO/TAN created alongside the ATT, Control Arms and its role as 
norm implementer of the ATT. The interests of the member states of the Treaty are 
also taken into consideration. Control Arms was chosen, due to the influencing role it 
has obtained in the Arms Trade Treaty implementation. This chapter will first centre 
on the methods and mechanism that Control Arms uses to achieve implementation 
of the ATT through the ATT Monitor reports. Then it will focus on the moral and 
material interests that the organisation is constructing with particular emphasis on its 
reformist nature. The final part of this chapter establishes a figure of the particular 
overlay of the human rights and security relationship alongside its implications. This 
study on Control Arms, will aid in the genealogical understanding of the evolution of 
the human rights and security relationship, and how the particular overlap that this 
NGO creates demonstrates that a non- state actor exerts pressure on the relationship 
 31 
and therefore onto the actors it is involved with. In this context, Control Arms-ATT 
Monitor shows that the human rights and security relationship is recognized but still 
in the midst of improving the control over the means of violence. Importantly, chapter 
5 will introduce and define the concepts of norm implementer and false morality that 
will be used to describe actors and action in the rest of the empirical chapters.  
 
Chapter 6 is the implementation of the ATT in a large arm exporting state: the UK. The 
case explicitly focuses on the 2017 decision of the High Court and the 2019 appeal on 
arms exporting to Saudi Arabia. A local NGO, aided by other local and international 
NGOs, led the race against the UK government to seek to stop the arms exports to 
Saudi Arabia given its direct effect on the Yemen War. This case was chosen, due to 
the particular characteristics that the actor has, like being a champion of the ATT 
during its creation whilst choosing to ignore its precepts and preponderate domestic 
interests, in the case of arms exporting to Saudi Arabia.10 This case also demonstrates, 
that states give rights whilst controlling the means of violence. This case, also favours 
the contribution on TANs that develop within domestic boundaries and defend, 
whether consciously or subconsciously, an international norm and therefore the 
human rights and security relationship. Explicitly, the first part of this chapter will 
explain the details and the constitutive causality of the High Court decision of 2017 
and the 2019 appeal, led by Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT).11 The second part 
centres on the nexus of material and moral interests that are ever-changing and 
constantly intertwined. It will explain the state´s false morality, as well as the morality 
of civil society needed to balance out the human rights and security relationship. It 
will also, focus on the nexus and how it is largely defined by answering to the question 
of why states export arms despite belonging to IHL/HRL instruments, like the ATT. The 
final part focuses on the figure of the particular overlap of the human rights and 
security relationship. It will highlight the importance of norm implementation 
dynamics and the denominated norm implementers, that in this case are either 
transformative NGOs or indirectly mixed non-state and state actors.  
 
Chapter 7 focuses on a small arms exporter, Norway and on the state and non-state 
actors that aid in Treaty implementation. As these actors construct and are 
constructed by global and local mechanisms and social interactions, the intricate 
intertwined set of reasons becomes apparent. This is what the case of Norway, and 
the halt of sales to Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, will exemplify. Norway was 
chosen because it represents state actors that explicitly hold the human rights and 
security relationship whilst holding their moral and material interests in an apparent 
parallel position. Norway´s worldwide peacemaker and peacebuilding reputation and 
its involvement with regional and international institutions feed its security, foreign 
policy and military strategies and give it a particular position to apply the ATT. 
 
10 Which are in many ways found in other large exporting countries like Germany or even the US. This 
especially given the recent Kashoggi case and the partial halt of US military aid to Saudi Arabia. 
11 CAAT is not the only UK NGO with interests in the HC decision, as will be seen in the chapter.  
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Although it is not one of the larger exporters of arms, its policies have allowed for it 
to become a specific actor in security and peace measure. Also, its peculiar way of 
managing non-state actors´ funding gives Norwegian NGOs a peculiar role in the 
human rights and security relationship. This case will show the implications of how a 
diverse composition of actors, actions, and the background of both conclude in a 
particular overlap of the human rights and security relationship. All in all, Norway´s 
idiosyncrasies are what will be explained in this chapter and directly and indirectly co-
related to the vision of giving rights while still controlling the means of violence. The 
first part of this chapter centres on the analysis of the implementation of ATT, whilst 
explaining the issue. To do so, Norway´s military strategy will be elucidated and the 
role of within- state actors as norm implementers will be introduced. Also, the special 
role of a reformative NGO, Redd Barna, in achieving the halt of arms will be studied. 
The second part of this chapter will focus upon Norway´s moral and material interests 
based on its identity. Paradoxical false morality will also be explained. The Norwegian 
Model and how it is all reflected upon Norway´s interests will be mentioned. The final 
part of this chapter concentrates on the figure that particular overlap that the set case 
has created for the human rights and security relationship. Lastly, this part will also 
explain the constitutively causal implication of this overlap locally and globally over 
the ATT.  
 
Finally, chapter 8 will draw the conclusions and present the findings of this thesis. 
Without giving much away, it can be said that, after exploring the human rights and 
security relationship amongst diverse actors that implement the ATT, the relationship 
is multilayered and complex. All through these cases, it can be appreciated how 
diverse actors have contributed to the deconstruction and construction of the 
relationship. This is in turn contributing to the evolution of the norm. The co-creation 
of the relationship by actors involved at an international and domestic level has 
exemplified the continuous exchange between structure and agency needed for the 




















 Today, if one gives close attention, it is barely possible to conceive security 
without rights or rights without security, at least in International Relations.12 This 
union stems from current conscious and subconscious efforts from diverse state and 
non-state actors to continue valuing human rights more than in the past. These efforts 
are, in many ways, born from the norm cascade caused by contemporary 
humanitarian and human rights and security norms, like the First Geneva 
Convention.13 These efforts, are also part of a silent unguided campaign to strengthen 
equality among the concepts. More importantly, these efforts are the result of a 
constructed socialization that has been evolving for centuries. Precisely this 
construction leads to wonder where and when it all started? Was there even a start, 
and exact point in time and place where security and human rights collided? This point 
is hard to define, however it is not impossible to trace back and genealogically 
speaking study the evolution of the relationship.  
 
The genealogical journey of the human rights and security relationship, that this 
chapter will carry out, is composed of the evolution of both ideas separately but also 
united. The genealogical framework will be operationalised in this chapter, by 
focusing on how the human rights and security relationship became possible. This will 
exhibit the contingent and constructive nature of both the methodology used and the 
actual relationship. It will also correlate to the contingent nature of constructivist 
theory as explained in Chapter 1. Interestingly, as will be seen throughout this 
chapter, even when studied isolated there is some underlying contiguity. The previous 
chapter introduced the notion of the human rights and security relationship and the 
characteristics that surround it. The relationship was only briefly defined and 
 
12 Rights and security are conceived together, whether wanted or not. For example, Timo Kivimaki´s recent study 
on how in the past two decades Western military involvements in conflicts have been justified making reference 
to the protection of the rights and lives of the civilians involved. See more on (Kivimäki, 2019b) and on the data 
this book is based on (Kivimäki, 2019a).  
13 Norm cascade, is the second phase in the lifecycle of the norm described by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). The 
first stage, norm emergence or norm building (Ibid., pp. 896–901), focuses on where norms come from and which 
actors are involved, with what motives they act and what is the dominant mechanism they use. The actor at this 
stage is the norm entrepreneur that uses organizational platforms to obtain its task. The norm entrepreneur is an 
agent or group of agents that have strong notions about appropriate or desirable behaviour in their community 
(Ibid., p. 896). To reach the second stage, which is norm cascade, the norm needs to become institutionalized in a 
set of international rules; Finnemore and Sikkink have named this the tipping point (Ibid., pp. 900–901). This 
happens once the norm entrepreneurs have persuaded a critical mass of states to become norm leaders and adopt 
new norms (Ibid., p. 901). Up to the second stage, domestic changes have not really occurred. It is right after the 
tipping point and the adoption of the norm by the state that the norm cascade begins by contaigioning others into 
doing so. Finally, internalization, at the end of the norm cascade, achieves its task mostly through professional 
domestic actors like lawyers, doctors, economist- professionals in general-, and bureaucrats.  
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therefore, for better perception, it is necessary to approach the relationship and the 
concepts that compose it in a genealogical manner by analytically unpacking. The 
deconstruction of security and human rights as separate entities will bring to light 
how the two came to be understood, but also how both their roots are tied to safety. 
This is what this chapter intends to do in order to focus on the genesis of both 
concepts particularly in IR theory.14 First focusing on the threat-safety axis as what 
weaves the two ideas together and as part of the paradigms of security that aggregate 
to its meaning. The study of security sets the premises for the connection with other 
topics like sovereignty and how it has evolved in the particularly in the last decades. 
Another crucial link that brings the relationship between human rights and security 
together occurs in a much deeper manner: human security. The notion of human 
security will be seen as a segway between human rights and security. The concept will 
be unpacked which will lead to the unpacking of human rights as well.  
 
The genealogy of human rights, pertinent to understanding the human rights and 
security relationship, is composed by the evolution of them, particularly in an IR view. 
It is also composed, as will be also seen in this journey by their universality and cultural 
relativism, or lack thereof. The works of John Rawls will be studied in order to further 
understand universality, fairness, autonomy and their social constructedness. 
Furthermore, this chapter will focus on the recent evolution of the human rights and 
security relationship, but overall on the evolution of the separate entities and how 
they became, or always were, one. Human rights norms and security norms tied to 
human rights will be explained in the birth of humanitarian norms. This results 
especially important for norms like the Arms Trade Treaty are located at the interface 
of state security, international security and universal human rights. To further 
recognise this, a focus on the evolution of human rights in International Relations 
Theory will be given. Understanding realist, liberal and particularly constructivist 
views on human rights will allow to further see where the human rights and security 
relationship comes from but also it will set a basis for the analysis of the actors in the 
case studies presented in this thesis. Finally, this chapter will re-construct the 
deconstruction of the two ideas and begin the definition of the human rights and 
security relationship. This definition will also aid the analysis of the case study 
chapters.  
 
Tying security and human rights  
 
 Several ideas stemming from diverse philosophical and international relations 
theory link security and rights together. It cannot be said that these thoughts do so in 
 
14 It is important to mention that at times oversimplification of the explanations for concepts and theories 
surrounding security and human rights might be palpable, however, it is only so the focus can be on the 
construction of the human rights and security relationship. Also, theoretical stands belonging to the Realist, English 
School and International Society are used to explain paradigms of security, this is only to obtain a fully 
encompassed understanding of the concept and therefore of its constructiveness and its role in the human rights 
and security relationship.  
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an orderly fashion or that it is absolutely tangible, however they are definitely 
inherent to human rights, to security and to both. When the interweaving of human 
rights and security started is difficult to precise, but looking with a genealogical 
perspective at the historical philosophical aspects of the two sets the stage for a 
better understanding of their confinement. This section seeks to further understand 
how security and human rights are tied together and perhaps even how they are at 
times untied depending on the construction surrounding them.  
 
Safety, threat and the paradigms of security  
 
 As mentioned briefly in Chapter 1 both concepts in the human rights and 
security relationship are deeply connected by the word safety. This because, on the 
one hand, the contemporary Western notion of security stems from a chimeric 
combination of the ancient Athenians´ intention to prevent the destruction of their 
empire, of the religious connotations of the Roman securitas and of the Hobbesian 
intention to prevent civil war (Arends, 2008, p.263). On the other hand, human rights 
stand to avoid vulnerability of individuals by protecting and guaranteeing safety. A 
further step into the connection between human rights and security leads to the 
reasoning behind both concepts: threat. If individuals, or groups of them, would not 
feel threaten then the reasons for safety would subside. Threat is understood as a 
precondition and anchored in Thomas Hobbes´s notion of fear. In fact, rights, for 
Hobbes were an extension of the natural human desire for survival (Herbert, 2002). 
Survival, meant survival from the constant threat of war, were peace was only a pause 
in between wars. This perception of threat, and therefore of safety was born 
somewhere between the Renaissance and the Enlightenment in the midst of the 
philosophical detachment of philosophy from theology in the 17th Century, and 
became the basis for International Relations Theory, particularly for realist theory.   
 
To understand the concept of security in IR, it is fundamental to understand that it 
has evolved throughout the years and that it can be approached with three different 
focuses: national, international or personal/human/cosmopolitan. National security 
based is the realist approach, international security based is the rationalist and the 
one that views personal insecurity as an international problem is linked to the 
cosmopolitan approach (Jackson, 2000, pp.196–199).15 The concept of sovereignty is 
also very relevant for security, particularly for classic theories where the state is the 
principal carrier of security. There was a dramatic change that followed the birth of 
the nation-state, with the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. First there were 
kings, and sovereignty and therefore security entirely fell on his or her person. As 
centuries went by, sovereignty moved to the people and with it security too. The end 
of the 18th century, influenced by a threat like perception of security, represented a 
major break in these security traditions. The French Revolution and the American War 
of Independence, allowed sovereignty to be entirely dedicated to the state. The 
 
15 Jackson actually refers to these three paradigms as approaches to the ethics of security.  
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enlightenment had revealed that people gave the right to being secure to the state in 
order to receive protection. The 20th Century has been the cradle for change, and for 
some scholars security now revolves around humans as will be further developed in 
the subsequent part of this chapter.  
 
From a Hobbesian, realist perspective national security can be defined as the ability 
to withstand aggression from abroad (Luciani, 1988, p.151), threat from abroad.  A 
nation is secure to the extent that it is not in danger of having to sacrifice its values 
and engage in war (Walter Lippman in (Buzan, 2008)). The state provides national 
security by building and deploying armed forces for national defence and for the 
deterrence of any conceivable foreign threats (Jackson, 2000). States are the primary 
source of threat but also the primordial sources of security. Hobbesian threat, looks 
at the lack of protection as insecurity. Insecurity is a potential or actual threat, danger, 
or menace presented by other people, whether individuals or groups, internal or 
external (Jackson, 2000, p.189). With insecurity the vulnerability of living in society is 
identified and therefore the need for safety becomes a key condition of human 
relations (Jackson, 2000; Jackson-Preece, 2011). It also becomes a condition for the 
state to guarantee and provide safety, nationally and personally, primarily through 
the use of force via police and military power, secondarily through financial, industrial, 
organizational, technological, scientific, educational, and other instrumental means 
(Jackson, 2000). Safety is needed to enjoy the advantages of living in society, whilst 
limiting the risks that come with it. Hobbes response to counteract threat and obtain 
safety was the Leviathan, a sovereign that protects its people.16 The Leviathan would 
protect personal security through a security arrangement that would lead to a 
problem of national insecurity or international insecurity amongst states. This security 
dilemma, defined IR theory and continues to do so today. Hedley Bull’s anarchical 
society of states stems from this dilemma, were safety becomes the human condition 
and security means “no more than safety: either objective safety, meaning safety 
which actually exists, or subjective safety, meaning safety which is felt or experienced 
(Bull, 1977, p.18)”. 
 
From a rationalist point of view, the concept of security widened, long before it 
achieved a certain fashionability following the end of the Cold War; in the late 1970s 
the Independent Commission on International Development Issues (ICIDI), chaired by 
former West German chancellor Willy Brandt, had already generated a report 
discussing the matter (Hough, 2014, p.13). Further back, it was actually the covenant 
of the League of Nations was the precursor where a global society of states gained 
ground. Rationalism conceives that the international society should also provide 
 
16 There is a distinction to be made between personal and state security. Jennifer Jackson- Preece and Robert 
Jackson similarly describe the differences: personal security refers to individual safety from the threat of harm 
from others, whilst state security refers to the ability to protect itself from external threats, like intervention for 
example. Both ideas are related, although in practice security of the state does not always translate to personal 
one. See more: (Jackson-Preece, 2011; Jackson, 2000). Furthermore, Barry Buzan argues that security is 
interdependent and therefore cannot be isolated at any level (Buzan, 2008).    
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security. The sources of threat are within other member states, or member states, 
threat remains within the international society of states. The UN Charter is the 
assumption that within the international community, which all states belong to, 
norms are to be respected. International security can be seen as the general condition 
of peace, order and lawfulness within the society of states (Jackson, 2000). 
Furthermore, from a Kantian universalist point of view, security is focused on the 
person, where all individuals have universal rights to be safe and secure (Kant 2018 
(1790)). This so called cosmopolitan view is the basis of human security.  
 
Evolution of human rights and security in international politics: human security 
and R2P 
 
 In IR, the post- Cold War period brought ongoing debates over the issue of 
state sovereignty and intervention that led to wonder whether there had been a shift 
towards universality of rights. These debates explain the birth of the concept of 
human security. Human security has broadened security analysis from 
territorial/national security to the security of the people. It connects personal 
security, state security and security of society together. The idea behind human 
security comes from Immanuel Kant´s categorical imperative, where moral judgement 
is universal and from his Perpetual Peace where the importance and international and 
cosmopolitan preponderance of the security of individuals is highlighted: “Because a 
community widely prevails among Earth´s peoples, a transgression of rights in one 
place in the world is felt everywhere, consequently the idea of cosmopolitan rights is 
not fantastic and exaggerated, but rather an amendment to the unwritten code of 
national and international rights, necessary to public rights of men in general; only 
such amendment allows us to flatter ourselves with the thought that we are making 
continual progress towards perpetual peace (Kant 2003 (1795))”. Kant´s aim was to 
have human rights and security realized by governments worldwide, whilst the 
ultimate goal of principles of national security and international security is to 
contribute to the idea of a personal security based on a cosmopolitan conception of 
rights (Hernandez, 2018).  
 
The actual concept of human security sprung from the 1994 in the Human 
Development Report (HDR), published by the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP). Human security is defined in many different ways but according 
to HDR it “recognizes the interlinkages between peace, development and human 
rights, and equally considers civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights” 
(UNDP, 1994). Due to the mixed nature of its definitions, it seems capable of 
supporting virtually any hypothesis (Paris, 2001), which can be its success but also its 
demise. For some the concept may be seen as vague and prone to lose its strength 
when understanding security (Paris, 2001). However, the idea that individuals can be 
subjects of international law and that human rights should be an integral part of 
foreign policy and international relations has led to an increasing use of the human 
rights language in international politics as some authors claim (Schmitz and Sikkink, 
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2012, p.683). Currently human security is widely used in international relations 
because of its facility in explaining security without using the state as its main actor. 
Today, adopting the concept is seen as a radical and transformative move by 
supporters (Garcia, 2011; Williams et al., 2008; Thakur and Maley, 1999).  
 
In practice, human security has evolved in many ways, for example in the shift of the 
understanding of interventions and sovereignty. The end of the 20th Century 
witnessed great tragedies of human rights violations. The horrors in Rwanda, Somalia, 
the Balkans and East Timor triggered some states to realize that intervening and 
violating a states´ sovereignty was perhaps needed to save human lives. This time was 
also the eye opener for major cases of protracted refugees and internally displaced 
persons that were more difficult to reach and to get humanitarian aid. Sovereignty 
would have to be violated in order to reach those in need and so in 1997 the Guiding 
Principles on internal displacement were put into place; compiling the relevant 
human rights and humanitarian law to guide states. The works of Francis Deng and 
Roberta Cohen on these principles were key to the evolution of the responsibility to 
protect by placing sovereignty as responsibility, responsibility on part of the 
government to protect (Cohen, 1991; Deng, 1999). In 2001, the Canadian government 
played a key role in realizing that the concept of sovereignty perhaps needed to be 
revalued. Canada created the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS) which would see the birth of the concept of the responsibility to 
protect or R2P backed up by UN member states in 2005. R2P places responsibility on 
the state to protect individual security, human security. The state is to protect its 
citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. 
When a state fails to do so, because of lack of means or precisely because it itself is 
going through civil war, then the international community has the responsibility to 
protect those in need. This means that in extreme cases, a state´s sovereignty can be 
breached, in a non-military way, in order to protect the individuals’ human rights. R2P 
also provides a framework for the UN´s Security Council to be used as a last resort to 
prevent violent crimes and protect civilians. In the past 8 years, the UN´s Secretary 
General, through reports and resolutions, has expanded the measures the R2P covers 
and has called on States, NGOs and International organizations to follow them17.  
 
For some, R2P is: “the most dramatic normative development of our time” (Thakur 
and Weiss, 2009, p.22) or the pivotal document on the place of human rights in 
International Relations for others (Dunne and Hanson, 2009). However, it has been 
heavily criticized for what some understand as misuse. Roland Paris points out that: 
 
17 Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary-General 2009; Early warning, assessment 
and the responsibility to protect: Report of the Secretary-General (2010); The role of regional and sub-regional 
organizations in implementing the responsibility to protect: Report of the Secretary-General (2011); Responsibility 
to Protect: Timely and decisive response: Report of the Secretary-General (2012); Responsibility to protect: State 
responsibility and prevention (2013); Fulfilling our collective responsibility: international assistance and the 
responsibility to protect: Report of the Secretary-General (2014) (Ki-Moon, 2009; Ki-Moon, 2010; Ki-Moon, 2011; 
Ki-Moon, 2012; Ki-Moon, 2013). 
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(1) on one hand, if there is no intervention in the face of looming mass atrocities, R2P 
is likely to be criticized as phony or hollow, like in the case of Syria; (2) on the other 
hand, if a preventive operation is launched and achieves its initial goal of averting an 
atrocity, it is still likely to be judged harshly like in the case of Libya (Paris, 2014; Paris, 
n.d.). The third pillar upon which R2P is based that states military intervention as a 
last resort has caused major misunderstanding about its implementation. For 
example, some scholars and policy practitioners have highlighted the need for greater 
‘political will’ among leading countries to take decisive action to avert mass killings 
(Bellamy, 2009, 2009; Brown, 2010 in Paris, 2014). Others have called for improved 
criteria and processes to authorize the use of armed force for R2P purposes (Evans, 
2012; Pattison, 2010; Government of Brazil, 2011 in Paris, 2014;); or for the 
development of greater ‘institutional capacity’ within international and regional 
organizations and national governments for responding to such emergencies 
(Bellamy, 2013; Buchanan & Keohane, 2011; Morada, 2011; Zenko, 2004 in Paris 
2014). Finally, the success stories and criticisms of R2P evidence the fragility of the 
concept and point to its nature where human rights and security seemed to be 
intertwined. Despite this, R2P is important to consider first of all, because of its 
normative advancement, particularly within the boundaries of human rights 
protecting norms. Second, because the change in the conception of humanitarian 
intervention has allowed for a greater importance on non-state actors, like NGOs and 
International Organizations and their ability to protect of refugees and displaced 
persons. Human security, through R2P, has empowered non-state actors as a global 
civil society that is based on a cosmopolitan understanding of rights, security and the 
international state system.18  
 
Beyond Roland Paris´s criticism of human security and R2P, human security, as was 
explained in chapter 1 has divided scholars. Some see it as a clear evolution from 
previous explanations of state centric security (Garcia, 2014; Garcia, 2015; Bolton and 
James, 2014) and others see it as similar to previous ways of understanding security 
(Cooper and Mutimer, 2011; Cooper, 2011; Stavrianakis, 2019). Human security has 
been criticised for being accepting of the military agenda. What will be seen 
throughout this thesis, particularly in chapters 5,6 and 7, will be a sense of human 
security more aimed towards controlling the means of violence. This, to focus more 
on the efforts by actors to promote cultures of peace and take actions in a global-local 
manner.   
 
Universality and the cultural relativism of human rights  
 
 As discussed before, part of the basis for human security and therefore R2P is 
Kant´s universality that became the core of liberalism. This universality has been 
contested, particularly in the case of rights (see more in (Donnelly, 2003)). Conceiving 
 
18 The concept and theory behind the concept of global civil society will be further developed in the following 
chapter.  
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human rights as universal means that all states consider them firmly established part 
of international law and politics (Ibid.). This conception becomes difficult because of 
the cultural relativism that rights carry. Raymond John Vincent argues that because 
of cultural relativism, rights cannot be universal due to the fact that the non-Western 
world does not necessarily share Western values (Vincent, 1986, p.37). Cultural 
relativism is essentially an anthropological and sociological concept loosely grounded 
in the theory of moral relativism (Shestack, 1998, p.228). Cultural relativism entails 
that rules about morality vary from place to place.19 Vincent, claims that there is no 
universal morality, because the history of the world is the story of the plurality of 
cultures, and the attempt to assert universality, or even Kant's procedural principle of 
universalizability, as a criterion of all morality, is a more or less well-disguised version 
of the imperial routine of trying to make the values of a particular culture general 
(Vincent, 1986, pp.37–38). In Vincent´s eyes, this means that the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, and any further proclamations that this document has 
influenced, like the ATT, are not universal and exemplify the validity of imperialism 
having imposed its values onto others.      
 
Relativists, like Vincent, defend a cultural conditioning that supposedly reflects a set 
of wants and goods that members of disparate cultural groups share, and that may 
include various human rights goods, but are not wants and goods arrived at through 
individual choices or preserved for individuals in the community as a matter of right 
(Shestack, 1998, p.230). In this sense, cultural relativism cannot be dismissed, because 
many non- Western rulers have used it to rationalize repressive practices by claiming 
that the culture of their society accepts those practices over universalist international 
human rights prescriptions, and that to criticize their society's human rights practices 
is to impose Western cultural imperialism over their local culture (Shestack, 1998, 
p.231). However, John Finnis and Alison Renteln have in fact found that all human 
societies show concern for the value of life, truth, property, etc (Finnis, 1980; Renteln, 
1991). Alan Gewirth claims that some cultures may use the concept of right without 
having an actual word for it (Ball et al., 1989). Also, fundamental human rights 
principles have become universal by virtue of their entry into international law as jus 
cogens, customary law, or by convention (Shestack, 1998, p.233). 
 
Much of the dispute just mentioned has to be understood in the sense that 
universalism is at the core of liberalism which is central to the human rights tradition 
(Langlois, 2009a). Liberalism is in fact based upon Kant´s universalism, however it also 
based on John Stuart Mill´s work which is actually in opposition. Kant is considered a 
deontologist whilst Mill is considered a consequentialist. Deontologists judge morality 
by looking at its adherence to rules and therefore the morality of the right itself. Mill´s 
consequentialism views morality as the producer of the right kind of consequences, 
where ends justify the means. Mill´s work is then utilitarian, influenced by Jeremy 
 
19 Examples of this will become evident in the case studies of this thesis, where morality is used loosely or falsely 
by different actors. 
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Bentham. Bentham thought that natural rights were dangerous, for him natural rights 
were unreal rights that came from an unreal law, natural law, and liberal democracies 
better focus on positive rights (Langlois, 2009b). This thought became crucial because 
it completely destroyed the ideas that had influenced the creation of the French 
revolutionaries. Mill´s perspective added on by claiming that the goal of ethics is to 
maximise happiness and in order to do so the greater the number of people that 
benefit the better. This idea is partly what liberalism is based on, where in the political 
and social context, the largest number of people are given the greatest freedom to 
believe what they like and to behave how they like, providing they do not harm others 
and are consistent with granting this freedom to all others (Langlois, 2009a, p.209). 
Utilitarianism in this form have deeply influenced how statesmen conceive and justify 
actions focused on consequences. This has had a large effect on how security and 
rights are conceived, practiced and justified.20 
 
While Mill´s utilitarianism focus solely on the result of an action, for example as long 
as it produces wellbeing somewhere, then it is good; Kant focuses on justice more 
than wellbeing. Both agree that morality is motivated by a reason, although Kant´s 
reason is humanity´s duty whilst Mill´s is gratification. Kant´s principle of universability 
is actually a test of morality where an act is morally acceptable if its maxim is 
universalizable. Here enters moral law or the categorical imperative where the 
morality of an action is derived from the action itself not from the consequences it 
produces, like Mill. The influence of philosophers on how rights, and for that matter 
human rights and human security, are conceived today goes deeper than John Stuart 
Mill. As mentioned in this chapter´s introduction, the space in this thesis is limited and 
the philosophers exposed here are the ones whose thought is considered the most 
influential to the human rights and security relationship and to the understanding of 
the case studies presented. However, the concept of false morality and the degree of 
falsehood that it carries that will be used in empirical chapters 5, 6 and 7, can be 
understood by differentiating Mill and Kant and consequentialism versus 
deontologist.  
 
Kant´s universality and Twentieth century philosophy 
 
 Universality is important beyond its focus on philosophy but also because this 
is where part of the subject that ties human rights and security together lies. This 
because, universality, or lack thereof, of human rights has allowed for human right 
and human rights based security norms to be justified and safeguarded. This 
universality is at the core of liberalism and therefore at the core of liberalist nations, 
like the ones involved in the creation and maintenance of human right security norms. 
These nations created these norms in the name of the protection of human rights, but 
 
20 The case studies in this thesis, will exemplify specially in relation to the concept of controlling the means of 
violence that forms an important part of this study´s research answer and that will be explored in subsequent 
chapters.     
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how these rights were conceived by them is important. Rights sustain universal order 
by contributing to security of property, or liberty and, most importantly for this thesis, 
of life. In order to do so, universal rights must become tangible. Through universality, 
whether culturally relative or not, emphasis is put on individuals, not on states. In 
universality lies the preponderance of human rights and security norms and therefore 
also the relationship between human rights and security. This is why, this next part is 
dedicated to one of the philosophers that based their work on universality: John 
Rawls.21  
 
The American political philosopher, John Rawls, like Kant, sought to oppose 
utilitarianism whilst maintaining and improving the idea of moral law and universality. 
Rawls´s theory of justice through the original position, was designed by seeking to 
respond to Kant´s critics who claimed that autonomy within the moral law was not 
well defined (Rawls, 1971). In the original position, the agents that define our laws are 
free, mutually disinterested and rational. Also, they do not tailor principles to favour 
selfish interest of allow social standings to advantage or disadvantage anyone. Agents 
do not know anything about themselves, only facts of life, they lie in what Rawls calls 
the veil of ignorance (Ibid.). The original position is designed to create polices and 
norms for society and because the procedure that it follows is fair, then the outcomes 
will always be fair. If the law is fair for all, then it can be assured that it is universal 
because it can be applied to liberal and non-liberal societies. Rawls describes how the 
idea of the original position with its veil of ignorance, may be used to model the 
agreement of representatives of both liberal and non-liberal societies on a law of 
peoples that respects basic human rights and is universal in its reach without being 
peculiarly Western or objectionably ethnocentric (Rawls, 1985; Shute and Hurley, 
1993, p.7). His theory of justice offers an intriguing combination of universalism about 
one part of morality, on which his political theory rests, and agnosticism about the 
other (Rawls, 1971; Shute and Hurley, 1993, p.6).  
 
By combining Kant´s universality and moral law plus Rawls´s original position, 
principles of human rights emerge that manage to encompass both security and rights 
in a universal and fair manner. The law of peoples that emerges from Rawls´s 
constructivist conception, limits the traditional powers of sovereignty not just with 
respect to waging war but also with respect to the treatment of people within a state´s 
boundaries (Shute and Hurley, 1993). The law of the peoples is the political 
conception of right and justice that applies to the principles and norms of 
international law and practice (Rawls, 1993, p.68). In this law, the least is to uphold 
basic rights that Rawls refers to as human rights. These are: the right to life and 
security, to personal property, and the elements of the rule of law, as well as the right 
to a certain liberty of conscience and freedom of association, and the right to 
 
21 Rawls is not the only philosopher based on Kant´s universality, others like Hannah Arendt did as well. However, 
Rawls has a direct relationship to the human rights and security relationship and to the actors that defend it, as 
will be seen in the empirical chapters.  
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emigration (Rawls, 1993). The right to security being the most important and relevant 
for the human rights and security relationship and therefore for this study.  
 
Rawls work is seen by many as a watershed moment in the recent history of political 
science. In fact, for some there is a before and after his theory of justice (Agra, 2004; 
Barry, 1991). Bhikhu Parekh (1999) argues that Rawls's importance is actually local 
because only in the US it is seen as so important, in Europe it is not. His theory is 
consisting largely of giving the beleaguered American liberalism a new philosophical 
basis and respectability (Alan Ryan in B. Parekh, 1999, p. 399).22 B. Parekh argues that 
the political theory that has sprung from Rawls is unwisely confined to the nation-
state at a time when the latter is being institutionally eroded from within and without 
and morally challenged by new actors (Parekh, 1999, p.399). This is particularly 
important when theorizing about human rights and security, because, as the case 
studies in this thesis will show, new actors are taking centre stage when politicising 
human rights. Not only are, NGOs leading and pushing for new norms and controls 
but the individualisation of security has started to put the nation-state´s priorities to 
shake. However, Rawls´s theory enhances the universality of norms based on security 
and rights as well as the important role of those agents that create, define, implement 
and improve these norms. The autonomy of these agents, in Rawls´s theory, would 
be key to the construction of fair and universal norms. As the case studies presented 
in chapters 5, 6 and 7 will show, full autonomy of the creating agents is difficult to 
fully prove. However, there are norm implementers that will become the agents of 
the original position seeking to limit the traditional powers of sovereignty through 
fairness. If Rawls´s original position is used further, with the agents in charge of 
implementing the norm, the agents should be completely autonomous. However, as 
this thesis will analyse some agents tend to be involved financially with nation-states, 
which to a certain extent takes away their autonomy leaving them outside full 
universality and fairness of the norm.  
 
Recent evolution of human rights and security  
 
 The First Geneva Convention and the many norms that followed brought a 
large advancement to the field of human rights, humanitarian rights, security and of 
course the human rights and security relationship. The journey that this chapter is 
travelling has large part of its dedication on the last decades. Human rights and 
security have entered society in diverse ways in the last few years, which has also led 
to increasing progress in the field of International Relations. Particular to this thesis 
and to this chapter is the constructivist view of both concepts separately and 
together. The constructivist point of view is what defines a main characteristic of the 
human rights and security relation later described on the final part of this chapter.  
 
22 Rawls is not without its critics, for example: Allan Bloom notices that Rawls has failed to appreciate the crucial 
distinction between opinion and knowledge or appearance of reality; and William Bluhm contends that he never 
defended his fundamental principal (Bloom, 1975; Bluhm, 1987 in B. Parekh, 1999). 
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Human rights and security entering society through the evolution of 
humanitarian norms 
 
 Human rights enter society through informal and formal norms. The basis for 
human rights norms were developed in the age of enlightenment and defined in direct 
relation to the state, were their safeguard became one of the state´s major functions 
(Lavenex, 2001). Formal or tacit human rights norms have created a relationship of 
obligation between the individual, other right holders and most importantly the state, 
as the obliged party. These norms have been founded as independent from political 
and historical aspects (Habermas, 1996) and their moral justification of human rights 
is thought to precede considerations of strict national sovereignty (Fagan, 2005, p.2). 
The underlying aspiration of the doctrine of human rights is to provide a set of 
legitimate criteria to which all nation-states should adhere; appealing national 
sovereignty without providing a legitimate mean for nation-states to permanently 
opt-out of their fundamental human rights-based commitments (Fagan, 2005, p.2). 
Therefore, and for many of its supporters, the doctrine of human rights aims to 
provide a fundamentally legitimate moral basis for regulating contemporary 
international relations and their geo-political order (Fagan, 2005). Whether this moral 
basis is fully followed or respected by actors remains up for discussion, particularly as 
will be seen in cases like the ones presented further in this thesis, were state actors 
utilize this morality falsely in order to achieve their mission. Human rights morality, 
then, although bound to the state, can be manipulated to lose its true meaning. The 
reasons behind such manipulation, tend to be varied but focused on each actor´s 
material key interests, namely security.  
 
Security has different ways of entering society, but one of them is through norms. In 
fact, the way in which security relates to norms is tied up to human rights in war 
norms. These norms are humanitarian norms and were demarcated by the birth of 
the First Geneva Convention (FGC) in 1864. Humanitarian law is rooted in the law of 
war that has always had rules based on chivalry, humanity and religious values that 
were designed to protect non-combatants- especially women, children and elderly 
men (Meron, 2000). Particularly through the Middle Ages, the Church was so powerful 
that it would forbid certain weapons in the name of God. The way in which war was 
carried out in the 19th century changed due to main developments in the 
industrialization of warfare, the growing importance of alliances, the codification of 
the laws of war and the Napoleonic legacy of conscript mass armies (Kaldor, 2013b). 
The modern war that developed in the nineteenth century and its ever increasing 
emphasis on scale and mobility led to an increasing need for rational organization and 
scientific doctrine to manage these large conglomerations of force and its 
consequences (Kaldor, 2013b, p.24). European Conferences proliferated at the time 
and contributed greatly to the development of rules governing the waging of war and 
the codification of the laws (Shaw, 2008, p.28). This coupled with the influence of 
philosophy gave fourth to the creation of the First Geneva Convention and through it 
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to the birth of international law and most importantly humanitarian law. 
Humanitarian law can be said to be a branch of human rights law23 that is “a set of 
international rules, established by treaty or custom, on the basis of which individuals 
and groups can expect and/or claim certain behaviour or benefits from governments; 
human rights are inherent entitlements which belong to every person as a 
consequence of being human (ICRC, 2013). The FGC was the international treaty that 
established humanitarian law and since then has been one of the key elements in a 
line of prosperous stories of non-state actors having centre stage in international 
decisions that have an effect over civilians, state interactions, state laws and state 
supremacy.  
 
In norm cycle terms (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998), delved upon in the introduction 
of this chapter, the birth of the FGC was the starting point of the norm, ending with 
the full norm internalization of the norm in the second half of the 20th century (Boli 
and Thomas, 1999a; Finnemore, 1996). Since its creation, 779 instruments have been 
adopted with a clear increase after 1945 (Elliott, 2011).24 Approximately 85 percent 
of instruments were drafted from 1940 to 2003 (Ibid.), showing the preponderance 
of the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the United Nations (UN). The 
UN, through the Declaration, introduced the concept of human rights into 
international law without altering the concept of sovereignty (Freeman, 2011). By 
means of an international political process the provisions for the Universal 
Declaration were the subject of intense debate and the final text was produced by a 
long series of votes (Morsink, 1999). Since its creation, the UN has sometimes had an 
ambiguous position. One the one hand, as the author and guardian of human rights 
standards and on the other, it has governments within its members that are often 
serious human rights violators (Freeman, 2011). Having a comprehensive human 
rights policy, like the one the Declaration has allowed for, has meant insisting on the 
legitimate appraisal of the internal conduct of all states (Vincent, 1986, p.152). For 
states to be in conformity with the new standards, they have had to protect human 
rights in their territory but also externally (Reus-Smit, 2001). This has implied further 
international involvement and the creation of further instruments, like the R2P 
explained above. Today, the legacy of the FGC has bifurcated into several branches, 
like the human rights and security norms like the focus of this thesis: ATT.  
 
 
23 Although rules of IHL deal with many issues that are outside the purview of IHRL, such as the conduct 
of hostilities, combatant and prisoner of war status and the protection of the red cross and red crescent 
emblems. Similarly, IHRL deals with aspects of life in peacetime that are not regulated by IHL, such as 
freedom of the press, the right to assembly, to vote and to strike (ICRC, 2013). 
24 This proven by the study of sociologist Michael Elliot (2011). Elliot means by instruments: 
conventions, charters, protocols or declarations. He gathered the instruments from: Brownlie 
&Goodwin-Gill 2001, Ghandi 2000, Lawson 1999 & 1996, Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights 1997, 2002, Symonides &Volodin 1999, Universtiy of Minnesota 
Human Rights Library (online) and Weston & Carlson 1994- 2003. 
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IR views on human rights  
 
 As has been indicated throughout the first section of this chapter, both human 
rights and security in IR theory are characterized by the tension between the 
theoretical stands. As a consequence, the notion of human rights is contested. This 
contestation is reflected in the evolution of IR theory and in the understanding of 
universalism and particularism that has featured since the end of the 20th century. 
Views in IR, are fundamentally opposite, particularly between the two classical 
theories, realism and liberalism. Based on the, previously discussed, Hobbesian 
objection of the existence of universal morality, the realist concept of human rights, 
is specific to the state and therefore not universal (Krasner, 1993). Consequently, 
human rights do not influence state behaviour and are only accepted once the state 
decides to promote them to pursuit selfish interests (Carr, 1947; Dunne and Hanson, 
2009; Dunne and Wheeler, 1999; Herbert, 2002; Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990; 
Morgenthau, 1948). For realist, human rights can be a useful tool if they enhance the 
relative power of a state; using force to uphold their values is almost always reckless 
and self-interested (Dunne and Hanson, 2009, p.63). Under an anarchic international 
system, states act competitively in order to maximize their power in terms of 
“population, territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, 
political stability and competence”(Waltz, 1979, p.131). Thus, human rights norms are 
pursued only as the imposition of the state´s moral principles upon another 
(Morgenthau, 1973). The main concern are questions of war and peace making all 
other goals subordinated to the interests that allow a state to survive.  
 
On the other hand, the liberalist/idealist thought, is clear on the moral equality 
between the state and the individual. Citizens have the capability of having natural 
rights independent of the state allowing for a basis for self-determination grounded 
within the authority of human reason (Locke, Kant in (Fagan, 2005, pp.3–4)). The 
state´s role is of guaranteeing the rights of its citizens as well as the promotion of 
universal values. States become “necessary staging-posts in a wider process of 
creating a functioning peaceful world society”(Williams and Booth, 1996, p.77). 
Anarchy is not the case and states are not constantly preoccupied with survival, 
instead cooperation and interdependence reigns. International laws and institutions 
promote rights among states and among individuals (Hurrell, 1990). Through 
institutions, liberals encourage the spread of liberal democracies that permits human 
rights to spread. Liberals give great importance to the domestic sources of state 
preferences that determine the outcomes in international politics (Moravcsik, 1997). 
For example, in Andrew Moravcsik´s work, states accept binding treaties of human 
rights as political survival to protect unstable democracies that existed at the end of 
World War II (Moravcsik, 2000). The promotion of human rights is inextricably linked 
to the promotion of democracy and good governance therefore, unless embedded in 
state-based institutions they will not be durable (Dunne and Hanson, 2009, p.63).   
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Unlike realism and liberalism, constructivism sees no tension between moral 
universalism and the interests of the sovereign state (Dunne and Hanson, 2009). The 
realist claim about the primacy of the national interest is problematized by 
constructivist where interests are a product of the identity and values of a state or 
region (Dunne and Hanson, 2009, p.63). Constructivists do not take states interests as 
a given, rather they look at other actors and their discourses and how they shape 
national interests and multilateral negotiations (Garcia, 2006, p.15) because social 
interactions and needs determine interests. This so called constructivist turn has 
broadened the study of international relations beyond state centric approaches to 
international relations; for example, extending neorealist and neoliberal thought both 
of which still consider anarchy or self-help as central organizing principles and 
therefore neglect transnational networks of knowledge and action, and the role of 
non-state actors in shaping states interests (Checkel, 1997; Garcia, 2006, p.15). 
 
Constructivists argue that human rights should not be regarded in opposition to state 
sovereignty but rather as an emergent standard for legitimate statehood (Dunne and 
Hanson, 2009; Reus-Smit, 2001). They argue in the capacity that the construction of 
identities, interests and norms have to create values. They see human rights as 
universal values and therefore as an integral part of the moral purpose of a state 
(Reus-Smit, 2001, p.520). Also, as opposed to realism, the state is not the unit level of 
focus for international politics.25 For constructivist it matters more how states define 
their interests and not how they pursue them (Finnemore, 1996). In fact, John Ruggie, 
argued that it is important to know the international power structure to understand 
the form of order, but not the content (Ruggie, 1983). To know the content and 
consequences of a particular regime or the structure of social purpose, we need 
additional information about norms (Schmitz and Sikkink, 2012). In this sense, human 
rights present a particularly promising case for exploring and extending a theory of 
norms in international relations (Sikkink, 1998). 
 
For constructivists, norms are shared assessments and can change with the 
circumstances but can also change social environments (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998 
and constructivist in general). The global acceptance of human rights norms since 
1948 originates in what academics have called a norm cascade which is a model of 
norm socialization (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Sunstein, 1997). According to them, 
once the norm starts other members of the community start adopting it, leading to a 
 
25 This particular claim is actually in opposition of neorealism specifically. The distinction between 
realism (or classical realism) and neorealism was not specifically made. The realist description in this 
subpart of the chapter refers to realism as a whole. However, the specific differences between both 
branches are: neorealism introduces the anarchical structure of the international system versus the 
classical realist thought of rooting war in the imperfect human nature; realism (or classical realism as 
it is referred to) is only concerned with matters of high politics like war and peace, whilst neorealism 
approaches all levels of interaction; and classical realists differentiate between status-quo powers and 
revisionist powers while neorealism regards states as unitary actors (Schweller, 1996). For more 
differences, even between main authors of both branches see: (Pashakhanlou, 2009).  
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cascade effect. Constructivist scholars have divided into two when answering if the 
norm cascade is an inconsequential commitment on the part of the state to weakly 
institutionalize human rights norms, or if it actually means a profound transformation 
of the international and domestic politics (Schmitz and Sikkink, 2012). State centric 
scholars, like Wendt, have answered with the language of sociological institutionalism 
to account for the growing international salience of human rights norms (Wendt, 
1999; Schmitz and Sikkink, 2012). Non-state centric scholars refer more to a 
fundamental normative socialization (Schmitz and Sikkink, 2012; Risse et al., 1999). 
Sociological scholars believe in decoupling between norm rhetoric and norm behavior 
(Boli and Thomas, 1999a; Meyer et al., 1997), while other scholars claim that the work 
of non-state actors begins exactly there (Finnemore, 1993; Ikenberry and Kupchan, 
1990; Risse and Sikkink, 1999; Schimmelfennig, 1994; Schmitz and Sikkink, 2012). In 
these cases, socialization can be defined as the induction of new members into ways 
of behavior that are preferred in a society (Barnes et al., 1980, p.35). Along these lines, 
norms can teach states (Finnemore, 1996); where clearly, the states interest are not 
undermined but lead by norms. Therefore, this means that norms should 
superimpose the state´s interest.  
 
Defining the constructivist human rights and security relationship   
  
 The construction of the human rights and security relationship stems from the 
deconstruction of both concepts, as has been appreciated throughout this chapter. 
This deconstruction develops from the understanding of common elements branching 
from notions of safety and threat, to the philosophical and theoretical composition of 
security and human rights. This chapter has set the premises for the connection 
between human rights and security and in particular for the juxtaposition of their 
common elements that define the relationship between them. Also, this chapter has 
given an overall sense of where the relationship stands, however its more tangible 
definition has not been provided yet. Like this, the human rights and security 
relationship can be seen as falling somewhere in between a Hobbesian security 
perspective and a Kantian universality. Although Hobbes and Kant are the basis of the 
tension that exists between human rights and security, the relationship is particularly 
constructivist in its formation, definition, scope and perception. This is due to, as was 
mentioned briefly in chapter 1, the relationship being composed by the nexus of 
moral and material interests that are in fact constructed by external and internal facts 
and environmental circumstances that each actor has.  
 
The human rights and security relationship can be seen either from an international 
level or from a narrower, more defined one. Narrowly, it refers to the relationship 
that the two factors have within a given actor. This can be domestically within a state 
or belonging to a domestic or international non-state actor, i.e. the human rights and 
security relationship of state “x” or NGO “x”. Internationally, the relationship is a 
conjunction of the relationships actors globally bring, but it is also a direct reflection 
of international law, specifically international humanitarian law (IHL) and 
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international human rights law (HRL). Because of this it can be said that the 
contemporary human rights and security relationship began with the establishment 
of humanitarian law, that is, with the creation of the First Geneva Convention in 1864. 
As was mentioned further above, humanitarian law was part of society long before it 
was established as so. It is inherent to the law of war, that defined armed conflict for 
centuries. The law of war was also meant to safeguard the state´s security. It was the 
birth of a new state and of modern war, allowed for the nineteenth century to become 
the cradle for international humanitarian laws, like the Declaration of Paris 1856, 
Lieber Code 1863, and the First Geneva Convention of 1864. Like this, the 
contemporary human rights and security relationship that rules internationally and 
influences locally was born and with it the constant construct of social realities that 
its interaction brings. Construct within the international relationship itself, but also by 
the composition of ever-changing local human rights and security relationships that 
reside within each actor. This international human rights and security relationship 
gives guidance to state and non-state actors by acting as a structure but also as an 
agent.   
        
The human rights and security relationship is also an example of the structure-agency 
dilemma, solved by the rules to demonstrate the co- constitution of both. The human 
rights and security relationship inhabits in world that is ruled by no one in particular, 
and therefore by everyone in association (Onuf, 2013, p.23). This ruling must not be 
considered in a vacuum, but in the agent´s choices and in the social arrangements 
that eventuate from agent´s choices (Onuf, 1997). Some actors are typically 
characterized for advancing in the name of security, like the state; others in the name 
of human rights, like non-governmental organisations. However, the reality is that 
actor´s interests are actually a combination of human rights based and security based, 
moral and material interests that define the relationship between human rights and 
security. As mentioned in chapter 1, then the human rights and security relationship 
turns out to be a platform where actors, directly or indirectly, consciously or 
subconsciously are influenced by cultural, social and historical facts to manipulate or 
accommodate the situations whilst constructing a defined connection between 
security and human rights.   
 
Both concepts of security and human rights complement and contradict each other in 
a constructed fashion were they are constantly being changed by the actors involved 
whilst changing them in return. This results in an ever-changing relationship, that is 
never a finished product (Onuf, 1998). This construction, as mentioned in chapter 1, 
takes place in the realm of international norms were the interaction between agents 
involves the socialization of diverse state and non-state actors. Moreover, the 
construction exemplifies the constructivist nature of the relationship based on its 
contingent core and the co-constitution of society (Kessler, 2016; Onuf, 2012; Onuf, 
2009). To better understand this, constructivists view on norms and the study of 
agents in global governance is needed. This will be the main topic of the next chapter, 
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so the human rights and security relationship can come into a clearer light in 




 As stated in chapter 1, a genealogical constitutive analysis of the human rights 
and security relationship is one of the main features that gives this thesis its unique 
contribution to the field of International Relations. Throughout this chapter, this is 
becoming more and more apparent through the deconstruction of the concept of 
security and the concept of human rights, as well as through the construction of the 
definition of the human rights and security relationship. This chapter slowly traced 
the roots and identities of security and rights while distinguishing historical 
contingencies and multiple narratives that are of political, ontological, 
epistemological and ethical nature.26 The genealogical constitutive analysis is 
demonstrating the genesis and identity of the human rights and security relationship 
that will become useful throughout the case studies further along. The genealogical 
aspect of the thesis is used to introduce the problematic between the elements of the 
human rights and security relationship, elements that will be found throughout the 
case study chapters. This refers to exposing the reasoning behind topics like false 
morality and its relation to Mill and Kant´s work, or norms as a response of 
contingency in constructivism and its relation to the recent evolution of humanitarian 
norms.  
 
This chapter has sought to see both human rights and security as separate entities, 
but at the same time as the same or at least stemming from the same. The journey 
has been non-linear and has brought the capability of seeing how the connection 
between both concepts has developed. In a few words the journey passes through 
the connection of safety-threat, the deconstruction of security in IR connected to 
sovereignty, human security and R2P, universality and cultural relativism of rights, 
Rawls perspective related to Kant´s universality, human rights entering society 
through humanitarian norms, deconstruction of human rights in IR, all to arrive to the 
definition of the human rights and security relationship.  
  
Concepts, like R2P, are especially important to consider, not only because its 
normative advancement in human rights protecting norms, but also because the 
change in the conception of humanitarian intervention has allowed for greater 
importance of non-state actors. This is particularly important for this thesis and for 
this chapter´s connection with chapter 3 and the empowerment and study of the 
global civil society based on the cosmopolitan understanding of security, rights and 
the international interaction of states. This chapter allowed for it to become apparent 
that the connection between security and rights is entrenched even in the dawn of 
their understandings. Universality´s dispute understood as Mill´s consquentialism 
 
26 To further understand this see more on (Clifford, 2018; Vucetic, 2011) on chapter 1 of this thesis.  
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versus Kant the deontoogist can be related to the way in which actors, states in 
particular, use morality in an end justifies means type of way. This will be further 
understood with the concept of false morality in chapters 5, 6 and 7. Furthermore, 
universality of human rights, or the lack thereof, has allowed for human rights and 
human rights based security norms to be justified and safeguarded. Through 
universality, whether it is culturally relative or not, emphasis is put on individuals, not 
states. Also, by combining Kant´s universality and moral law plus Rawls´s original 
position, principles of human rights emerge that manage to encompass both security 
and rights in a universal and fair manner. It is important to mention that Rawl´s theory 
enhances the universality of norms based on security and rights. Also, that the agents 
of the original position are similar to the norm implementers that will be central to 
chapters 5, 6 and 7.  
 
This chapter ends by defining the human rights and security relationship and how it is 
constructivist in its core: in its formation, definition, scope and perception. The 
deconstruciton of both concepts, security and human rights, has given common 
elements that compose both ideas as well as the human rights and security 
relationship. The relationship can be seen as falling somewhere inbetween a 
Hobbesian security perspective and a Kantian universality, whilst at the same time 
composed by the nexus of moral and material interests that were mentioned in 
chapter 1. This composition and the elements that comform it are also constructed 
by internal and enviromentla causes that each actor has. This particualrity of the 
relationship will be furhter uderstood as the case studies in this thesis develop. The 
human rights and security relationship is part of a constructivist world, that is ruled 
by no one and therefore by everyone (Onuf, 2013, p.23). Like this, it turns out to be a 
platform where actors, directly or indirectly, subconsciously or consciously are 
influenced by social, cultural and historical factors to manipulate and accommodate 
issues whilst constructing a defined connection between security and human rights. 
Both security and human rights complement each other as well as contradict each 
other, whilst constantly changing and being changed by the actors invovled. The 
construction of the human rights and security relaitonship takes place in the 
jurisdiction of international norms were state and non-state actors involve 
themselves in socialization with each other. In order to understand this interaction 
better, focus on norms and agents working in global governance will be explained in 








Chapter 3 - Engaging discourses of human rights and security in 





 As established in chapter 2, the human rights and security relationship enters 
society through norms. Although norms have been studied in international law for 
some time, they were introduced into international studies until the early 70s and 
early 80s when scholars who focused on transnational actors (Keohane and Nye, 
1977), early constructivist (Adler, 1997; Dessler, 1989; Kratochwil, 1989; Kratochwil 
and Ruggie, 1986; Wendt, 1987) and regime theorist (Krasner, 1983) began to fit 
norms into their works. According to Katzenstein, norms are prescriptions or 
proscriptions for behaviour (Katzenstein (ed), 1996). They are “a standard behaviour 
for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore, 1996, p.20; Katzenstein, 1996b; Klotz, 
1995). At times the word norm is confused and used interchangeably with institutions 
but in the constructivist understanding institutions are a set of norms. The definition 
of norm isolates single standards of behaviour, whereas institutions emphasize the 
way in which behavioural rules are structured together and interrelate (Finnemore 
and Sikkink, 1998, p.891).  
 
Finnemore and Sikkink´s seminal work, summarizes how norms have been seen in 
different categories according to the main proponents of norms in constructivism. 
Norms are divided into: regulative norms, constitutive norms and evaluative or 
prescriptive norms (Gelpi, 1997; Katzenstein, 1996b; Ruggie, 1998b; Searle, 1995; 
Wendt, 1999). The last and most important category for the understanding of 
international relations and for constructivist is the one that gives norms its 
particularity and uniqueness and sets them apart from any kind of rule with the 
prescriptive (or evaluative) quality of "oughtness"  (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). 
Oughtness brings out the moral obligatoriness of norms, particularly when referring 
to the actors to whom the norm is intended to proscribe. Actors such as: states, 
international organizations, NGOs and even individuals depending on the nature of 
the norm. Due to the moral obligatory quality that oughtness gives to norms, “we 
typically do not consider a rule of conduct to be a social norm unless a shared moral 
assessment is attached to its observance or non-observance” (Fearon, 1997a, p. 25 in 
Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998).  
In constructivism, norms shape national security interests or directly security policies 
of states and shape state identity (Jepperson et al., 1996). Norms establish 
expectations about who the actors will be in a particular environment and about how 
these particular actors will behave (Jepperson et al., 1996, p.54). This coinciding with 
Finnemore and Sikkink when explaining the indirect evidence of norms. The strength 
of the causal effects of norms varies because norms fall on a continuum of strength, 
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from mere discursive receptivity, through contested models, to reconstructed 
wisdom (Berger, 1998; Jepperson et al., 1996; Kier, 1996; Price et al., 1996). It is a 
mistake to characterize constructivism as focused on norms as opposed to neorealism 
and neoliberalism, which are allegedly focused on power and interests (Hurd, 2008, 
p.310). Constructivist are also concerned with power and interests, they just see the 
sources of those interests as constructed and as born from the interaction between 
agents and structures. Studying norms does not mean that strategic behaviour should 
not be taken into consideration. Then, norms are not mutually exclusive to the study 
of strategic behaviour, constructed behaviour that is. It does not mean that material 
power is unimportant or that actors do not make instrumental calculations, nor does 
it mean that sovereign states or anarchy don’t exist; it just means that all of these are 
socially constructed (Hurd, 2008, p.313).27  
In this normative sense and in order to continue the journey of the human rights and 
security relationship the realm in which it takes place needs to be understood. This 
exemplifies the genealogical stance of this thesis, by dividing the parts of the human 
rights and security relationship into such a realm. It follows the causal analysis with 
attention to the processes and interactions that lead towards the formation of the 
relationship. The realm is that of international norms, particularly human rights and 
humanitarian norms, but not exclusively. In this thesis, the focus is more on norms 
under the humanitarian and human rights umbrella, specifically those also related to 
arms control where human rights and security collide. This chapter will deconstruct 
these norms in order to construct the realm in which the human rights and security 
relationship mainly takes place. This will include the interactions the actors involved 
in their conception, negotiation, creation and implementation go through to achieve 
a successful union between human rights and security. Part of the interactions that 
actors, particularly states, carry on are based on disarmament diplomacy which will 
also be explained in this chapter. Throughout this chapter the rise in the importance 
of non-state actors and the activities there are involved in will become apparent. This 
will serve as a basis for the important role that different non-state actors have had in 
the implementation of the ATT in the upcoming cases.  
 
Continuing with the deconstruction of the realm of the human rights and security 
relationship in this chapter will lead to focusing on the study of its key agents like: 
transnational advocacy networks and global civil society which can be used 
interchangeably in some cases. It will also focus on comprehending contemporary 
sources of arms control, controlling the means of violence, humanitarian arms control 
and small arms and light weapons. All these will be understood as stemming from the 
 
27 These clarifications on the constructivist understanding of norms become crucial for the purpose of 
this thesis. It can be wrongly thought that human rights and their construction have nothing to do with 
states security interests. However, because security tends to be one of the state´s priorities, its 
influence on the creation of interests, the championing of norm creation, the adoption of norms, and 
the overall interaction that norms on rights create is constantly intertwined and bouncing back 
influences between them. This fact will be further exemplified in the case studies of this thesis. 
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source of human security and the norm internalization that came from the Geneva 
Conventions, and perhaps before. The construction of the human rights and security 
relationship takes place in the jurisdiction of international norms were state and non-
state actors interact generating dynamics that in IR have been called norm dynamics. 
These norm dynamics central to this chapter will be those focused on arms control 
and disarmament diplomacy and the diverse branches this entails.  
 
This chapter will allow for the understanding as to why NGOs and other non-state 
actors have achieved centre stage in the international system. This is also the reason 
why the focus of this chapter and of this thesis is upon considering non-state actors 
over state actors, particularly in these initial chapters. This chapter, as this thesis, is a 
reflection of the growing importance non-state actors have had in the field of IR, but 
also in the international system. It is also a reflection of security stemming from state 
actors, but more and more centred on the individual. Another reason is that this thesis 
seeks to reflect the underlying recognition or lack thereof of the human rights and 
security relationship in the realms of arms control, and to do so attention on non-
state actors is needed. As it will be seen in the case studies, the importance of these 
non-state actors is that the correct implementation of the norm and therefore in the 
advancement of the balancing out of the human rights and security relationship lies 
mainly on them. However, state actors also play a crucial role in the interspace of the 
human rights and security relationship, as will be seen with the case studies further 
along. In fact, NGOs activity is almost always interrelated with state activity. The 
construction and maintenance of the interspace and of the human rights and security 
relationship comes from multiple actors, state and non-state. Non-state actors have 
gotten centre stage more and more in the last decades but state actors also promote 
the human rights and security relationship, whether on the security, human rights or 
both sides. As will be explained further below, due to the complexity of state´s role in 
the human rights and security relationship, it is at times needed to dialogue beyond 
constructivism and into English School and sociological institutionalism theories. This 
is also another reason why this chapter tends to focus mostly on non-state actors, 
because to properly grasp state action exemplification is needed. Actor´s actions, 
particularly the state´s one, will be best perceived as the case studies come to light. 
Therefore, these actors are the focus of the deconstruction and construction of the 
real and socialization of the human rights and security relationship presented in this 
thesis and in this chapter.  
 
The interspace of the human rights and security relationship within arms 
control  
 
 The human rights and security relationship can today be seen in  the newly 
created norm regimes that focus on humanitarian security and therefore entail both 
human rights and security. These norms have become an important part in the 
journey of the human rights and security relationship but also in the arena of 
international law. In order to better understand these norms, a deconstruction of its 
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elements and the arms controls topics that surround it will be explained in this part 
of the chapter. The deconstruction will start with humanitarian security regimes, as 
they are the direct basis of the ATT. Humanitarian security regimes will then further 
decompose into IR literature focused on contemporary arms control, controlling the 
means of violence, humanitarian arms control and small arms and light weapons. 
Other forms of norms connecting human rights and security will also be dealt with, 
with less of a focus on arms control. All topics are interconnected and in most cases 
share the same background, actors and ramifications. They are all consequence of the 
norm cascade corresponding to the Geneva Conventions that, as seen in the previous 
chapter, can be traced back to the end of the 19th century and the creation of the First 
Geneva Convention. Also, they are part of the advancement in the studies of human 
security and the changes in International Relation theory to further focus on the 
construction of norms. Finally, by the end of this part of the chapter it will become 
obvious that the topics presented are a direct representation of the union of human 
rights and security, of the human rights and security relationship and testimony and 
reason as to why studies and most security related issues have the need to be viewed 
with a human rights and security lens.  
 
Denise Garcia´s humanitarian security regimes  
 
 The most recent, and for purposes of this thesis, most important factor in the 
deconstruction of international norms are the recently created humanitarian security 
norms, of which the ATT is a part of. The term, humanitarian security norms, was 
coined by scholar Denise Garcia specially in relation to arms control. Although the 
term was not formally mentioned until 2015 in Garcia´s article titled, precisely, 
Humanitarian Security Regimes; the literature on these regimes and on international 
humanitarian and human rights law had been evolving over the past three decades to 
arrive to this point. In fact, the literature on regimes evolved so that, according to 
Garcia, it now occupies centre stage in the study of international relations (Garcia, 
2011, p. 56). Humanitarian security regimes also embrace the protection of human 
rights and Garcia defines this regime as:  “driven by altruistic imperatives aiming to 
prohibit and restrict behaviour, impede lethal technology, or ban categories of 
weapons through disarmament treaties, and centrally embracing humanitarian 
perspectives that seek to prevent civilian casualties, precluding harmful behaviour, 
and protecting and guaranteeing the rights of victims and survivors of armed violence; 
thus, the main goals of humanitarian security regimes are to reduce human suffering, 
to prohibit harm and to protect victims” (Garcia, 2015, p.55).  
 
According to Garcia, humanitarian security regimes are not just about state security, 
about those states that possess weapons or the technology to make them; they are 
about everyone´s security (Ibid., p.57). This reflects the permeation of the concept of 
human security and the universalization of rights discussed in the previous chapter. 
They reflect human rights change and the successful pathways of norm dynamics 
explained by constructivist. The aim of these regimes is to establish humane 
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frameworks that negotiators and activists- government or otherwise- can use to 
create new international norms prescribing but often proscribing behavior (Ibid.). 
These frameworks may lead to changes in international-national security, because 
they emphasize humanizing international security through the setting of principled, 
multilaterally agreed proscriptions (Ibid.). The already existing examples of these 
types of regimes are: the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty- also known as Ottawa 
Treaty- of 1997, the Convention on Cluster Munitions of 2008, and this thesis´s case 
study: the Arms Trade Treaty of 2014. The landmine and cluster munitions bans of 
1997 and 2008 are the first instruments in international law to mandate the high 
contracting parties to assist present and future victims, as well as banning weapons 
(Ibid., p.65). The ATT is the first treaty to state as its main purpose the aim of reducing 
human suffering. In this sense, humanitarian security regimes create mechanisms to 
protect civilians after a conflict is over and/ or they also prevent unlawful use of 
weapons (Ibid.).  
These new norms are examples of the rise in the importance of human or individual 
security in the eyes of the state. To some extent this is not fully implemented, 
however today discussions are not only limited to states' rights and national 
sovereignty, they also include talk of protecting civilians, addressing the plight of war-
affected children and the threat of terrorism and drugs, managing open borders, and 
combating infectious diseases are now part of a dialogue (Axworthy, 2001, p.19). This 
shift may appear recent, however, it has been gathering momentum since the end of 
World War II and the urgent rethinking of states priorities that the Holocaust set upon 
us. The rise of human rights and its challenge to the Westphalian conception of 




 In this broader conception of security, disarmament diplomacy has become 
one of the key mechanisms at the disposal of states to protect human security (Garcia, 
2011, p.183). It has also become crucial for non-state actors involved in enhancing the 
humanitarian side of security. Disarmament diplomacy is thought to be the realm of 
stalemate, defiance and non-compliance (Garcia, 2011, p.1). It was also a domain that 
was previously thought to be exclusive to the state – how they procure and manage 
their conventional arms-  that has been penetrated by multiple sources: like the civil 
society mostly represented by NGOs (Garcia, 2011, p.2). It is important to mention 
that most humanitarian security regimes centre on disarmament and the regulation 
of arms, they are different from traditional arms control regimes; arms control 
regimes typically take a purely regulatory approach and have often been guided by 
the rationale of military necessity and economic benefit (Garcia, 2015, pp.56–57). 
However, arms control has been crucial to the development of the ATT, for example.28   
 
28 Arms control will be clarified further bellow.  
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The humanitarian principles in the Geneva Convention of 1949- and now part of 
customary law- of prohibiting the unnecessary suffering of combatants, outlawing 
indiscriminate weapons, and distinguishing between civilians and combatants have 
been key to disarmament diplomacy (Garcia, 2011, p.184). The evolution that has led 
to the creation of humanitarian security regimes or human rights based security 
regimes had been not only championed by governments, individual actors- like Nobel 
Price winner Oscar Arias, in the case of the ATT- and NGOs- like Amnesty International, 
in the case of the ATT as well- have played a crucial role in putting this issues in the 
international agenda. Promoting human security globally has required that 
governments work more closely with the nongovernmental sector (Axworthy, 2001, 
p.22). NGOs have played a variety of important roles: they bring technical expertise 
and experience to the policymaking process, often work with government to 
implement international agendas, inform citizens about challenges and choices on the 
international agenda, mobilize human and financial resources to help solve local and 
global problems, work to end human suffering, and hold governments accountable 
(Axworthy, 2001, p.23). 
The evolution and convergence of international humanitarian law and human rights 
law has been crucial to the existence of humanitarian security or human rights based 
security regimes. Without either, these regimes would not exist. Disarmament 
diplomacy has evolved with them, from a purely military centered framework to a 
more humanitarian, IHL and HRL, based one. This new framework reframes that 
negotiations no longer lie only on the realms of disarmament and arms control, but 
in humanitarianism and privileging the victims (Garcia, 2011). The influence of 
international human rights law began after 1948; according to Oberlieitner, all legal 
texts on war adopted since have had an eye on human rights (Oberleitner, 2015, 
pp.340–341). The role of NGOs, like Amnesty International and Oxfam, to mention a 
few, has been key in procuring the advancement and proper application of human 
rights law. This is clearly portrayed in the ATT´s history, which will be discussed in the 
next chapter. On the other hand, the ICRC has been the one responsible for advancing 
the teachings of IHL. The ICRC has relentlessly reminded states of their solemn 
responsibilities as high contracting parties of the Geneva Conventions and their 
Protocols in terms of not transferring arms if there is a belief that they will be used 
for the violations of IHL (Garcia, 2011, p.193). The ICRC has participated as a 
campaigner during the ATT process but also has generated authoritative legal analysis 
and information for states and for the general public (Garcia, 2011, pp.193–194) 
The convergence of human rights law and humanitarian law is not an invention of 
current human rights scholarship and advocacy; it has its roots in the interaction of 
images of war and the role assigned to law in such situations (Oberleitner, 2015, 
p.341), as has been seen throughout this thesis. Since the 1970s pronouncements of 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the continued application of human rights, 
the union of both has happened in many ways like: the inclusion of human rights law 
in humanitarian documents, the litigation of human rights in armed conflict before 
international human rights commissions and courts, the monitoring of human rights 
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and humanitarian law by UN human rights bodies and the Security Council, the 
confluence of human rights and humanitarian law in international criminal law, the 
identification of the interplay of human rights and humanitarian law in the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)´s study on customary humanitarian 
law, the use of human rights and humanitarian law in civil society advocacy, and the 
emergence of state practice which allows the application of human rights in armed 
conflict (Oberleitner, 2015, p.341).  
Contemporary Arms Control  
 
 Efforts to control arms go back to ancient Greece. First at a local level, then at 
a regional level and since the end of the 19th Century, at an international level with 
the creation of the Hague Conventions. They have evolved to become more complex 
and more representative of global needs. This evolution represents the growing 
leverage that human rights and humanitarian aspects have gotten in the human rights 
and security relationship. Philosophical trends, as explained in previous chapters 
slowly brought a further understanding of the concept of security. This pushed for a 
more humanitarian aspect of it allowing for a conscious effort to refrain from 
damaging human lives through the control of arms.   
 
Since the early 1990s increased attention to non- nuclear tools of violence has 
prevailed. The end of the Cold War also caused a large proliferation of arms, due to 
the end of proxy wars and the end of ongoing preparedness of the major powers. This 
marked a significant change in terms of arms trade patterns and the economic 
rationales for arms sales moved to the forefront (Hartung, 2008, pág. 351), it also 
signified a downturn in global arms sales (Stohl & Grillot, 2009). Many countries 
simply did not need to purchase any more weapons, as their arsenals were already 
saturated with purchases made during the Cold War (Grimmett, 1990). Moreover, 
countries began to cut their arms production, due in part to decreases in domestic 
demand (SIPRI, 2003). Actually, in some regions the United States was not the world's 
largest exporter, although its forays into several different regions gave it a solid base 
around the world (Stohl & Grillot, 2009). 
 
The large amounts of weapons causing innocent individuals to undergo pain made it 
easier for some to understand that a control regime was needed. In 1991, in the wake 
of the Gulf War, the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council -
United States, Britain, France, China and Russia- established guidelines for 
conventional arms transfers, including advance notification of arms sales, 
considerations of human rights consequences, and concerns for destabilizing arms 
build-ups (Grillot, Stapley, & Hanna, 2007). These were never implemented, however 
they were further discussed in the Report of the Disarmament Commission A/51/42 
of 1997 (United Nations, 1997). Perhaps, the most substantial arms control 
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development of the 90s was the UN Register of Conventional Arms in December of 
1991- precursor to the ATT.29   
 
Fragile statehood, poverty and under-development, war economies, conflict over 
resources, terrorism, transnational organized crime and the privatization of security 
have been the cause for the international community of states, together with the 
transnational campaigns of the non-governmental organizations, to begin to 
introduce new forms of arms control and disarmament in order to meet the new 
challenges of the 21st Century (Wisotski, 2010). In International Relations since the 
1960s there was an emergence of key texts upon which arms control understanding 
was based on (Schelling and Halperin, 1988; Bull, 1961). Post-Cold War arms control 
study and practice have represented a radical break with the principles of classical 
arms control which focused primarily (if not exclusively) on nuclear deterrence 
between the superpowers (Cooper & Mutimer, 2011) and therefore on security based 
exclusively on the state. In fact, the focus of arms control, by the end of the Cold War, 
was not on deterrence per se but on proliferation (principally Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD)) and in later years to a lesser extent the proliferation of small 
arms and light weapons (SALW) (Cooper & Mutimer, 2011).  
 
Today, there are two main approaches to arms control. On one hand, the problem 
solving (positivist) approach, John Borrie suggests that the purpose of classification is 
to make an attempt in the field of arms control and disarmament to think outside the 
box for the purpose of addressing contemporary challenges (Borrie, 2009; Mathur, 
2011). On the other hand, the critical perspective encourages a study of discursive 
formations in the fields of humanitarianism and arms control and disarmament as 
they intersect with each other, not to explain those shifts, but rather to display the 
structural differences they embody and to some extent to document the parallels 
between contemporary shifts in several discursive formations (Rouse, 2005; Mathur, 
2011). This critical security studies approach struggles to deconstruct hegemonic 
framings of the arms limitation problem and develops alternative narratives that 
contain inherently transformatory meanings, a powerful political act in itself (Cooper, 
2006). This thesis goes beyond these two perspectives and approaches a more holistic 
view of arms control that adds the nexus of material and moral interests as 
 
29 The United Nations has not been the only forum to discuss arms control, disarmament and arms 
trade. In fact, since 1949 the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) later 
succeeded by the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use 
Goods and Technologies (WA) of 1996 has also played an important role. The Wassenaar Arrangement 
unlike its predecessor COCOM, was not created to target any region or group (COCOM was created to 
target the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc). It was established to promote transparency and greater 
responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing 
destabilizing accumulations. (Wassenaar Arrangement Secretariat, 2004). The WA has developed 
impressive lists of munitions, dual-use goods, and technologies that require monitoring (Gärtner, 
2008). It continues to date.  
 
 60 
influencers. As will be seen below, the human rights and security relationship focuses 
not on arms control, but on controlling the means of violence.  
 
Controlling the means of violence instead of arms control  
 
 Neil Cooper and David Mutimer argue that: “We have moved from an era 
where arms control was principally about ensuring societies remained at risk of 
extermination to one where it is principally about exterminating risk all together – at 
least for the major powers” (Cooper & Mutimer, 2011, p. 9). Of course in theory this 
has been the case. In fact, when referring to the creation of the ATT the most 
prominent defenders of the control of trade of conventional weapons wanted a 
broader, almost full, extermination. In the end, in the final draft of the Treaty, the full 
and broader control was not actually achieved. It is as if one of the new aspects of 
contemporary arms control is a kind of absolute security that perhaps is more visible 
in terms of non-proliferation of WMD and of other weapons used for the so called 
war on terror. Ironically, this search for absolute security appears to be giving rise to 
ever more arms control challenges as illustrated by the way in which prophylactic 
interventions to prevent the next 9/11 have given rise to threats of improvised 
explosive devices and the copycat use of unmanned aerial vehicles (Cooper & 
Mutimer, 2011).  
 
Cooper and Mutimer suggest that there is the need of an alternative term to arms 
control, a better term: controlling the means of violence (CMV) (Cooper & Mutimer, 
2011, págs. 10-11).  This is because looking at it from a critical point of view, as 
opposed to a problem-solving one, weapons are changing, some of the technologies 
of war are not linear developments and because arms control should encompass 
limiting the means of violence in civil conflicts against individuals (Cooper & Mutimer, 
2011). As was explained in Chapter 1, CMV includes more radical and inclusive forms 
of global-local action in order to avoid embedding with militarism. CMV focuses on 
bottom-up power of civil society actors as opposed to arms control from below with 
the logic of militarism from above (Turner et al., 2010). As will be seen throughout 
this thesis, CMV allows for the focus of the human rights and security relationship and 
its construction and deconstruction to be more focused on moral issues.  
 
Within the CMV perspective, Keith Krause sets contemporary practices of controlling 
the means of violence in a historical perspective (Krause, 2011; Dalby, 2011). Krause 
suggests that “progressive development of measures to control weapons of mass 
destruction in the 1980s and 1990s essentially moved arms control beyond a 
sovereign conception of how (and why) to control arms, as part of the management 
of security relations between competing powers, towards a larger logic of 
governmentality that reached deep into the domestic affairs of states and involved 
forms of regulation and control that went far beyond inter-state agreements to 
regulate their military competition” (Krause, 2011, pág. 20). Although this move 
described by Krause relates more to arms control in the broader or more classic sense, 
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that is the sense of WMD it has a definite logic within the conventional weapons and 
SALW that the ATT is defending. He sets attention on Foucault´s issue of 
governmentality which is the art of government. Sovereignty and governmentality are 
seen like “two distinct ways of exercising power that focus on either securing a given 
territory and system of rule over people (sovereignty) or on managing a population 
through the wide-ranging regulation of economy and society (governmentality)” 
(Krause, 2011, pág. 21). In this sense, Krause states that arms control has moved from 
a sovereign to a governmentality perspective. As this thesis advances, this will also be 
noticeable in the case of the implementation of ATT and the actors’ actions towards 
it. The actors of the cases presented have in fact reached into the domestic affairs of 
states and involved forms of regulation and control that go beyond what was agreed 
upon ATT. This particularly in the cases of states, especially a large arms exporting 
state like the UK in Chapter 6. The encompassing view of arms control through the 
implementation of ATT will be made clearer as the cases are developed.  
 
Krause also argues that “arms control practices can also be viewed more broadly 
through the lens of governmentality; where arms control are about who can possess, 
use, develop and transfer the technologies of violence, under what circumstances, 
against whom and for what ends” (Krause, 2011, pág. 29). In fact, Krause then 
mentions that initiatives like the Ottawa Treaty, the PoA and the 2008 Ban on cluster 
munitions can be considered as arms control governmentality. Even though this 
article was written a couple of years before the final draft of the ATT, it is most likely, 
given its characteristics and similarities with the just mentioned initiatives, that the 
Treaty would be considered by the author as arms control for governmentality as well. 
Krause´s article places a number of key issues on the table, in particular, the relation 
of CMV to broader modes of government, and the centrality of issues of framing for 
understanding the nature of the means of violence and of their practices of control 
(Cooper & Mutimer, 2011). What Krause and Cooper and Mutimer´s research does is 
better set the interspace in which the human rights and security relationship plays in. 
An interspace of a broader understanding of arms control that seeks to control the 
means of violence.   
 
Humanitarian arms control 
 
A key innovation of contemporary arms control has been a turn to what has 
been labeled humanitarian arms control (Cooper & Mutimer, 2011), which is part of 
the movement that created the ATT, the ban on cluster munitions and the control of 
landmines. Also deeply related, to Denise Garcia´s humanitarian security regimes. 
One of the features of the post-Cold War arms control agenda has been the 
emergence of a set of control initiatives that are increasingly being categorized under 
the rubric of humanitarian arms control (HAC) (Greene, 2010; Hynek, 2007; Wisotzki, 
2010; Cooper, 2011) or humanitarian disarmament (Borrie, 2009; Borrie and Randin, 
2006; Krause, 2011; Cooper, 2011). As an example, the 1997 Convention to Ban on 
Anti-Personnel Mines (known as Ottawa Treaty), the 2001 Programme of Action on 
 62 
Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA), the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions and 
the diverse attempts to create the ATT. In this context, the concept of humanitarian 
arms control emerged trying to procure the new security challenges of the 21st 
Century.  
 
The characteristic of humanitarian arms control is the comprehensive application of 
the principles of proportionality, need and compensation, according to Simone 
Wisotski of the Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt (Wisotski, 2010). According to 
her, humanitarian arms control is characterized by certain moral principles and 
principles of justice (Wisotski, 2010). This is demonstrated in norm-generation efforts 
in humanitarian arms control: the moral aspirations of the transnational campaigns 
of the non-governmental organizations in particular are thwarted by state’s 
particularistic national security interests (Wisotski, 2010). One would expect 
democracies in particular to be especially committed to the development of norms in 
the field of humanitarian arms control because the underlying moral convictions and 
normative principles closely resonate with democratic values (Becker, Muller, & 
Wisotzki, 2008). Quite to the contrary, an ambivalence between norm-building efforts 
and national interests can be identified, such as in the case of the United States, 
particularly under the Bush administration (Wisotski, 2010). This ambivalence will also 
become apparent as the cases of this thesis are developed, and will also reflect and 
be a reflection of the human rights and security relationship of each case.  
 
Humanitarian arms control, particularly the current regimes built around it, like the 
ATT, has been argued of being ahistorical. This because, “there is in fact a long record 
of initiatives aimed at eliminating certain pariah weapons or restricting their use in 
particular context”(Cooper, 2011, p.141). It also depends on a rather partial 
understanding of the way the relationship between power, ethics and specific models 
of economy have been expressed throughout the history or arms trade regulation 
(Cooper, 2011). Cooper argues that this ahistoricism refers to the fact that attempts 
to control certain weapons is quite a normal practice in the history of arms control. 
Although this is true, it has to be mentioned that the specific characteristics of the 
current humanitarian arms control agenda are unique to today. Only today, has the 
world been globalized in such a way to allow the transfer and trade of arms to cause 
an extraordinary awareness of its negative consequences. Also, actors such as NGOs 
and international institutions had not previously existed, which makes the current 
humanitarian arms control agenda unique. Like this, HAC is an example of how, 
indirectly, the understanding of security related issues is being seen more and more 
in a human rights and security relationship perspective. HAC also set a further 
appreciation of the interspace that surrounds the human rights and security 
relationship, or at least the interspace it wishes to have to properly be fulfilled and 
balanced.   
 
Small arms and light weapons 
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 One of the most important loci of humanitarian arms control is the attempt to 
control small arms and light weapons (Cooper, 2011). Small arms proliferation and its 
regulation has also become part of the contemporary arms trade history due to the 
profound effect it has had on the spread of violence across the world. Small arms and 
light weapons (SALW) are now thought of as practically synonymous with the problem 
of the conventional arms trade: their proliferation is widely understood as a key 
indicator of the transformation in the nature of conflict brought about by the end of 
superpower confrontation and the rise of globalization (Stavrianakis, 2011).  
 
Small arms spread and availability is essentially an international problem due to the 
international nature of both illicit arms trafficking and the illicit trade, and also 
because of the widespread character of the problem of armed violence in the world 
(Garcia, 2006, pág. 5). Obviously, SALW trade has also suffered an extraordinary 
increase in the last couple of decades. According to Michael Klare there are ten 
reasons for the increase in the small arms trade after the Cold War: the break-up of 
the former Soviet Union and the Yugoslav Federation, Ethnic warfare within the 
successor states of these regions, breakdown of central authority in Russia and the 
former Soviet Republics, diminished superpower authority over proxy forces in 
internal Third World conflicts, NATO and Warsaw Pact possessed large stockpiles of 
surplus weapons, the proliferation of ethnic, tribal and religious conflicts, growing 
social, political and economic disorder within societies, the growing importance of 
non-state actors, the growing vibrancy of the global underground economy, and the 
growing privatization of security and violence (Klare, 1995).  
 
In this sense, small arms were understood in a perspective of a Post Cold War era. 
There was no questioning arms control; however, the paradigm was to be broadened 
to include small arms and light weapons given their importance. The years following 
the end of the Cold War also saw” the introduction of human security principles into 
the field of arms export controls” (Bromley, Cooper, & Holtom, 2012, pág. 1035). Then 
the new organizing principle of arms control agreements had to be the attainment of 
human security: freeing people from the threat of violence (Garcia, 2006). The initial 
impetus for raising awareness regarding small arms can be traced back to two actors: 
scholars and practitioners (Garcia, 2006). The increase in attention on SALW is also an 
example of the increase of a more humanitarian arms control that gives human rights 
values a better place against typical security issues. Like so, this is another example of 
how the relationship between human rights and security has evolved to favour human 
rights more. It is also an example of the background surrounding the social 
construction of the paradigm that allowed for the ATT to happen.   
  
Actors and interactions of the human rights and security relationship  
 
 The interspace in which the human rights and security relationship occurs is as 
important as the actors that conform it. The activities these actors carry out are 
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equally crucial to the development, and therefore to the understanding of the human 
rights and security relationship. This part of the chapter will focus on precisely this. 
The human rights and security relationship is led by state and non-state actors. Most 
of the times, it tends to be that non-state actors support the human rights side while 
state actors the security side, but this is not necessarily black and white in all cases. 
As will be seen in the case studies, some state actors change the side they support 
depending on their moral and material interests at the time and depending on the 
domestic and international circumstances that surround them. This chapter will talk 
about a dialogue between constructivism and the English School of IR to set a basis 
for the understanding of the case studies presented further.  
 
Recent key actors that have supported the advancement of international norms that 
fall in the sphere of the human rights and security relationship, like the ATT, have 
been NGOs. NGOs tend to stick to their side and keep advocating for it more and more 
strongly despite changes in circumstances. IR theory, particularly constructivism, has 
focused in studying these non-state actors since about a few decades back. Margaret 
Keck and Kathryn Sikkink 1998 work has become the basis of these studies and large 
influence on the focus of this thesis. It has also set certain types of non-state actors 
and their activities as key in the development of a more important place for NGOs in 
the international scene as well as in IR theory. Studies on global civil society have also 
made NGOs centre stage and have given perspectives on how these actors use 
normative tools to influence state actors. These actors have also played a crucial role 
in the social construction of global governance and on defining how the elite 
designated to lead the international system works. Non-state actors are using norms, 
in particular for this study arms control norms, to achieve this. Below, all these stances 
will become apparent through the continuing deconstruction and construction of the 
interspace of the human rights and security relationship and the actors and activities 
that surround them. First there will be a taster of state action to continue further with 
non-state actions and interaction in a global human rights and security relationship.   
 
State´s actions in dialogue: constructivism, the English School and sociology  
 
 States are complex beings and so are their actions, particularly those relating 
to norms based on the human rights and security relationship interspace. As will be 
seen in the cases presented in this thesis, actors perform through a complex nexus of 
key material and moral interests that are partially determined, directly or indirectly, 
consciously or subconsciously, by other actors´ actions, by outside circumstances of 
the system as well as by the human rights and security normativity locally and 
internationally. This complexity of influences can only be understood with a 
combination of theoretical viewpoints, just as it was mentioned in the introductory 
chapter of this thesis. Starting with a constructivist point of view to then evolve into 
an English School one with a sociological point of view as well. Saying that state´s 
preferences are defined by norms is constructivist, as explained by Martha Finnemore 
(1996). In her 1996 work, she aims to respond to “one of constructivism problems 
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that the relationship among principles, norms, institutions and identities are not well 
defined and at times some researcher´s norm could be another´s identity; also, social 
elements of the relationship between these are not taken into consideration” (1996, 
p. 16). This is particularly crucial as norms are social structures, for Finnemore. Since 
the 1980s some authors have elevated social structures to causal status30; in fact 
constructivist authors have done the same in Katzensteins´s collection of essays: “ The 
Culture of National Security”(1996).  All of the contributors to the volume make social 
structures causal because they argue that they mould state´s preferences, as has been 
seen previously. 
 
Finnemore argues how constructivism is not good at explaining social structures as 
casual variables, therefore it must be united to the English School and institutionalists 
to impart causality to the social structure (Finnemore, 1996). One approach to the 
causality of social structures is found in the English School.31 The English School´s 
central claim is that the practice of states is shaped by international norms, regulated 
by international institutions and guided by moral purposes (Dunne, 2011). It also 
combines the realist international system with the liberal world society to create the 
international society, where in fact norms and social structures affect states´ 
behaviour.   
 
Because the English School has been criticised as needing to be more sociological, 
then the most comprehensive approach to social structures as causal variables is the 
sociologists view called institutional structure (Thomas et al., 1987). Unlike 
constructivist, they view social structure as coherent and all encompassing; unlike the 
English School, where states are primary actors, they understand international society 
to be a society of states but focusing on a broad range of actors where world culture 
influences organisations and individuals as well as states (Boli and Thomas, 1999b; 
Finnemore, 1996). The institutionalist perspective fails to go far enough to impart the 
social structure´s causality. Although this approach best explains causality, the three 
of them- constructivist, English School, and institutionalist work best when together. 
In institutionalist terms, “the society of states described by the English School and the 
norms and understandings identified by the constructivist can be understood as 
manifestations of much larger and more comprehensive world cultural forces” 
(Finnemore, 1996, p.21). Taking this as her basis, Finnemore takes the mutual 
constitutivity of agency and structure (Wendt, 1987) by focusing first on the power of 
social structures and then on the agent side to prove that both are important 
(Finnemore, 1996). This allows for another of the criticisms of constructivism to 
subside and allows for the basis of the explanation between the influence of the 
 
30 See (Haas, 1990; Kratochwil, 1989; Puchala and Hopkins, 1982; Ruggie, 1982)  
31 Most prominent scholars of English School: Hedley Bull, Martin Wight, Charles Manning, Robert 
Purnell, James Mayall, John Vincent, Barry Buzan, Tim Dunne, James Der Derian, Ole Weaver, Andrew 
Hurrell, Robert Jackson, Edward Keene, Andrew Linklater, Richard Little, James Mayall, Hidemi 
Suganami and Nicholas J. Wheeler to mention a few.   
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relationship between human rights and security on actors behaviour within the ATT, 
as will be seen in the case studies of this thesis.  
Finnemore´s international society and social norms, that create particular patterns of 
behaviour, shape or constitute the basic features of politics that most IR theory take 
as given: “what states want and even who or what states are” (Finnemore, 1996, 
p.130)32. The English School and institutionalist do explain the patterns of behaviour 
or the characteristics of their causality in some way, but neither pays sufficient 
attention to norms regarding human equality (Finnemore, 1996). Human equality is 
important for Finnemore for it is one of the three foundational normative elements 
of her international society. The other two are bureaucracies and markets. In the 
international society, International Organisations through international norms 
socialize states into accepting new values.  
Beyond Finnemore´s understanding there is a further affinity between the 
international society tradition and constructivism, according to English School scholar 
Tim Dunne (1998), Barry Buzan (2004) and to Christian Reus-Smith (2009) .33 Theorist 
from both parties, have gathered inspiration from each other, like Tim Dunne from 
Alexander Wendt, or constructivist in general from Martin Wight and Hedley Bull.34 
Both theories “assume the centrality of states, and both interrogate the meaning of 
international system/society according to the intersubjective practices through which 
it is constituted” (2009, p.58). The two views also share “interests in the cultural bases 
of state identity, the rule-governed nature of international society and the variable 
forms of life under anarchy” (Ibid.). The English School and constructivism also fall 
short upon understanding that interests cannot be defined without values, or 
strategies devised without knowledge (Ibid.). This is why beyond their similarities, 
both theories can be placed together to further comprehend the complexity of the 
international system and to bring them closer to the ideal theory, as Reus-Smith says 
(Ibid.).   
The parallelism between constructivism and the English School is much more 
complex, however this explains that state´s actions, as well as non-state actors 
´actions, need to be understood within these parameters in order to see their 
connection to the human rights and security relationship and with its interspace. It is 
also true that understanding actors in a much more open way allows to see the 
connection between the ATT, the human rights and security relationship and this 
thesis´s hypothesis relating to states controlling the means of violence, as explained 
above. How state´s actions are contingent to other´s actions and to the human rights 
and security relationship to arrive to states giving rights but controlling the means of 
violence needs to be seen in an exemplified manner. This is why further study of  
 
32 Finnemore´s international society is nothing particularly new, she recognizes that she takes elements 
of Weber, Tocqueville, Locke, Durkheim, Marx, etc.  
33 The English School of International Relations is also sometimes referred to as international society 
or British institutionalism.  
34 For more information on this see (Reus-Smit, 2009, pp.59–60).  
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states and their interaction in the human rights and security interspace will be better 
reviewed throughout the case studies presented subsequently. This is also why, in the 
remaining part of this chapter the focus will be more on non-state actors.   
 
TANs: key socializing actors and the “boomerang effect”  
 
 Beyond focusing on the understanding of actors, especially states, and viewing 
them from a holistic point of view encompassing diverse theories of IR and sociology, 
it is key to delve deeper unto the diverse angles upon which non-state actors are 
interpreted. This, especially seeing non-state actors, in particular NGOs, importance 
and influence on the balancing of the human rights and security relationship. 
Although, as already mentioned, some scholars (Keohane and Nye, 1977) had focused 
on transnational actors and other early constructivist began to fit norms into their 
research (Adler, 1997; Dessler, 1989; Kratochwil, 1989; Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986; 
Wendt, 1987; Thomas et al., 1987; Meyer and Hannan, 1979), it was not until 1998 
that transnational advocacy networks really became centre stage in constructivism 
and in IR. In order for actors to succeed, the agents or actors at work in the human 
rights and security relationship happen to form networks to obtain their objectives 
and through this multiply their opportunities for interaction and exchange (Keck and 
Sikkink, 1998). Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, from a constructivist point of view 
have studied the dynamics of these networks and have named them transnational 
advocacy networks. Transnational advocacy networks (TANs) evoke “the structured 
and structuring dimension in the actions of these complex agents” (Keck and Sikkink, 
1999, p.90). Again, it is a theoretical dedication to agents and the manner in which 
they interact.35 In fact, they claim that on issues of human rights, like the ATT for 
example, these networks interact and “also make international resources available to 
new actors in domestic political and social struggles”(Keck and Sikkink, 1999, p.89).  
 
Similarly to Sikkink´s work, alongside Finnemore (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998), on 
norms, draws on sociology to understand the complex interactions between actors. 
The agents tend to be NGOs at a domestic and international level. This networks are 
not new; in fact, the birth of the ICRC is an old example of these networks being at 
work since the end of the 19th Century. They have become more evident in the last 
decades and thanks to this literature they are tying up development studies and 
international studies to reach a better understanding of them. Transnational 
 
35 As focus on global civil society will follow, it is important to mention that Keck and Sikkink make the 
distinction from global civil society. They do not specifically refer to Chandler´s work, as it was written 
after Transnational Advocacy Networks. They refer to the predecessors of Chandler´s global civil 
society (Boli and Thomas, 1999b; Meyer and Hannan, 1979; Thomas et al., 1987). Keck and Sikkink 
claim that global civil society ignores issues of agency and political opportunity and some see NGOs not 
as actors but enactors (Boli and Thomas, 1999b). The work of Chandler and his contemporaries does 
allow for agency and its interactions to flourish. However, for purposes of this thesis, at times NGO, 
TAN and global civil society are used interchangeably.     
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networks according to Keck and Sikkink tend to emerge with issues where there is a 
lack of communication between the needs that local NGOs see and the officials in 
charge of addressing them. Such is the case for human rights, and in particular for this 
thesis human right security issues. Keck and Sikkink´s networks function through a 
“boomerang effect”. The “boomerang effect” puts national and international NGOs, 
social movements and networks as exerting pressure on the state from above and 
from below to bring human rights change in authoritarian regimes.  
 
Putting TANs centre stage and based on the “boomerang effect” other constructivist 
and ES scholars have carried out large studies that push towards a more 
comprehensive union between human rights and security and the norms and norm 
internalization surrounding them. These studies have become crucial to understand 
the construction of norms, and even more so the internalization of human rights 
based norms. This research results invaluable to the deeper understanding of how 
regimes, like the ATT, are internalized and how their internalization has consequences 
that have been theorized upon and will aid in the analysis of this thesis´ case studies. 
The power of human rights and the persistent power of human rights books (Risse et 
al., 1999; Risse et al., 2013) focus on the series of steps that a norm must endure to 
influence the state. The study argues that the process by which international norms 
are internalized and implemented domestically is the process of socialization (Risse 
et al., 1999). This process has three necessary mechanisms: (1) processes of 
instrumental adaptation and strategic bargaining; (2) processes of moral 
consciousness-raising, argumentation, dialogue, and persuasion; (3) processes of 
institutionalization and habitualization. The three types of socialization socialize non- 
compliant states into human rights norms during distinct phases also known as the 
“spiral model” (Risse et al., 1999; Risse et al., 2013). This model is inspired by the 
“boomerang effect” where the international network that pushes for change also 
supports local organizations (Risse et al., 1999, p.18). In these processes states make 
concessions but also sometimes follow norms because they want others to think well 
of them, and because they want to think well of themselves (Fearon, 1997). This has 
served as an example of the crucial role that TANs play in the realm of international 
law and particularly in the advancement of norms directly related to the human rights 
and security relationship. All in all, these authors example reminds us that: “The 
diffusion of international norms in the human rights area crucially depends on the 
establishment and the sustainability of networks among domestic and transnational 
actors who manage to link up with international regimes, to alert Western public 
opinion and Western governments (Risse et al., 1999, p.5)”.  
 
Global Civil Society 
 
 The process of globalization together with the end of the Cold War allowed for 
more global focus in academic, diplomatic and theoretical terms. Little by little it 
brought new dimensions in international relations theory focused on other actors 
beside the states. Besides the recently mentioned studies on TANs, work on global 
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civil society has also set non-state actors as centre stage. This because, the tendency 
to focus on states can lead to “only legitimise and perpetuate discourses and practices 
of political regulation which are built on—and maintained by—exclusion and 
war”(Chandler, 2004a, p.315)36. Before this turn in IR, realists and liberalists 
exaggerated their focus on military and economical factors and claimed rationality of 
actors. After this turn, some academics decided that it was better to focus on norms, 
values and the power of ideas rather than the power of empirical force (Finnemore 
and Sikkink, 1998; Manners, 2002). This has given “greater focus on the global civil 
society without dismissing the role of the states, making the study of the global 
system, a system increasingly composed of layers of political institutions, individuals, 
groups and even companies, as well as states and international institutions” (Anheier 
et al., 2005; Kaldor, 2003, p.583).  
 
Global civil society can be referred to as similar to Kant´s universal civil society and 
has come into the experts’ attention since the early 90s. The global civil society refers 
to the non-state actors that operating ‘beyond the confines of national societies, 
polities and economies’, and to new global norms and values variously ascribed to 
these actors or derived from their interaction (Anheier et al., 2005; Chandler, 2004b; 
Chandler, 2004a). The activities of the global civil society have permitted a “shift from 
formal national institutions to new local and cross-border spaces” (Kaldor, 2013a, 
p.148). As examples the humanitarian security norms that NGOs have conceived and 
led: the Ottawa Treaty, the Cluster Munitions Ban and the Arms Trade Treaty. Like 
this, the actions of the, so called, global civil society have also brought to light the 
power of norms and the human rights discourse that has been raised above 
sovereignty and has put a new positive agenda (Chandler, 2004b).  
 
Constructivism has broadly focused on theorising on global civil society, where non-
state actors pressure states into acting in a more morally enlightened manner that 
has redefined and reconstructed their identities and interests, becoming part of a new 
post- Westphalian moral agenda (Chandler, 2004b, p.19). The way in which the global 
civil society pressures the state is through international normative structures created 
by multiple interactions of state and non-state actors (Ibid., p. 25). This view 
exemplifies the influence of structure on agency through a constant interaction 
between the two that generates dynamic results that more and more value certain 
topics over others, like human rights further intertwined in the security realm defined 
by normative agents in the global political arena. In this sense, David Chandler, claims 
that constructivists assumptions of global civil society demonstrate the importance of 
ideas, or moral and ethical dialogue, over the importance of power relations 
(Chandler, 2004b, p.55). He also claims that the explanation for the rise of moral and 
ethical concerns cannot be found in the international sphere or the new international 
pressures from non-state actors but in the projection of national interests and 
 
36 Chandler references this conclusion as coming from: (Campbell, 1998; Connolly, 1991; Foucault, 
2003; Pogge, 1994) 
 70 
domestic change (Chandler, 2004b, p.81). This view complicates the role and perhaps 
the importance of the global civil society, although it does make a point to take into 
consideration national themes just as much as international ones. In other academics 
view the reasons for change are actually a combination of domestic, international and 
everything-in-between circumstances, as will be seen below in Avant et al´s work on 
“Who governs the globe?” (2010). This combination of reasons will become important 
for this thesis, for when studying the case studies, it will be important to focus on the 
influence of the international structure but also on the domestic peculiarities of each 
case to understand the nexus of key interests that are at play on each case´s human 
rights and security relationship.  
 
Who governs the globe?  
 
 In the interspace of the human rights and security relationship, if the global 
civil society or TANs have been slowly gaining entry into the governing elite of the 
international system, how does this governing body work? In the IR theory, global 
governance is regarded as instance of governance in the absence of government 
where there is no government at the global level,  but there is governance, of variable 
effectiveness (Ruggie, 2014). In this case, the social construction of reality is awarded 
to agents in the international arena.  It is these agents that are in charge of defining, 
changing and adapting realms of social life to cope with structural changes. Global 
governance, explains this dynamism and studies the ins and outs of the governors and 
their interactions. Global governance has many definitions but all more or less 
conclude of it as:  “the sum of organizations, policy instruments, financing 
mechanisms, rules, procedures, and norms” or “the collective effort to identify, 
understand, and address worldwide problems that are beyond the capacity of 
individual States” ((Najam et al. 2006; Club of Rome n.d.) in (Avant et al., 2010)).  
 
Deeply studied by Avant, Finnemore and Sell in 2010, this part of constructivist IR 
theory has evolved from studies of the interaction of agency and structure that 
started around the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall alongside the empowerment of 
new types of actors due to globalization, privatization and technological change 
(Avant et al., 2010; Bull, 1977; Wendt, 1992). Global governance has looked into 
making sense to the new interactions between state and non-state actors increasingly 
gaining centre stage in world politics. Particularly in the 1990s, global governance 
efforts were clear and had strong effects. To mention a few pertinent for this thesis: 
the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of the World Conference on 
Human Rights and the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Both involving non-state actors and 
their undisputed presence and leadership in international affairs. The actors in these 
outcomes are active agents who want new structures and rules (or different rules) to 




Avant, Finnemore and Sell´s hunch is that “it is not the type of actor but the character 
of relationships, both among governors and between governor and governed, that is 
key to understanding global politics” (Avant et al., 2010, p.3). Focusing on the 
governors it is understandable that structural constraints may explain their changes, 
but for Avant et al, governance is the result of constraints generated and led by 
agents. This portrays the high importance of agency in constructivist study and the 
importance of it to this thesis. Because these agents do not live in a vacuum but in 
constant change, their relationship and acting dynamic is driven by exogenous and 
endogenous factors as well as constraints. Avant et al conclude that these are not only 
intermestic ones- defined by Putnam´s two-level game (1988) but constraints that 
reside in multiple levels that build upon themselves to create a distinct method of 
global governance depending on the case. This will be seen in the diverse case studies 
of different types of agents for this thesis.  
 
In global governance, there are multiple authorities, just like it will be seen in the case 
of the ATT between leading NGOs and championing states. This does not signify that 
if an NGO has power it would mean less power for the state, on the contrary non state 
actors sometimes enhance state power as will be seen in the case studies of this 
thesis. Governors also function by seeking trust to gain legitimacy even if the structure 
of global governance is informal. A final conclusion of Avant et al is that expecting 
surprises within the study of the relationship of the governors and how they achieve 
their duties is key to understanding the dynamic processes of global governance.  
 
Today, global governance is slowly becoming more apparently weak. Global 
governance architectures, legal and institutional, are said to be fragmenting 
(Biermann, Pattberg, Van Asselt, & Zelli, 2009; Koskenniemi & Leino, 2002 in Ruggie, 
2014). Traditional forms of international legalization and negotiation through 
universal consensus-based institutions are stagnating (Pauwelyn, Wessel, & Wouters, 
2012 in Ruggie, 2014). For Thomas Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson, it remains slippery 
and abusively used, by academics and policymakers, as an attempt to control the 
pernicious aspects of globalization, and a synonym for world government (2014). They 
raise issues about the somewhat lacking deeper investigation of global governance in 
terms of: how power is exercised globally, structures of global authority, increasing 
complexity, actor proliferation, and change. Although, Martha Finnemore has replied 
to these concerns (Finnemore, 2014) by sketching more focused research agendas on 
these issues, the fact of the matter is that global governance is changing.  
 
The relative decline of the West and the rise of new powers, like the BRIC countries, 
as well as the rise of nationalistic populist governments add to this change. New 
dynamics are being shaped every day with every new world issue. The number of 
significant countries and significant non-state actors has risen. However, the existing 
dynamism appears to at times continue to preference established powers (Stephen, 
2017). This is taking global governance into a new era, an undefined era that unlike 
the golden era of the 1990s is more complicated and more fragmented. However, this 
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can also be seen as the expectation of surprises that Avant et al conclude in their 
work. Which brings to the idea the non-static evolution of governance and therefore 
of the factors surrounding it.  
 
Global governing through multilateral arms control  
 
 Tying up norm creation with global governance within the realm of the 
interspace of the human rights and security relationship is easy when focusing on 
governing agents and their interactions in the international arena. Because agents 
play a deciding role in global governance it is also important to understand them 
within the arms control environment that the ATT puts them in. Harald Muller and 
Carmen Wunderlich, focusing their empirical research on multilateral arms control, 
explain the dynamics within norms in response to the constructivist criticism of lack 
of agency. The authors argue that their view is less static and agency based with 
particular notice on agency represented by the so called norm entrepreneur 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). They base their theory on a Putnam´s two level game 
(1988) where the domestic stage influences the international stage and vice versa, to 
explain how these norm entrepreneurs make their decisions on norms. In this two 
level norm discourse, agents have to engage in bargaining both with their 
international interlocutors in order to achieve agreement and with their principals in 
order to achieve sufficient compromise to give their consent to the agreement (Muller 
and Wunderlich, 2013, p.10). 
Muller and Wunderlich describe norm dynamics as the meaning of the norm that may 
change from beginning of the norm-setting process onward and is subject to change 
by agency (Muller and Wunderlich, 2013, p.11). There is no norm dynamics without 
intentional agency and that is why most of the book is devoted to norm entrepreneurs 
and their drive to change norms. Like this, the authors recognize the static-
structuralist bias of constructivist research on norms (Wunderlich, 2013, pp.20–21).  
Norm change is triggered by disputes arising from applying the norm to a specific 
situation or in reaction to triggering events or acts (Wunderlich, 2013, p.30). In 
opposition to Finnemore and Sikkinik (1998), norm entrepreneurs do not necessarily 
have to be in the initial phase of the “lifecycle of a norm”, actually for Wunderlich 
they have to be in a later phase.  
Muller identifies three types of norm entrepreneurs: (1) Common- good driven; (2) 
Conventional-driven; and (3) In between (Müller, 2013, pp.352–357). States are not 
the only actors that can be norm entrepreneurs, in particular in type (1) NGOs and 
IOs- if they act in an independent way, pursue a combination of common good, 
humanitarian, and justice orientations that the individual as the rightful moral 
claimant entitled to be protected; this explains why this group of entrepreneurs is 
 73 
strongly promoting humanitarian arms control (Müller, 2013, p.352).37 Meanwhile, 
the actors in type (2) are states, most times great powers that according to Muller 
and Wunderlich´s findings are dominate their concerns on national security. Much like 
it will be seen in these thesis´s case studies, there is no norm dynamics without 
intentional agency for the authors as well as norm entrepreneurs that can act in a 
later phase of the lifecycle of a norm. This clearly in relation, as will be seen further 
forward, to norm implementers. 
 
In some ways the topic of this thesis, particularly the focus on the implementation of 
a multilateral arms control treaty and the interests behind it, can be relatable to parts 
of this work: Norm Dynamics in Multilateral Arms Control: Interests, Conflicts, and 
Justice (Muller and Wunderlich, 2013). However, there a few reasons why it is not. 
First of all, the methodology, analytical framework and theory combinations are not 
the same. Chapter 2 of this book focuses on humanitarian arms control alongside with 
weapons of mass destruction. Fours chapters are dedicated to the different agents 
involved in norm dynamics. It does so, by basing on Putnam´s two level game, 
different to this thesis that goes beyond and into a multilevel game. As David 
Mutimer, in his of review says: “Although the book does a very good job at studying 
the legal commitments, the contradictions that have either emerged or been coded 
within them, and the strategies that the most salient states have taken. It does, 
however, leave very little room to explore the central problem that spurred the book: 
what is the relationship between norms and interests” (Mutimer, 2014). This is where 
this thesis differs and adds onto this study, by truly focusing on the nexus of moral 




 Throughout this chapter the interspace and the key actors of the human rights 
and security within it have become clear through the focus on norm dynamics in the 
realm of arms control. A genealogical sense of understanding coupled with 
constructivism continues to guide the understanding of the interspace of the 
constructivist human rights and security relationship. A particular actor in this 
interspace and actors, and in the international system in general, are non-state actors. 
Specially with the CMV lens that this thesis seeks to carry, non-state actors become 
the holders of global-local action that allows for radical and inclusive forms of 
controlling the means of violence and avoiding embedding with militarism. These 
actors, whether performing as networks, individually, within the state or 
internationally have been gathering momentum for a few decades to appear centre 
stage in practice, in theory and in this chapter. Their activities have been responsible 
for the underlying recognition of the human rights and security relationship in the 
 
37 NGOs, certainly the most moral actors in the field, are also organizations with material interests (in 
funding) and leaders who, at times, display in elevated egos. Battles over turf are not infrequent, and 
coordination is always a problem (Müller, 2013, p.352).  
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area of arms control, located in the newly created norms like the ATT. This has not 
meant that state actors have been overlooked, in fact non-state actors almost always 
work in relation to state actors, especially when promoting human security 
(Axworthy, 2001).  
 
The construction and maintenance of the ever-changing interspace in which the 
human rights and security relationship develops comes from multiple poles, including 
state and non-state actors. Nevertheless, as will become apparent in the rest of the 
chapters, non-state actors balance out more, or more purely, the human rights and 
security relationship towards the human rights side, which is usually the most needed 
side. The construction of the interspace that allowed for the human rights and 
security relationship to continue flourishing and for the Arms Trade Treaty to happen 
and continue being implemented the right way, is the sum of diverse concepts and 
perspectives on actors that have been explored by different scholars in the field of 
arms control in IR. The interspace concepts of humanitarian security regimes, 
disarmament diplomacy, contemporary arms control, humanitarian arms control and 
small arms and light weapons, have a different focus, even though they touch upon 
similar topics. The concept of CMV, as has been explained in this chapter and in 
chapter 1, has allowed to understand the need to focus on actors, particularly non-
state, to include forms of global-local action and moral action to explain the 
weaknesses of constructivism.  
 
The second part of this chapter has been dedicated to the actors of the human rights 
and security relationship. This part focuses more, although not exclusively on non-
state actors as in most cases they support more the advancement of human rights, or 
at least in a purer way. The studies used in this part of the chapter exemplify well how 
non-state actors develop in the interspace of the human rights and security 
relationship. Each study has a different perspective, but all are based upon non-state 
actors called by different names, like transnational advocacy networks or global civil 
society. These actors interact and socialize within them, with other non-state actors 
and with state actors in order to achieve their purpose.  
 
Farther than paying attention to state and non-state actors and observing them from 
an all-encompassing theory, it is imperative for this thesis to focus on NGOs and how 
they have gained prominence in International Relations, in the international system 
and in the human rights and security relationship. The beginning of further 
importance on non-state actors was with what Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink 
defined as transnational advocacy networks or TANs. Focus on TANs means focus on 
agents and on the way in which they interact. For example, with issues of human 
rights these agents also make international resources available to new actors, as will 
be seen with the actors in the ATT creation and implementation in the following 
chapters. Similar to TANs, global civil society pressures the state through international 
normative structures (Chandler, 2004b), demonstrating the influence of structure 
upon agency, the constant dynamics involved and the importance of ideas, morality 
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and ethics over power (Ibid.). Morality and ethics, David Chandler claims, stem from 
national interests and domestic changes. However, these changes are actually 
considered to be a combination of national, international and everything-in-between 
circumstances, as Avant et al´s work has come to show (2010). This combination of 
reasons is important for this thesis, as it encompasses the nexus of key moral and 
material interests that push for the enhancing or attenuation of the human rights and 
security relationship. What matters most is not the type of actor but the character of 
the relationship between governors and governed. Global governance is constantly 
changing, as are its agents, the current understanding of global governance is 
declining affected by factors coming from all levels. This is why Avant et al, conclude 
to expect surprises. This will become apparent in the case studies that will follow, as 
agents, whether state or non-state, are bombarded by changes in circumstances from 
above, below and everywhere in between. Their interests are defined by domestic, 
international and other levels and are ever-changing and non-static. This will show 
the effect it has on the human rights and security relationship of each case. Then, 
particularly the interaction between different actors, usually between state and non-
state actors, will allow the explanation of moral action and therefore aid in the 
weaknesses of constructivism. Due to the complexity of the actors and of the 
circumstances that circumscribe them, the further socialization of actors will become 
more obvious as the case studies are developed, as well as when the next chapter 













 In the period from 1989 to 1996, there had been $150 billion worth of global 
arms transfers, the US accounted for over 45% of them (Arias, 5 October 1996). This 
massive availability of weapons and the transfers that came with it were out of control 
with the majority ending in countries with severe violent domestic issues. Oscar Arias, 
and a group of his fellow Nobel Peace Laurates got together to represent the civil 
society and publicly unveil the International Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers in 
1997. The code asked that weapons-producing countries refrain from selling arms to 
states that live under dictatorships, commit human rights abuses or are engaged in 
aggression against other nations or peoples (Arias, 29 May 1997). This action is part 
of the many actions that the evolution of the relationship between human rights and 
security have brought, particularly since the end of World War II. It is these actions 
that pushed for the creation of the Arms Trade Treaty that came into force in 
December 2014.  
 
The Arms Trade Treaty is a direct reflection of the legacy of the relationship between 
human rights and security that has been discussed in this thesis. Through its 
negotiation process, functioning and implementation, it exemplifies the balancing act 
that occurs between norm dynamics, global governance and humanitarian arms 
control. It reflects the push for greater attention of the humanitarian aspect of 
security issues started since the creation of the Geneva Conventions. It exemplifies 
the complexity that exists between actors, state and non-state, that juxtapose to 
create a new sort of dynamism between civil society, states and international 
mechanisms to impulse human rights in a typically considered security issue.  
 
The ATT includes diverse ways of arms control, as part of chapter 3 has shown. These 
have clearly influenced the creation and continuity of the ATT as well as the actors’ 
objectives and interests. This chapter will concentrate on the Arms Trade Treaty and 
will be divided into two parts: part one, on its characteristics and key issues before 
and during its creation and part two, on the implementing of the treaty post 2014 and 
the important role of NGOs in it. In the literature, the ATT has been extensively 
studied (Spies, 2009; Garcia, 2014; Stohl, 2015; Casey-Maslen et al., 2016; Bolton and 
James, 2014; Bromley et al., 2012; Carneiro, 2007; Kytomaki, 2015; Searle, 1995; 
Stavrianakis, 2016; Stedjan, 2013; Worster, 2014) with particular attention on the 
negotiations. This chapter, will not explore those works, only indirectly whilst talking 
about its humanitarian core, the role of normative agents in the first part and the 
description of the official treaty mechanisms in the second part. This chapter will 
serve as example of the cross-fertilization between constructivism and the English 
School, where a norm is the example that the practice of states is shaped by it as well 
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as being guided by moral purposes (Dunne, 2011). This will allow to comprehend how 
the norm entrepreneurs that will later become norm implementers, in the empirical 
chapters, have been continuing with what Keck and Sikkink set out for them: a 
boomerang effect of exerting pressure on the state from above and from below (Keck 
and Sikkink, 1998).    
 
The first of the chapter part will evidence, a system of global governance, like the one 
described in chapter 3, where diverse agents play in a multilevel game seeking to 
change or improve the international structure. It will also seek to explain why states 
agreed to the ATT, or to any other similar regime. The importance of non-state actors 
and their socialization with state actors will become apparent. However, so will the 
still important role of states in the acceptance of human rights and security regimes. 
This will serve as a basis for the understanding of the nexus of key material and moral 
interests that aligns with the human rights and security relationship of each case 
presented in subsequent chapters.  
 
The second part of this chapter will center around the implementation of the treaty, 
particularly from the side of the institutions of the treaty itself. It starts with an 
analysis of the official mechanisms of the treaty followed by the unofficial ones. This 
subpart will exhibit the preponderance of state actors, not only because the treaty is 
composed of states, but also because the institutions, dynamics and activities that 
surround its positioning into everyday international life do as well. It is important to 
mention that one of the key unofficial mechanisms of the treaty, ATT Monitor, will be 
one of the main focuses of chapter 5 and will therefore not be discussed in this 
chapter. The reliance on NGOs for the future of the ATT and their direct role in the 
evolution towards a more human rights based relationship between human rights and 
security will come about by the end of this chapter. This second part of the chapter 
will also coincide with this thesis´ argument that the states of the ATT give rights whilst 
controlling the means of violence, where state and non-state actors complement each 
other in the search of treaty fulfillment. This chapter will also shed light upon why the 
ATT and its major actors matter, for purposes of this thesis and otherwise. It will 
demonstrate the complex dynamic of global governance between actors that 
continues to allow for the contemporary relationship between security and rights to 
continue its evolution. Also, attention on the treaty, its actors and its institutions will 
allow for an understanding of the organisations became the Treaty´s norm 
entrepreneurs. The figure of norm entrepreneur will serve as a basis to understand 
the figure norm implementers of the ATT and of the human rights and security 
relationship that will be used across the case studies in further chapters.  
  
Overview of the Arms Trade Treaty Pre 2014 
 
 One of the key facts about the Arms Trade Treaty is its humanitarian core, key 
for the advancement of these types of norms in the international system and key for 
the understanding of the evolution of the human rights and security relationship. 
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Humanitarianism is stated directly in the body of the treaty as well as indirectly in the 
long negotiations that precede it. The treaty and its humanitarianism reflect a clear 
position in favour of a more balanced human rights and security relationship. The 
same can be said about its key actors, like non-state organisations and championing 
states. However, as it will become apparent in subsequent chapters, this is not the 
case when looking at the implementation of the treaty. States joined the ATT for many 
diverse reasons, depending on the state. One crucial reason, as will be stated under 
this part of the chapter is the maintenance of their reputation. What is behind this 
action is a series of multilevel causes similar to those that will be analysed in 
accordance with the nexus of material and moral interests on the case studies.  
 
Humanitarian core  
 
 The Arms Trade Treaty entered into force on December 2014. It is the first 
legally binding international mechanism to regulate the transfer of arms and manage 
their spread across borders. Article 1 states that the control of conventional weapons 
has the purpose of reducing human suffering and to contribute to regional and 
international peace. Its main provisions are to set rules for the transfer (meaning the 
export, import, transit, trans-shipment and brokering) of conventional weapons – 
meaning battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large-caliber artillery system, combat 
aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles and missile launchers and small arms 
and light weapons; under the treaty’s provisions, national governments will need to 
examine the risk of these arms being used to commit or facilitate serious acts of 
gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children 
(Delgado, 2015). The treaty makes definite prohibitions on  arms transfers that build 
upon and reinforce the existing instrument of arms embargoes (Erickson, 2013). The 
United States has not ratified the treaty; mainly because it touches unto very sensitive 
domestic policies, like arms control but also because the US had since years before 
set its own checks on arms trade. Still, the treaty has been enforced without the US. 
In fact, leading up to the Arms Trade Treaty, the United Nations General Assembly 
passed three ground-breaking resolutions by overwhelming majority, signaling 
consensus on the need to proscribe weapons transfers that jeopardize states’ 
commitments to IHL and HRL (Garcia, 2015, p.65).  
 
The Arms Trade Treaty is humanitarian in its core. Besides reaffirming and 
acknowledging elements of the Charter of the United Nations and the Geneva 
Conventions that seek to promote security and human rights, it specifically recognizes 
the security, social, economic and humanitarian consequences of the illicit and 
unregulated trade in conventional arms (United Nations, 2013). Similar to the Mine 
Ban Treaty and the Convention on cluster munitions, both human rights based 
security treaties, it is the culmination of over a hundred years of the evolution of the 
contemporary relationship between human rights and security. The ATT allows for 
humans to be the primary objective of a security issue, which in a typically 
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Westphalian perspective would never have happened. As has been discussed 
throughout this thesis, this has been made possible by decades of a norm cascade 
process started since the creation of the First Geneva Convention. The treaty is 
evidence that human rights has gained leverage against security in the human rights 
and security conundrum and that conceiving international issues taking into 
consideration the human rights and security relationship, directly or indirectly, 
consciously or subconsciously is effective. However, this is only in relation to the 
treaty´s creation, that although imperative it is not where the story ends. Much 
attention and effort is still needed to make the ATT a well implemented treaty and to 
keep pushing for actors, especially some state actors, to prioritize human rights over, 
or at the same level as, security in the human rights and security relationship.  
 
Key actors in the ATT negotiation 
 
 Similarly, to what happened with the creation of the First Geneva Convention, 
it was the civil society the one that gave the biggest impulse to create what would 
become the ATT. First a single norm entrepreneur: Oscar Arias and other Nobel Peace 
Laureates, later known as the Arias Foundation. Subsequently the creation by 
International Action Network Against Small Arms, Amnesty International, and Oxfam 
of Control Arms Campaign in 2003 intended to establish a binding international 
agreement to control the arms trade according to established principles of human 
rights, humanitarian law, sustainable development, and peaceful international 
relations (Spies, 2009). This story can almost be compared to Henry Dunant and the 
ICRC, where there are no norm dynamics without the norm entrepreneur (Muller and 
Wunderlich, 2013). Actually, more than a comparison it is clear that what some claim 
is the uniqueness of the ATT creation is actually part of the norm cascade brought 
upon by the Geneva Conventions.  
 
However, the ATT is unique and the complicated negotiation process is evidence of 
the challenge human rights based regimes have on state actors, on non-state actors 
and on the system. All and all it took almost two decades of initiatives and even a 
failed attempt in for the treaty to come about. What this delay represents, among 
other issues, is the complicated relationship that actors have with the human rights 
and security relationship, with the advancement of human security, with the 
supposed partly loss of state preponderance over all things security internationally 
and nationally and with the overall acceptance of an advancement of non-state actors 
in the international system. Nevertheless, a new global governance dynamic came 
about with the ATT were non-state and state actors operated together to succeed. 
The support of the one of the world´s largest arm exporter and Security Council 
member, the UK, was a major reason why the ATT triumphed. The UK’s championing 
of the ATT’s cause came as: “a breakthrough for activists who, worked for years for a 
treaty, elevating their cause to the next level and representing an important step to 
bring the treaty to life” (Garcia, 2014, p.428). The UK did not work alone, it gathered 
a core group of states: Australia, Argentina, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan and Kenya. 
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Interestingly, as will be seen in chapter 6, the UK´s position has somewhat changed in 
relation to the ATT and particularly to the human rights side of the human rights and 
security relationship. 38   
 
These norm dynamics and the state and non-state actor involved represent efforts in 
global governance where the Arias Foundation, Control Arms and championing states 
became active agents, in different phases of the negotiation, who wanted to achieve 
change in the international structure of normative security with a clear IHL and HRL 
core (Avant et al., 2010). The central group of states mobilized worldwide advocacy 
as vibrantly as the campaigners, with vision and principled pragmatism, inaugurating 
a new way to get things done in world politics, and within the UN (Morley, 2014; 
Bolton, 2013, pp. 9–10; Kimball,2013 in (Garcia, 2014, p.428)). Even after the failure 
of 2012, due to the US´s opposition, Mexico, a country that also became a core agent 
in the late negotiations, led the statement that 90 states continued to be committed 
to pursue the treaty.  
 
These agent actions evidence a system of global governance where agents seek to 
change or improve the structure. They also signify a step towards a further evolution 
of the relationship between human rights and security. The actors have been 
influenced by domestic and international pressures but also by the heavily 
humanitarian discourse that surrounds security more and more. Some think that this 
is the outcome of relates to a broader post-Cold War trend putting human rights and 
humanitarian issues (Erickson, 2015). Others might think this is an outcome of a new 
movement of states wanting to raise morality issues in their foreign policies  (Dunne 
and Wheeler, 2004; Dunne and Wheeler, 1999). However, it is also a clear effect of 
the norm cascade that the Geneva Conventions have brought upon and of the way in 
which agents are creating structural changes through the social construction of norms 
that define new paradigms in the international stage.  
 
Why states accepted the ATT: international and domestic concerns 
 
 Although international politics are slowly changing, there is still a notion of 
state centric security prioritizing understanding of reality. Stemming in particular from 
the Cold War and prevailing notions of realist theory, as was explained in chapter 2. 
Unwritten norms of state interaction with international agreements joined by the 
importance of state actors have led to believe that states have a difficult time 
accepting instruments that might in some way erode their principals. Such is the case 
for the Arms Trade Treaty. So then why did states accept ATT? 
 
 
38 To date the UK has violated the precepts of the ATT and has sold millions of pounds worth of arms 
to Saudi Arabia protracting the crisis in Yemen. This will be further analysed in the chapter on the UK 
as case study.  
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Without a doubt the work of individuals- like Oscar Arias- and NGOs- like Oxfam, ICRC, 
AI, etc- had much to do with the impulse that led to the creation of ATT. However, 
ATT´s history demonstrates how states acceptance was key for the treaty to advance. 
Without powerful state´s acceptance, like in the first attempt of ATT, the treaty did 
not survive. Championing states where crucial to the negotiation, but these states, 
like the UK, were actually major arms exporters. What was their interest in abiding by 
an arms transfer human rights based security regime? 
 
As will be experienced in further chapters, other non-state actors besides NGOs come 
into play in the interactions with the ATT and the human rights and security 
relationship. Other non-state actors that can be international or domestic and that 
influence the state´s material and even moral interests. This will become more 
apparent in chapter 6 and 7. In the meantime and in relation with the ATT, it is 
important to mention that the military industry has a long term close relationship with 
the state which has resulted in an influential role in shaping domestic and 
international policies (Adams 1981; Eisenhower 1961; Kurth 1971; Markusen et al. 
1991; Moravscik 1993 in (Erickson, 2009)). Evidence of government subsidies and 
financial aid supports this (Hartung, 1996). Specially in the early  1990s it was believed 
that the voice of the arms industry should be reflected in state policy (Moravcsik, 
1993; Moravcsik, 1991). The state is not so much an actor in world politics in its own 
right, but rather a “representative institution constantly subject to capture and 
recapture, construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social actors” and their 
interests (Moravscik 1997: 518 in (Erickson, 2009)). This goes hand in hand with the 
nexus of moral and material interests that interplay in the human rigths and security 
relationship of this thesis, as it will be later seen. What it means in practical terms is 
that the domestic sphere matters and it did so for states when negotiating the ATT. 
What happens nationally with the arms industry, specially for this case, is relevant. If 
the arms industry is interested in having arms transfers regulated and believes it will 
benefit from it, then their lobbying groups will push for acceptance of the treaty. 
However, domestic issues are not the only factor behind states decisions.  
 
Jennifer Erickson´s book Dangerous Trade: Arms Exports, Human Rights, and 
International Reputation argues that states engage in this type of arms export 
methodology to keep their international reputation intact (2015). Erickson finds that 
states policy choices have nothing to do with the defence industry preferences but 
instead they come from the desire to enhance their reputations as responsible 
citizens of the international community (Erickson, 2015; Erickson, 2009). Chapter 5 of 
Erickson´s book turns to domestic reputation to explain states compliance. According 
to her scandals in the news on extremely irresponsible arms transfer can damage a 
nations reputation leading to loss of legitimacy and other political costs (Erickson, 
2015). To keep these scandals at bay, states engage in treaties like ATT. Reputation as 
a social incentive for states is seen as a concrete mechanism through which states 
socialize. This does not mean that norm internalization and norm cascade don’t exist, 
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simply that reputation is heading states interests when deciding to abide by a arms 
transfers regime.39  
 
The long negotiation and failed attempt exemplify the difficulty for states to accept 
the treaty. The answer as to why states accepted ATT, although casuistic, is a 
combination of domestic and international concerns as has been mentioned. It is also 
a representation of the effect that the dynamics of global governance have upon its 
actors and of the multilevel causation of actor´s actions in the human rights and 
security relationship and in the international system in general. This will become even 
more apparent as the thesis carries on and the case studies are presented. Behind 
those concerns is the philosophy of the relationship between human rights and 
security. It is clear that the effect of a more human rights based understanding of 
security topics has permeated into the civil society, which has then permeated- 
directly or indirectly- into the state’s decision making process. The Geneva 
Convention´s norm cascade and norm internalization have also played a major role in 
allowing for the preponderance of human rights preponderance over security issues.  
 
Post 2014: Implementing the ATT alongside NGOs 
 
 The power of human rights (Risse et al., 2013; Risse et al., 1999), the 
“boomerang effect” of transnational advocacy networks (TANs) (Keck and Sikkink, 
1999) and the norm internalisation (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) of human rights 
and security instruments, like the Geneva Convention, have succeeded, all that is left 
is the successful fulfilment of the treaty. It has only been six years since the Arms 
Trade Treaty entered into force in December 2014.  However, faults are quickly 
coming to shore and are giving both state and non-state actors gaps to fill. Dynamics 
between state and non-state actors in the implementation of the treaty reflect 
symptoms of global governance previously discussed on Chapter 3. Although most of 
the theory on global governance could be probably focused solely on the norm 
creation process there is much to rescue in terms of norm implementation. As will be 
seen in this chapter section, global civil society or NGOs pressures the state through 
the international norm structure (Chandler, 2004b). In fact, this goes further than the 
Arms Trade Treaty, for NGOs have sought state fulfilment across parallel projects of 
their own, as will be seen below. Although, deeper proof of global governance 
theories will be further noticed by the end of the rest of the case studies of this thesis, 
the ATT implementation case the interaction between structure and agency will be 
reflected within the sphere of multiple authorities (Avant et al., 2010) all within the 
constraints of an international arms control treaty.  
 
 
39 What happens then with the UK case? The UK was a championing state for the ATT and today sees 
itself in scandals of arms sales to Saudi Arabia that have brought upheaval in civil society. This issue will 
be discussed further in the upcoming case study chapter on the UK.  
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ATT official mechanisms- The Secretariat and Presidency 
 
 Following what is established in the Treaty document, in its preamble and in 
Article 5, each state party is responsible for taking all the required measures to assure 
a successful implementation of the treaty. With this, the treaty sets no formal 
mechanism to ensure this and leaves the door open for civil society to have a key role 
in doing so. The only official requirements are the annual delivery of a report on 
export-import of weapons as well as the attendance to the annual Conference of State 
Parties (CSP) which take place only once a year and do not allow for a year-long 
dedication towards the Treaty. Article 13 requires that each state submits annually a 
report of exports and imports of conventional arms established on Article 2. In order 
to comply with Article 13, one initial reports plus two annual reports are supposed to 
have been presented by each state so far. Transparency is crucial for the ATT´s success 
and with reporting it is sought after. Reporting is the only measure that the Treaty 
has, since the ATT secretariat has no direct enforcement authority. The ATT 
Secretariat has the duty to assist State Parties in the effective implementation of the 
Treaty. As established on Article 18, the Secretariat is responsible to State Parties and 
undertakes these responsibilities: (a) receive, make available and distribute the 
reports as mandated by the Treaty; (b) Maintain and make available to States Parties 
the list of national points of contact; (c) Facilitate the matching of offers of and 
requests for assistance for Treaty implementation and promote international 
cooperation as requested; (d) Facilitate the work of the Conference of States Parties, 
including making arrangements and providing the necessary services for meetings 
under this Treaty; and (e) Perform other duties as decided by the Conferences of 
States Parties (United Nations, 2013).40  
 
According to an interview with former President of the ATT, Amb. Klaus Korhonen 
(Finland)41, the Secretariat has a simple structure, small but good (Korhonen, 2018). 
It is composed by three people: the head, the policy officer and the administrator. It 
is also “a government led position and it does not have a very extensive political role, 
the political direction comes from state parties” (Korhonen, 2018). This last fact, will 
be clearly exemplified by the a-political functioning of the CSP as will be seen under 
the next subtitle of this chapter. It is a reflection of the needed neutrality that a 
Secretariat ought to have but also of the continued control from states to safeguard 
their interests. Throughout the interview with Amb. Korhonen, he continued to 
underline that the ATT was a treaty amongst states and therefore with this the 
importance of neutrality and a a-politicized nature. This was also reminded during an 
interview with Sarah Parker, Policy Support Officer at the ATT Secretariat (Parker, 
2018). This is understood as important to achieve an international treaty, but it is also 
the reflection of the preponderance of state interests in world politics. With it, it also 
 
40 As will be seen further down, some of these duties have been aided by civil society organisations.  
41 The ATT presidency changes every year, so far presidents have been from Mexico (temporarily), 
Nigeria, Finland, Japan and Latvia. 
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reflects the perhaps loft-sided relationship between states and non-state actors, and 
it could even be said between human rights and security. Obviously, it is in the 
Secretariat and President´s best interest to achieve a humanitarian treaty, however 
the state parties’ interests may vary according to each case as will be seen further 
below.   
 
The function, management and location of the ATT Secretariat was not set until the 
preparatory and actual meetings for the CSP1 in 2015. It was a difficult subject to 
agree upon and became another example of the “complexity of multilateral 
diplomacy” (Marsh, 2015). Perhaps this is one of the reasons why today the ATT 
Secretariat and its duties can be considered small. It is also an indirect reflection of 
the preponderance of states in international affairs and the fear of losing sovereignty 
particularly over security issues. States afraid of their position being undermined have 
not allowed an international body to exceed in its managerial position, even if the 
Secretariat is responsible to State Parties, as Article 18 establishes. However, the 
treaty does allow for the dependence of help from civil society organisations. This 
reflects the norm internalization of human rights security laws that have been 
permeating and constructing a just space for human rights in the international arena 
for many years. Once more the power of human rights and with this the power of 
their most prominent carriers: the civil society. However, this fact is also the reflection 
of the preponderance of states in the international system and in the Treaty. In this 
sense, non-state actors are needed to balance out states and the human rights and 
security relationship. The ATT Secretariat does not have the duty that would give it a 
status of international governing body of arms trade control. In some ways, this space 
has been left for NGOs that allow for the relationship between human rights and 
security to evolve more towards human rights. This fact might be tricky, because 
NGOs place is possibly not as largely recognized and encouraged as the role of the 
state. Nevertheless, it can be seen as an advancement.  
 
The final decision for the Secretariat´s location also exposed the preponderance of 
large Western States. Three options were available: Vienna, Geneva and Port of Spain. 
In the end, despite what it would have meant to have the secretariat of such an 
important treaty in a non- powerful country the decision went for Geneva. Because 
of its location, Trinidad & Tobago, alongside the other Caribbean Island countries have 
become a hub for drug traffickers and a node for illicit trade and traffic of weapons. 
These states have been deeply engaged in disarmament and have engaged, promoted 
and supported international and regional efforts in favour of it. On one hand, it did 
seem like the most reasonable choice given the UN system facilities available in 
Geneva. On the other, it reflects that although this issue was put to a vote during the 
CSP1, and therefore all State Parties had a say, prevalence of larger states and a North-
South divide amongst participant states. However, interestingly Trinidad & Tobago 
lost by only 3 votes (Stohl, 2015). Even though Port of Spain was not the chosen 
option, the sizable support it had from fellow State Parties displays that the 
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awareness of human rights security issues is widespread and not only limited to 
Western states.  
 
After speaking with the ATT former President and the Policy Officer, the capacity issue 
for the secretariat came to mind. Certainly the Secretariat is a busy place and is, to 
date, fulfilling the requirements set by the treaty and required by state parties. It is 
important to see that the tasks set for the Secretariat and the gaps left, could have 
been approached in a different manner whilst the ATT was being written. This, again, 
exemplifies the state´s interests in remaining the sole custodians of security related 
issues and the diplomatic constant of not allowing a type of international governing 
body over the state. This is not questioning the Secretariat´s quality of their tasks, it 
is only a reflection of state´s interests in international politics.  
 
ATT official mechanisms- Conferences of State Parties 
 
 The decisions about the Secretariat, where not the only ones taken at the 
CSP1. Financial rules, rules of procedure, agreeing the President, Vice-Presidents and 
Management Committee for CSP 2016 and reporting templates where also in 
discussion. It was helpful to allow the Conference to authorize subsidiary bodies, 
other humanitarian and disarmament treaties, like the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty and the 
2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions, to set up informal intersessional Standing 
Committees to assist with treaty implementation that proved to be valuable 
mechanisms (Casey-Maslen et al., 2016). Civil society encountered a gain, when 
discussing the rules of procedure for the Conferences. It was agreed that NGOs be 
allowed to speak in plenary sessions, as well as receiving official documents and 
submitting their views in writing at the Conferences. Industry representatives and 
non-State Parties have also been allowed the same rights. This openness of 
negotiation meetings during the Conferences increases transparency and confidence 
in the Treaty (Control Arms, 2015). Although the space for NGOs represents a win for 
civil society and therefore for human rights, the fact that the other parties- like 
industry, non-signatory states and non-ratifying states- have been granted the same 
right signifies equality but also a reflection of the type of players in the human rights-
security relationship. The attendance of the civil society was facilitated by Control 
Arms, and contested by states like the UK, Switzerland, Norway, Romania and 
Cameroon. Actually, the UK pushed for sessions to remain close by default (Control 
Arms, 2015). Even so, an open Conference won, which shows the power of this NGO 
in the ATT sphere.  
 
Conference of State Parties are attended by other non-ratifying states; these states 
might be signatories or not. Such is the case of the United States and China. All the 
invited contribute to the ATT Budget and the contributions are made public via a 
document on the ATT Secretariat´s webpage. Based on this document, the top ten 
budget outstanding contributions from 2015- October 2017 from highest to lowest 
are: Japan, USA, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, China, Australia and 
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Mexico (ATT Secretariat, 2017). Eight of these contributors are state parties, the 
second contributor is the USA who is a signatory but has not yet ratified, and the 
eighth contributor is China which is an observant. Contributions are calculated in 
accordance to the states ‘membership agreement with the United Nations. This 
reflects the large amount given by states that are not member parties of the Treaty. 
Despite this, both the US and China contribute to the Treaty and participate in the 
CSPs whilst also heading the list of the top arms importers worldwide. Both countries, 
are allowed to speak at meetings during the CSPs but have no right of vote and 
member states are always prioritized over them. It is obviously in the US and China´s 
best interest to be involved- directly or indirectly- in decision making processes of 
international trade of arms. On one hand, the behaviour of states like China and the 
US, alludes to a self-interest move (Moravcsik, 2000; Moravcsik, 1997), but also to the 
power of human rights (Risse et al., 2013; Risse et al., 1999). It exemplifies the 
complexity of state activity within the Treaty and its reflection of states aiming to 
reach a constructed organized outcome via international legal means versus an innate 
realist state behaviour. Treaty member states allow the participation of these non-
members, weather signatories or observant, in hope that this will aid in their 
ratification or signing of the treaty (Korhonen, 2018). Especially when referring to 
signatory members, like the United States, their influence during the CSPs is shared 
actively with the member states. Also, besides the current US administration, the US 
has always participated actively at a technical level, which makes for a valuable 
participant of the Conferences. The US has always been a constructive partner and 
therefore their input is welcome at the CSPs (Parker, 2018). 
 
Due to the urgent need for decisions about the functionality of the Treaty and the ATT 
Secretariat´s final hiring, CSP2 and CSP3´s discussions were mostly focused on 
administrative matters. A key advancement was on the creation of the Voluntary 
Trust Fund (VTF), as established on Article 16. The VTF is important because it aims to 
support State Parties who are in need of legal assistance, institutional capacity-
building, and technical, material or financial assistance; such assistance may include 
stockpile management, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, 
model legislation, and effective practices for implementation of Treaty obligations 
(United Nations, 2013). The Fund´s objective is straightforward and if it functions 
correctly it should give states the necessary support needed to fully follow the 
Treaty.42 The VTF has geographically diverse member parties, which is important to 
have representatives of all regions and achieve a balance between likely donor and 
recipient states (Ibster, 23 August 2016).43 There are 13 donor states.44 Interestingly, 
 
42 However, VTF is not enough to fully implement the treaty because civil society has created 
complementary projects to assist states particularly to correctly fill the yearly reports. 
43 VTF selection committee includes: Argentina, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, El Salvador, Germany, Guinea, 
Japan, Mauritius, New Zealand, Nigeria, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. 
44 VTF donors are: Argentina, Australia, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK.  
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most donor states are top arms exporters. This only exemplifies the duality between 
being a state that has a significant part of its economy depending on arms exports and 
a state interested in defending and protecting human and humanitarian rights 
worldwide. Once again, strengthening the argument of this thesis of giving rights 
whilst controlling the means of violence. However, the donor states can be seen as 
progressive states and although top arms exporters they are dedicated more to larger 
armaments; “these states tend to be more supportive” (Parker, 2018).  
 
The VTF is very recent and in the ATT Secretariat´s webpage a neatly set overview of 
the 1st cycle of the Voluntary Fund can be found. The total number of projects 
financed was of 17, interestingly 76% of the projects where led by a local or 
international implementing partner (NGOs) as opposed to led by the state itself. This 
shows the large NGOs interest in assisting the implementation of the Treaty. It can 
also mean the lack of capacity that certain states have and therefore the need for 
assistance. It is important to mention what the NGOs mission is in this. A project like 
this also means capital for NGOs, which can perhaps lead to question the 
organisations pureness in their intention of assisting the ATT implementation. 
However, it is NGOs- usually local ones, that know the state´s needs the most.  
 
During CSP2, in August 2016, civil society was keen on discussing crucial matters like 
the use of arms by Saudi Arabia to cause harm on the Yemeni population. In the online 
Conference reviews, diverse organisations of the civil society- Control Arms, WILPF 
and the Stimson Center- concluded more or less the same issue: a lack of substance 
in CSP2 discussions. Despite specific efforts made by Control Arms and the diverse 
media coverage, arms transfers to Saudi Arabia were not discussed by state parties, 
but only mentioned by members of civil society. Meanwhile, Peru with the support of 
other Latin American states, requested that the final CSP2 report included a 
paragraph about the elements used to make the human assessment risk, like the UN 
Human Rights Council Resolution A/HRC/RES/32/12 on the Impact of Arms Transfers 
on Human Rights, which clearly mentions a connection with the ATT. Other member 
states, mostly large exporters, argued that this had not been discussed enough during 
the plenary meeting to have a place on the final report. In the end, the Peruvian 
proposed paragraph was removed.   
 
CSP3 actually opened with a focus on the impact faced by communities in conflict, like 
the testimony of a Yemeni human rights defender that showed the consequences of 
arms transfers and the importance and power of the Arms Trade Treaty. However, 
the meeting mostly focused, again, on procedural matters and only Costa Rica 
mentioned Yemen during the meeting (Control Arms, 2017). Reporting was heavily 




the fact that not all states have completed theirs either on time or in full.45 The ATT 
implementation is key and the discussions had during CSP3 on reporting, the ATT 
Secretariat, universalization and transparency should strengthen it. Civil Society´s 
participation was one again crucial, as well as the media coverage that CSP3 
generated. In fact, many states stressed the important role of civil society in achieving 
the Treaty, these states are: Belgium, Bulgaria, El Salvador, France, Ireland, Mexico, 
Montenegro, Norway, Slovenia and Zambia (Control Arms, 2017). Interestingly, the 
Conference was held at the same time as the world´s largest arms fair, which ironically 
meant that event to promote arms trade happened at the same time as an event 
seeking to control it. Perhaps, a clear reflection of the duality most states face of 
allowing its arms industry to flourish whilst regulating it. Also a clear similitude with 
today´s relationship between security and human rights.   
 
Although there were high hopes for CSP4 to discuss the Treaty more substantially, it 
was not necessarily the case, at least not on the official meetings. There was progress 
on other administrative themes, capacity building and information exchange. As well 
as a greater focus on going beyond what Article 7 establishes and properly discussing 
gender- based violence. Compared to other Conferences, there was a specific session 
on tackling the diversion of weapons into the illicit trade, however there was no 
specific discussion of compliance with obligations of the ATT particularly in relation to 
member states transferring arms to states using them against Yemen. In fact, 
ironically, the UK a country that as will be seen in chapter 6 does not comply with the 
main agreements of the Treaty, expressed that it “would not want states that cannot 
meet their financial obligations to join the ATT” (Pytlak, 2018b). This has allowed for 
a conclusion, from NGO members, to be wary of focusing too much on positive action 
in terms of capacity building and other administrative themes and not focus enough 
on areas of non-compliance.46   
 
All Conference of State Parties, so far, demonstrate a duality between procedure and 
substance, between practice and reality, between arms trade and arms trade control, 
between states and civil society, and between security and human rights. All 
encompassed in the centrality of international norm functionality. The CSPs have in 
fact advanced in administrative steps. There do seem to be sparks of humanitarianism 
amongst bureaucratic like meetings. There do seem to be honest humanitarian 
intentions buried within the constant perfectionism of procedural matters. However, 
CSPs seem to reflect a disconnect between what is said on paper from the practice. 
Every year, there is hope for a new CSP, and yet every year there seems to be key 
 
45 For example, only 64 per cent of ATT Annual Reports for 2016 had been submitted by the time CSP 
2017 began, and three governments (Liberia, Panama and Senegal) had kept their reports private 
(Control Arms, 2017). Further analysis and explanation on ATT Monitor´s report will be discussed under 
the next subtitle of this Chapter. 
46 See more on: (Control Arms, 2018; Pytlak, 2018a; Pytlak, 2018b; Bromley, 2018).   
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issues ignored. Perhaps, is early in the reality of the Arms Trade Treaty, but in order 
to achieve successful Treaty implementation rigour is needed. States might hide 
behind the fact that the Treaty is new and not mature yet; and although treaties 
require significant infrastructure, they also need “to be effective, treaties need 
political will…” (Pytlak, 2019). Political will from its member states is key to confront 
non-compliance from certain members and complementary effort between Treaty 
procedures and the civil society is needed as will be seen in the indispensable 
mechanisms of the ATT below.  
 
ATT unofficial but indispensable mechanisms: gap filling 
 
 Because the story of the ATT took many years in the making, civil society 
expanded its commitment not only to achieve a fulfilling Arms Trade Treaty but also 
to allow for the creation of organisations dedicated partly and entirely to the cause. 
This was also influenced by the norm cascade and norm internalisation brought by 
the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty and the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions. To go even 
further, it is also the result of the clear norm internalisation of the Geneva 
Conventions and the human rights flow it brought.  
 
Besides large NGOs that have dedicated part of their work towards achieving the 
Treaty, like ICRC, Amnesty International, Oxfam, and Saferworld, there are many 
medium size NGOs that have been dedicated portions of their work to the treaty.47 
For this study 15 were found to have at least one page of their webpage dedicated to 
the explaining the ATT before, during or after its creation. Of these, 5 do not appear 
to be affiliated to bigger NGOs, while the rest were created as affiliates of 
organisations like Saferworld during the ATT campaigning. There are 11 dedicated to 
the ATT implementation, by either publishing analysis on the ATT reports, documents 
to aid State Parties, briefing reports on implementation, case studies, lists of arms 
control experts worldwide, research papers, and blog posts. Five out of these 11, fully 
dedicate to the ATT, four of which were specifically dedicated to support on 
implementation. It is interesting to see that the majority of this last group has its 
headquarters in the United States. Of course the fact that the offices of the United 
Nations are in New York helps. This rather large representation of NGOs dedicated to 
the Treaty are a reflection partly of the norm internalization brought to by years of 
human rights based security regimes starting from the Geneva Conventions, but also 
partly of the power of influence brought forth by the Arms Trade Treaty and its 
mission. In this sense, human rights appear to keep gaining a stronger place in the 
human rights security relationship.48  
 
47 Because there are many NGOs that have supported ATT or still support its implementation specially 
as local partners of Control Arms, the criteria used to research and analyse these NGOs was to include 
the NGOs that had at least one page in English dedicated to ATT.  
48 This sentence uses the word appear, because in the next section of this chapter the funding of these 
NGOs might slightly reverse human rights leverage over security in some way.  
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Two of the most important implementation based NGOs are the ATT Monitor- part of 
Control Arms, which at the same time is formed by many international and national 
NGOS- and ATT- BAP- part of the Stimson Center. ATT Monitor will be discussed in 
further detail in Chapter 5, but ATT-BAP will be set subsequently. Following the 
adoption of ATT, despite efforts made in the preparatory meetings and during the 
actual Conference, the State Parties did not decide on the reporting templates. An 
NGO that has been specifically developed to assist States with reporting is the ATT 
Baseline Assessment Project (ATT-BAP), adding a further gain to human rights. Since 
2013, it seeks to provide guidance on the Treaty´s obligations and to establish baseline 
assessments of the State´s ability to implement ATT (www.armstrade.info). The 
project was created by two leading arms control personalities; full-time academic Dr. 
Paul Holtom (Coventry University) and consultant Rachel Stohl (Stimson Center). 
When going through the projects webpage- their objectives, motivations, activities, 
etc- its committed nature becomes clear. Its creators have extensive backgrounds on 
working with disarmament and with directly and indirectly pursuing international 
control of weapons. The project has foreseen the need for an unofficial mechanism 
to aid States on the implementation of the Treaty. It has also, kept up with the 
reporting issues that continue to need tackling given the somewhat poor results that 
the available ATT Reports have shown. As a State, the information provided, via 
questionnaires and downloadable resources, and the tailored guidance, allows for a 
better fulfilment of the obligations entailed by the ATT. As a researcher, the analytical 
reports and other resources available, give sufficient and interesting information to 
continue filling the gaps needed to continue in the path of a successful 
implementation of the Treaty.  
 
For example, the latest ATT-BAP reviewing report of 2017 analyses if the Annual 
Reports are fulfilling the promise of the ATT. The percentage of states that submitted 
their report on time went from 46% of states in 2015 to 36% of states in 2016, even if 
this last figure later rose to 63% by the end of the year (ATT BAP, 2017). In fact, now 
by the latest 2018 report the reporting figures have become stagnant and the ATT has 
not been living up to its potential and Treaty application is becoming difficult to assess 
(ATT BAP, 2019).  It is worrying the lack of commitment from states to fill in and turn 
in on time their annual reports. This can be due to the technical confusion and 
discrepancies mentioned earlier in terms of how to fill the report. Also, while there 
has been an increase of the states from Africa and the American continent that have 
joined the Treaty, there has not been an overall increase in the number of reports 
coming from these countries. This along the fact that the number of Treaty States 
Parties that have elected to not make their annual reports publicly available increased 
from one to three (ATT BAP, 2017), are signs of reduced transparency.  
 
Although three years of reporting is not enough time to consider a trend, these are 
facts that need to be taken into consideration by the ATT Secretariat and addressed 
within the CSP environment. If these issues where to be left only on the hands of the 
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ATT Secretariat and CSP meetings, they would only be specifically addressed once a 
year. Here is where precisely ATT BAP is working to aid with a year-long monitoring 
and support to State Parties to reflect on the overall success of Treaty reporting. In 
theory, ATT BAP´s work is essential to the oiled machine that the ATT should become, 
especially if State Parties are not involved directly in improving reporting conditions. 
Three reporting years, is too early to measure the actual effect this NGO is having on 
the treaties success, it would be interesting to analyse further ahead weather this has 
made a difference or not. However, for now, it can be seen that trends are showing 
stagnation and lack of commitment.  
 
The ATT´s imperfect reporting illustrates the importance that non-state normative 
agents have within the arena of the international arms transfers, like ATT Monitor and 
ATT-BAP. It also shows, that agents´ duty goes further than the initial phases of the 
norm cycle. In fact, a large responsibility of the future of the norm´s internalization 
and further influence of other norm creations lies heavily on NGOs capacity and focus, 
much like it is also shown in Risse et al´s work on the power of human rights (Risse et 
al., 1999; Risse et al., 2013). This, of course, does not take responsibility away from 
states. It is almost like NGOs role in the enforcement of the Treaty is a representation 
of the “checks and balances” that global governance dynamics entail. Without them, 
the ATT and the actors involved, would not be able to continue influencing the human 
rights leverage on security. It is important to note that NGOs cannot hold states 
accountable or enforce them in any legal way to collaborate with the treaty, however 
they can indirectly name and shame those reports so that the rest of the civil society 
works together to demand compliance.   
 
NGOs importance also highlights the non- state preponderance over state actors in 
the human rights and security relationship. Most times, states tend to guard security 
more closely than they do human rights and certain NGOs tend to keep human rights 
closer to their core. NGOs being in charge of enforcing a human rights based security 
regime, like the ATT, strengthens human rights position over security in their 
relationship. The Treaty enforcement led by NGOs is eroding little by little the states 
preponderance over all things security. This step, is still in its initial phase and it will 
take long hours of work from NGOs to ensure further change in the relationship 




 The previous chapters have been dedicated to the deconstruction of concepts 
in order to understand the construction of the human rights and security relationship. 
This chapter has emphasized the construction of the relationship with particular 
presence on the Arms Trade Treaty. The first part of this chapter has been evidence 
that the humanitarian core of the Treaty is an influence of human rights instruments 
like the Geneva Conventions and the UN Charter, among others. It has also been 
evidence of the multilevel game that a system of global governance and its agents 
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play to improve the international structure. This multilevelness is unique and 
complex, representing the difficulty actors have in accepting the advancements of 
human security and supposed loss of state preponderance. In this the UK became a 
key actor, that later backfired as will be perceived in chapter 6. As will be seen in more 
detail on chapter 6, the same state actor has avoided full compliance of the Treaty 
and has been somehow fully reprimanded to do so.  
 
Part two of this chapter centred around the implementation of the Treaty and the 
practices and institutions that surround it. Global governance dynamics, the power of 
human rights (Risse et al., 2013; Risse et al., 1999), the “boomerang effect” of 
transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink, 1999) and the norm 
internalisation (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) of human rights and security 
instruments filled the ATT negotiation but they are also filling the implementation. 
The ATT implementation, has become the interaction between structure and agency 
reflected within the sphere of multiple authorities, with constrains of an international 
arms control treaty. Since the Treaty has not set any formal mechanisms to ensure 
these constraints, it has left the door open for NGOs to do so. Because the Treaty, is 
a treaty amongst states, the political direction of the Secretariat comes from them. 
Therefore, it is important for the Secretariat to keep a neutral and a-politicized nature, 
like former ATT president Amb Korhonen and Policy Support Officer of the ATT 
Secretariat, Sarah Parker underlined in my interviews with them. The complexity of 
multilateral diplomacy and the preponderance of state interests, particularly Western 
State interests, in the Treaty is what this shows. States give rights, by agreeing to 
treaties like the ATT, but they still control the means of violence, as this thesis 
hypothesis states. Nevertheless, the lack of authority of the Secretariat has left a 
space for NGOs to allow for the humanitarian side of the Treaty to grow. CSPs have 
also become a place where the equalities inequalities of the human rights and security 
relationship can be seen. More than anything, the result of all the CSPs is that, as this 
thesis argues, states gives rights whilst controlling the means of violence.  
 
Besides the formal mechanisms and institutions of the Treaty, civil society has been 
filling in the gaps need to achieve a fully complied Arms Trade Treaty. There are over 
15 international NGOs that at least have a small part of their work dedicated to the 
ATT. Two of the most important implementation based NGOs are ATT Monitor, part 
of Control Arms, which will be central case of chapter 5, and ATT-BAP part of the 
Stimson Center, with financing of diverse member countries. The ATT’s imperfect 
reporting exemplifies the importance that non-state agents have within the arena of 
arms transfers, while also illustrating that non-state actors go beyond the negotiation 
of a Treaty and further into the initial phases of the norm cycle, into its 
implementation. Overall, this and the rest of this chapter have allowed for an 
understanding of the Arms Trade Treaty but also for the role of other actors, besides 
state actors, in the norm implementation of the Treaty which will become key across 
the subsequent case study chapters. 
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Chapter 5- NGOs role in the ATT fulfilment: Control Arms and 




 Often, the words civil society and non-governmental organisation are used 
interchangeably, academically and otherwise.49 This is perhaps the result of NGOs 
seen as key pieces in the so called global civil society analysed in Chapter 3 (Boli & 
Thomas, 1999; Chandler, 2004; Kaldor, 2003; Keane, 2003; Meyer, Boli, Thomas, & 
Ramirez, 1997 to mention a few). The meaning of civil society has changed 
dramatically through time. For Hobbes and Locke, civil society was not on a different 
realm from that of the state. Hegel´s view became closer to the modern conception 
of the term; however, the market was seen as part of it. Based on Marx´s perspective, 
Antonio Gramsci came up with a meaning where civil society was a vehicle of the 
bourgeoisie. Contemporary conceptions of civil society are “less as they have 
appeared in the history of political thought and more as they might contribute to a 
theory of contemporary globalization and governance” (Scholte, 2002, p.283). Some 
do not agree upon calling this civil society global, due to its unevenness, and use the 
term transnational instead (Price, 1998). Mainstream theorists assume civil 
society/NGOs to be a clear third force, separate from the state (Florini, 2000). Others, 
interpret it as everything that exists outside of and beyond the reach of the territorial 
state and other institutions of governance (Keane, 2003, p.9), at times including 
businesses and even mafias and terrorist groups (Buzan, 2002; Keane, 2003). Other 
theorists focus on a clear relation of the civil society to the state (Anheier et al., 2005; 
Shaw, 1994; Stavrianakis, 2013), a historical tie with the emergence of capitalism 
(Chatterjee, 1990), and a field of power relations (Cox, 1999, p.10). Therefore, the 
meaning of global civil society or NGO is difficult to pinpoint but what is true is that it 
is dynamic and non-static. It is “an unfinished project that consists sometimes thick, 
sometimes thinly stretched networks, pyramids and hub-and-spoke clusters of socio-
economic institutions and actors who organise themselves across borders, with the 
deliberate aim of drawing the world together in new ways; These non-governmental 
institutions and actors tend to pluralise power and to problematize violence; 
consequently, their peaceful or ‘civil’ effects are felt everywhere, here and there, far 
and wide, to and from local areas, through wider regions, to the planetary level 
itself”(Keane, 2003, p.8). 
 
In this sense, Control Arms Campaign is an example of an organisation that has 
changed dynamically and adapted to the environment around it. It is an organisation 
 
49 For example, when having a conversation with Amb. Klaus Korhonen and Policy Officer for ATT Sarah 
Parker, both used civil society and NGO interchangeably when referring to the NGOs that worked 
alongside the ATT. Academics tend to do so as well and so will this chapter and this thesis.  
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that served as a norm entrepreneur (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) during the 
negotiation and creation of the norm and has become an implementer of the Treaty, 
a norm implementer. It originally stemmed from the need to advocate a strong Arms 
Trade Treaty. Once its main objective had been met, it evolved into the dedication of 
pushing for more states to sign the treaty, of providing assistance to the UN 
delegations, government officials and civil society organisations in order to facilitate 
the ratification and effective implementation of the ATT  (www.controlarms.org). It 
has now created the ATT Monitor Yearly Report to aid states into ensuring a strong 
and consistent application of the Treaty  (www.controlarms.org). Control Arms- ATT 
Monitor´s objectives align neatly with seeking a leverage in human rights in the 
human rights and security relationship. With each yearly report and with the 
interactions with the state parties of the Treaty, it is slowly constructing and defining 
its personality in the international scene of arms control. Having a defined position 
can allow for a larger capacity to inflict change onto other state and non-state actors 
and onto the Treaty implementation. Conventional arms control has proven harder 
to control than other topics, like landmines for example, and therefore the impact 
that the organisation can have could take years before being noticed. Nevertheless, 
it is in these initial reports and actions that the foundations of where the position will 
grow to are being set and consequently their analysis and understanding is crucial.  
 
In terms of arms control, the involvement on treaty negotiation and the efforts of 
these organisations are well-known across states, international organizations, the 
media and the general public. This chapter, along with this thesis is part of the 
expanding literature on the lifecycle of a norm and on the role NGOs have on it 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Keck and Sikkink, 1999; Florini, 2000; Price, 1998; Boli 
and Thomas, 1999b; Price, 2003; Risse et al., 1999; Risse et al., 2013), specifically in 
arms control. This literature, specially that related to human rights based security 
treaties, like the ATT and the Mine Ban Treaty has focused on the emergence stage of 
the norm (Garcia, 2014; Garcia, 2017; Bromley, 2018; Bromley et al., 2012; Spies, 
2009; Casey-Maslen et al., 2016; Carneiro, 2007; Sears, 2012; Bolton and James, 2014; 
Stavrianakis, 2016; Bower, 2016; Bower, 2015; Bower, 2017). The implementation 
role of NGOs in the second stages of the norm in arms control has been looked at in 
relation to landmines (Mathur, 2011) or in non-peer reviewed publications (Atwood, 
2006; Crowley and Persbo, 2006). This chapter, and the following two as well, will 
focus on NGOs in the implementation stage of the norm. To do so, it will elucidate the 
perspectives of independence and dependence of NGOs towards the state, so as to 
gain a full understanding of their role. It will also keep in mind theoretical views stated 
in the theory chapters, like the cross-fertilization between constructivism and the 
English School that allow for the further understanding of norms in connection with 
the “nature of international social and political life and what constitutes ethical 
conduct” (Reus–Smit, 2002, p.501).   
 
This chapter will initially focus on defining who is Control Arms, specifically Control 
Arms- ATT Monitor. Although the main focus of chapter 5 is Control Arms- ATT 
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Monitor, with the aim of gaining a better perspective for the human rights and 
security relationship, the state parties of the ATT as a whole will be set against the 
organisation. The framework of analysis of genealogy linked to constitutive causality, 
as discussed in chapter 1, will aid in this chapter by bringing the attention towards the 
social processes, interactions, confluences and accidents that Control Arms-ATT 
Monitor has as an agent in the international scene (Lebow, 2009). It will also 
deconstruct with the aim of then constructing the specific human rights and security 
relationship of this case. A CMV lens will be used to concentrate on what actors do to 
promote cultures of peace in a global-local manner to therefore focus on moral issues.  
  
Expressly this chapter, will first set a definition of what implementation means 
compared with verification and monitoring will be set followed by the detailed 
mechanisms of what Control Arms and ATT Monitor seek to advance in the Treaty 
fulfilment. Then, there will be a comprehensive explanation as to where Control Arms-
ATT Monitor stands in the international scene, specifically what type of NGOs it is and 
how this influences how it is constructing its current and future actions. The second 
part of this chapter is dedicated to the main analysis of the nexus of moral and 
material interests. It will start with defining the organisations identity and the 
politisation it has reached or not with its actions so far. The figure of norm 
implementers will be introduced and defined as well as their connection with Rawl´s 
original position. Then, the chapter will focus on morality and its relationship to state 
parties of the ATT to then enter the material interests, in particular financial. It will 
also introduce and define, false morality to focus on morality and aiding in addressing 
weaknesses of constructivist theory. Finally, once the main exploration is established 
the particular overlap of the human rights and security relationship of this case will 
be exposed in order to understand why states give rights whilst controlling the means 
of violence.  
 
ATT implementation alongside an NGO: Control Arms’ ATT Monitor  
 
 Although NGOs multilateral power has been slowly increasing since the latest 
involvement and achievements in the creation of disarmament treaties, states 
continue to have centre stage. NGOs have demonstrated their effect on these treaties 
and their diplomatic influence to achieve more robust treaties that protect and raise 
human rights in the human rights and security relationship. NGOs now need to 
demonstrate the same but in the implementation of the treaties. This subdivision of 
this chapter will be dedicated to first, understanding what is actually meant by 
implementation and its relation to verification and monitoring in the Arms Trade 
Treaty. Then, onto the more detailed mechanisms that Control Arms on its own and 
particularly through the ATT Monitor seeks to have indirect control of Treaty practices 
and direct control over good practices. Finally, this subpart will focus on the type of 
NGO that Control Arms has become, especially in its new role as vital part of the ATT.  
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Defining implementation, verification and monitoring 
 
 The Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties (1969) notes that “the 
principles of free consent and of good faith and the Article 26, pacta sunt servanda 
rule are universally recognized” and that “every treaty in force is binding upon the 
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith” (1969). This signifies that 
it is universally recognized that agreements must be kept. Most of the member parties 
of ATT have ratified the Vienna Convention, and are therefore bound by it. This means 
that the articles that specify distinct actions in the realm of conventional arms trade 
are to be carried out by ratifying states and by the organs that the treaty created- the 
Secretariat and the CSPs. The article specifications are, however, open to 
interpretation in some ways which can leave the strict side of things aside.  
 
According to Article 17 of ATT, the CSP organ is in charge of reviewing 
implementation, which resembles the functions of a typical CSPs in environmental law 
(Worster, 2014) and also in previous similar treaties, like the Mine Ban Treaty. It also 
means that all the member parties have the duty of implementation as a whole and 
individually. Each state party has an obligation to report to the other states parties via 
the Secretariat and the CSP is not expressly empowered to consider those reports 
under article 17; nonetheless, it is safe to say that the CSP must have an implied power 
to consider such reports in order to discharge its general power to review 
implementation (Worster, 2014, p.1029). Article 17 has measures for compliance with 
the treaty where the CSP carries, however CSP may only review generally without 
necessarily identifying violators (Ibid.). The CSP potentially could name and shame 
those members who did not complete their reports in duly form. To date CSP, has not 
done so. This could be because the treaty is in early stages and due to interpretation 
confusion, reports are not yet being filled in unison. All of this has left a window open 
for the opportunity of realising a deeper analysis of the yearly reports. This action, 
done by NGOs specifically by Control Arms through ATT Monitor as the civil society´s 
implementation of ATT. 50 Because implementation is specified to be the CSPs task in 
Article 17, then Control Arms work becomes monitoring and verification. However, 
verification and monitoring can be both part of implementing, so the terms are 
sometimes used interchangeably.  
 
According to the UN, verification is “a process in which data is collected, collated and 
analysed in order to make an informed judgment as to whether a party is complying 
with its obligations” (UN General Assembly, 1995). Guido Den Dekker has broken 
down this process into three fundamental stages: fact-finding- establishing the factual 
 
50 This is not the first time an NGO has participated in the implementation of a treaty. There are a 
number of examples of successful formal NGO participation in treaty implementation and verification 
procedures, particularly in the environmental sector, such as the 1973 Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species and the 1971 Ramsar Convention on Wetlands (Meier and Tenner, 2001) 
in (Crowley and Persbo, 2006, p.244). And in the case of disarmament, the Landmine and Cluster 
Munition Monitor.  
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behaviour of the state-; review- testing the established facts against the rules set out 
in a Treaty-; and assessment -deciding or estimating the degree of compliance with 
the rule- ((Den Dekker, 2001) in (Crowley and Persbo, 2006, p.227)). Verification is 
typically carried out by an international organisation, like the UN, or in the case of the 
ATT by one of its organs: the ATT Secretariat or the CSPs. In human rights cases, it has 
been done by other organisations, like Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty 
International (AI). HRW and AI verification is recognized widely by the international 
community. Monitoring can be seen as a wider concept and described as “efforts to 
detect, identify and measure developments and activities of interest” (Den Dekker 
2001 in Ibid., p.229). Sometimes, it forms part of Den Dekker´s first stage of the 
verification process: fact-finding. According to Crowley and Presbo, monitoring does 
not need to focus on finding evidence that necessarily must match a legal standard 
(Ibid.).  
 
These definitions set a somewhat confusing picture for where to set Control Arms´ 
ATT Monitor report. Because of its name, ATT Monitor, might be confused as just a 
monitoring activity. Nevertheless, according to the ATT Monitor goals and objectives, 
ATT Monitor “serves as a trusted source of information … including tracking 
implementation measures to embed the Treaty's obligations” 
(www.armstreatymonitor.org). This is very important because, even though due to its 
name ATT Monitor might be seen as simply monitoring it actually reviews the facts 
and information coming out of the yearly reports against the rules of the Treaty, as 
Den Dekker defines it in the second stage of the verification process. This means that 
ATT Monitor is a verification mechanism of ATT.51 ATT Monitor´s predecessor is the 
Landmine Monitor and was created in 1998 after the Ottawa Convention. These 
Monitors are completely outside the formal verification system of international 
agreements on arms control and disarmament. In this sense, Meier and Tanner set 
three types of NGO interaction with treaty verification activities: official interaction, 
quasi-official interaction and informal interaction (Meier and Tenner 2001 in Crowley 
and Persbo 2006). These divisions are not strict, in fact they are fluid and ATT Monitor 
is proof. ATT Monitor might not be an official interaction, however, although reports 
are made public by the ATT Secretariat, Control Arms gets the information passed 
down before time to have the analysis of the reports ready each year.   
 
Methods and mechanism of Control Arms- ATT Monitor Project  
 
 ATT Monitor is a resource based on civil society that provides independent 
analysis and information on the effectiveness of the ATT to support the 
 
51 It is important to note that the organisation Reaching Critical Will has a yearly publication called ATT 
Monitor as well. However, this online source is actually monitoring for it detects, identifies and 
measures development of the CSPs and their previous meetings only. It is therefore a monitoring 
mechanism of ATT. 
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implementation of, and accession to the Treaty (www.armstreatymonitor.org).52 The 
staff and editorial members are Control Arms members, who due to the nature of 
Control Arms belong to different international NGOs or are independent consultants. 
The international referencing group is comprised by two leading academics on the 
subject- Dr. Denise Garcia (Northeastern University, USA) and Dr. Owen Greene 
(University of Bradford, UK) and researchers from Scandinavian and American 
research centres- SIPRI (Sweden), PRIO (Norway), Norwegian Red Cross and the 
Stimson Center (USA). Particularly when looking at the list of international references, 
the country of precedence is clearly Western and belonging to states that have been 
heavily involved on the development and acceptance of ATT, except for the United 
States. ATT Monitor was launched in 2015 and financed with support of Austria, 
Australia, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway and Trinidad and Tobago. It is interesting the 
involvement of certain countries in the ATT Monitor, specially because of the leverage 
that resources like this give to human rights in the human rights and security 
relationship.53  
 
ATT Monitor has as an objective to research and analyse trends and practices that 
have an impact on the implementation of the Treaty. Its duty is to report on evidence 
the risks of weapon transfers in order to guide the commitment of Article 11. The 
reports available today, 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018, unfortunately evidence a lack of 
clarity on how state parties should complete the template given as well as somewhat 
worrying numbers on ATT compliance. For example, the ATT reports from 2015 show 
discrepancies in filling the template. Some Parties left sections blank without 
explanation, others did not report data on imports at all- UK and Austria (Control Arms 
Secretariat, 2015). Because of the different definitions of small arms, reporting on 
these is varied. According to ATT Monitor, the discrepancies in reporting must not be 
assumed to be from diversion or fraud but perhaps from the different methods and 
systems that each country has used in the past to control and report arms transfer 
((PRIO), 2017). The reports from 2016 show that only 41% of the States Parties that 
should have reported on their exports and imports by June 7, 2017 did so (Control 
Arms Secretariat, 2016). The 2017 report, saw an improvement in universalization of 
the treaty and suggested that coordination of regional sub-bodies aided in this. 
Focusing on transparency, this report found that the official sources of information of 
the Treaty, the annual reports, were “disappointing in quantity and quality”, 
exemplified many “discrepancies” and few cases of best practice (Control Arms 
Secretariat, 2017, p.16). In 2018, the report found that although initial reports had 
now been submitted with a 73% compliance rate, no state parties had provided an 
updated version of this report; “this lack of updated information could stymie e orts 
towards comprehensive treaty implementation and undermine the value of 
 
52 Reaching Critical Will has a publication that functions only during CSPs called ATT Monitor as well. 
This publication has been used as reference in Chapter 4.  
53 This will be further understood as the chapter continues as well as in chapter 7 with the case study 
of Norway.    
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transparency in national control systems” (Control Arms Secretariat, 2018, p.13). 
Meanwhile, after 4 years of Treaty, the annual reports tally is at 45% for 2018 (Ibid.).  
 
What these reports demonstrate is the need for an actor, such as Control Arms and 
the other organisations involved, to continue working to achieve full compliance and 
implementation of the Treaty. These initial reports serve three ends: they offer self- 
assessment of implementation and compliance; they highlight best practices and 
lessons learned; and they identify gaps and assistance needs for effective 
implementation ((PRIO), n.d., p.56). The reports also demonstrate that NGOs job to 
ensure the effectiveness of ATT will be a task requiring patience and hard work. In the 
case of ATT Monitor Project, comprised by Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and 
other organisations, also to ensure and motivate compliance (Erickson, 2015). The 
ATT Secretariat and the annual meetings of state parties have the duty to support the 
implementation of the Treaty, but no official mechanism is fully dedicated to 
monitoring this implementation. Through the annual compilation report, ATT Monitor 
is serving the function of a much needed enforcement mechanism (Hafner-Burton 
and Tsutsui, 2005, p.1402). States are in direct control of ATT practices, but NGOs are 
in indirect control of practices and direct control of good-practice. This action, allows 
for human rights to maintain and hope to win leverage against security in the human 
rights and security relationship. This, of course, is a matter of endurance and obstacle 
dribbling across diverse circumstances of the international politics. 
 
Where does Control Arms- ATT Monitor stand 
 
 Part of an NGOs power comes from how they can pressure decision makers 
through their engagement with the public. To do so, NGOs activity ranges further 
away from only aid in multilateral diplomacy. Sometimes the results of these activities 
can be felt indirectly, however, they are important contributions in shaping 
disarmament treaties and their objectives. NGOs tend to focus other activities besides 
policy development, like: research, advocacy, public awareness and education and 
implementation (Batchelor, 2002, p.37). There are many other more specific areas in 
which NGOs contribute, these include: independent monitoring of state behaviour in 
relation to global norms and agreements; independent reporting on multilateral 
disarmament processes; studies on dimensions of particular weapons issues and their 
actual or potential impacts; building alliances for multi-actor engagement towards 
action appropriate to what is required at the multilateral level; and actively assisting 
the decay of ineffective multilateral processes while helping to put in place, even at 
the informal level, new, more appropriate mechanisms (Atwood, 2006, pp.49–50). In 
fact, this so called new humanitarianism within arms control and disarmament topics 
has had diverse contributions since the early 2000s particularly in terms of banning 
landmines (Borrie, 2009; Cameron et al., 1998; Cooper, 2006; Fox, 2001; Mathur, 
2011; Williams et al., 2008; Bower, 2017; Bower, 2015; Bower, 2016). In the case of 
ATT, the NGOs that contribute in diverse ways post- 2013 are: Reaching Critical Will, 
ATT-BAP, Control Arms- ATT Monitor, Small Arms Survey, Arms Transfer Dialogue, 
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SIPRI, CAAT, Saferworld- Expert Group on ATT Implementation (EGAI), Forum on Arms 
Trade, and Centre for Armed Violence (CAVR). The type and level of contribution 
varies. Some work specifically and solely on ATT, whilst some have other disarmament 
objectives in mind. Some offer ongoing monitoring of ATT, some focus on CSPs while 
others simply offer a directory of ATT experts. 
 
Control Arms through ATT Monitor seeks to influence positive change onto the 
implementation of the ATT and to fulfil actions that were not directly given to any 
state parties by the actual Treaty. Control Arms started as an organisation committed 
to the need to advocate a strong Arms Trade Treaty. Guided and supported by larger 
NGOs and conformed by ten steering members and one hundred and eight 
organisations worldwide, it achieved the Treaty in 2013. Today, it has evolved to 
become a crucial actor in the advancement of the Treaty and of the global control of 
arms trade, in general. The need for evolution stems from the nature of global civil 
society as being non-static and dynamic, it is an unfinished project that keeps 
changing (Keane, 2003). David Atwood, in a UNIDIR document, states that this 
evolution happens because “NGOs need to accept the multilateral world in order to 
succeed”(Atwood, 2006, p.33). NGOs are fluid and, like Control Arms, are carving their 
own role and have been developing into specialised beings that directly or indirectly, 
consciously or unconsciously are affecting the human rights and security relationship.  
 
Theoretically, in IR, academic studies that bloomed in the late 90s and early 2000s 
that focused on transnational advocacy (Bieler et al., 2004; Burgerman, 2001; Clark, 
2001; Florini, 2000; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Khagram et al., 2002; Matthew, 1999; 
Price, 1998; Price, 2003) where based on the premise that these non-state actors 
were completely independent from the state. Others have focused on the Gramscian 
understanding of civil society, where there is no independence from the state or from 
corporations. Anna Stavrianakis´s work (2011; 2012; 2013) conceptualises a study of 
NGOs and global civil society involved in the arms trade from the point of view of 
Marxist/Gramscian non-independence from state actors. For Stavrianakis´s NGOs 
agency is both constrained and enabled by historical and structural grounding while 
contributing to hegemonic social formations (Stavrianakis, 2011). Therefore, NGOs 
and other similar non-state actors are not independent from the state. With this view 
in mind, in a way, it could be said that previous profound studies on NGO activity and 
success as completely different actors from the state (Garcia, 2006; Grillot et al., 2006; 
Krause, 2001; Krause, 2002) are obsolete. For example, if it is assumed that NGOs are 
not an entirely separate actor from the state, then all their effort to be a third force 
(Florini, 2000) has to be set aside. This is because these studies privilege the agency 
role of these actors (Price, 2003), particularly as norm entrepreneurs whilst setting 
agendas in the creation of norms. However, the Gramscian view does not mean that 
NGOs are powerless, on the contrary, they “exercise considerable power in promoting 
a liberal conflict-security-development agenda that serves to shield the wider world 
military order from scrutiny while reproducing the South as a site of intervention” 
(Stavrianakis, 2011, p.232).  
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Stavrianakis makes a strong and well-argued case with examples of recent NGO 
activity, particularly from the UK, to demonstrate the dependency of non-state actors 
to state actors, and vice versa. She has diverse examples of how there is connection 
and sometimes repetition amongst personnel from Dfid (Department for 
International Development, UK) and Saferworld or Oxfam (both agencies deeply 
involved in ATT) (Stavrianakis, 2011, pp.228–231). She conceptualizes NGOs involved 
in the arms trade with Jan Art Scholte´s (2002) notion of reformist or transformative.54 
“Reformists are those civil society entities that wish to correct what they see as flaws 
in existing regimes while leaving underlying social structures intact” (Scholte, 2002, 
p.284). In the case of the arms trade, Oxfam, Saferworld and AI, accept the legitimacy 
of the arms trade and seeks tighter regulation within existing parameters 
(Stavrianakis, 2013, p.33). “Transformists are those civil society associations that aim 
for a comprehensive change of the social order (whether in a progressive or a 
reactionary fashion); these parts of civil society are frequently termed "social 
movements", they include anarchists, "dark green" environmentalists, fascists, radical 
feminists, pacifists, and religious revivalists, with their respective implacable 
oppositions to the state, industrialism, liberal values, patriarchy, militarism, and 
secularism” (Scholte, 2002, p.284). For the NGOs concerned with arms trade, CAAT 
and BASIC have transformist approaches (Stavrianakis, 2013). For example, CAAT´s 
goal is the reduction and ultimate abolition of the international arms trade, because 
of the role it has in undermining human rights, security and economic development 
(Ibid., p.37).55 Interestingly, reformists organisations tend have direct support from 
states (like Oxfam and Saferworld), whilst transformative ones are more independent. 
NGOs can also be divided by their strategies as: insider or outsiders (Stavrianakis, 2013 
Chapter 3).56 Insiders are those NGOs whose argument is closer to the received 
understanding of an issue, the further it is from it refers to outsiders (Ibid., p.63). 
Reformists tend to be insiders, while transformist outsiders. AI, Oxfam, Saferworld, 
and IANSA are reformist with a mix between insider and outsider; and BASIC and CAAT 
are transformist with insider and outsider strategies (Ibid., p. 92).  
 
All of these designations are heuristic and are to be seen in a case by case scenario. 
Also because organisations are hybrids and as they evolve their objectives change. For 
example, Anna Stavrianakis, in her Gramscian understanding of NGOs and based on 
 
54 Scholte actually speaks of civil society organizations being: conformist, reformist or transformist 
(Scholte, 2002, p.284). Stavrianakis dismisses conformists.  
55 CAAT is the main NGO involved in the case of the UK on Chapter 6 and will be delved upon then.  
56 This concept is not new. It was first identified by E.E. Schattschneider in relation to pressure groups 
(Schattschneider, 1935) but became influential when Wyn Grant developed and created proposition of 
an insider/outsider model (Grant, 1978). It has been used by internationalist before to explain pressure 
groups success or lack thereof in multilevel governance particularly in Latin America (Sikkink, 2005). 
Stavrianakis bases her definitions on Grant (1978). 
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Scholte (2002), has defined Control Arms as mainly reformist.57 However, due to the 
progression the organisation has had after the signing of ATT, this thesis describes 
Control Arms as reformist with hints of transformative. Reformists, because it stays 
within the framework of accepting the legitimacy of the arms trade and seeking 
tighter regulations within the existing parameters (Stavrianakis, 2013, p.33). Its 
activities directed towards aiming to universalization of ATT are definitely 
reformative. ATT Monitor, although it seeks to somehow confront the states by 
analysing the annual reports it remains reformist. This is because these tasks do not 
really challenge the status quo. This does not mean that these actions are not 
effective and/or are meaningless. In fact, due to their relative closeness to the state 
actors it is actually easier for them to push for change, even if the change might be 
slow and non-radical. These activities are crucial to the realisation of a better ATT and 
also towards gaining leverage over security in the human rights and security 
relationship.  
 
Control Arms role in the CSPs is mostly reformative, even if the statements delivered 
by Anna Macdonald, its Director, push for a somewhat radical transformation of 
states perspectives.58 Nevertheless, what is behind this radicalness are actually the 
already set requirements of the Treaty. ATT Monitor is reformist in the sense that it 
leaves the underlying structures of society intact. However, it has a powerful side to 
it. It is perhaps too early to see it, but the gap that it is filling in the transparency claim 
of the ATT is evident. The analysis published is done by a global network of experts 
that have different backgrounds but that seek to communicate how the member state 
reports can improve. Evidence of successful very similar publications is the Landmine 
Monitor, created almost twenty years ago.59 However, in comparison to the Landmine 
 
57 Stavrianakis dedicates many pages to Control Arms and to the organisations that form part of it, 
particularly in its position towards the creation of ATT. For more see: (Stavrianakis, 2013, pp.34, 37, 56, 
78–80). Her definition is based upon Control Arms´s position in the negotiation and creation of the ATT, 
not on the implementation side like the ATT Monitor.   
58 In the latest statement by Control Arms last September at the CSP3, Anna Macdonald reminds about 
the responsibility and the power to ensure that states do not supply arms that risk being used to 
commit or facilitate violations of international human rights and humanitarian law (Macdonald, 12 
September 2017). She speaks of this specially within the context of the Yemen case. Some of the other 
statements delivered by the rest of the Control Arms Coalition organisations were also based on a call 
for action for the Yemen case. All staying within the boundaries of the status quo but pushing for states 
to remember the objective of ATT: to reduce human suffering. The Caribbean Coalition for 
Development & Reduction of Armed Violence (CDRAV) did do some naming and shaming of states that 
have not made their reports public (Mutota, 13 September 2017), even if the Treaty entitles them to 
make a decision on it. Even through brief moments of extremism, the Control Arms Organisations, 
continue pushing for a full implementation of ATT. 
59 The Landmine Monitor has had a crucial role in promoting and monitoring compliance of the Mine 
Ban Treaty (Wareham, 2006). The Landmine Monitor has helped to ensure the timely submission of 
reports required by the Mine Ban Treaty, “the number of states parties submitting their initial reports 
increased dramatically from 63% in 2001 to an impressive 96% by October 2005” and “states parties’ 
reporting appears to have become more detailed since 1999” (Ibid., p. 87). It has also engaged with 
non- state parties and with armed non-state actors which has encouraged transparency and further 
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Monitor, ATT Monitor´s effect has more challenges to meet. Landmines tend to be 
remnants of war, whilst the conventional arms that the arms trade is seeking to 
control are used for war and are therefore a delicate subject for states. This clearly 
related to the tension between human rights and security that has been discussed 
throughout this thesis. Therefore, the actual result of Control Arms- ATT Monitor´s 
intention is yet to be fully proven.  
 
The transformative shade of Control Arms has also to do with Control Arms itself, 
perhaps without apparent relation to the ATT Monitor Reports. The Control Arms 
Coalition joined CAAT, Oxfam, AI and other organisations in challenging the UK 
government on the case of the sales of arms to the Saudi Coalition. This is the main 
focus of the next chapter and will be delved upon then. However, it can be understood 
that CAAT functioned as the key transformative NGO pushing for change. Even 
though, this did not occur under strict Scholte terms (2002), it did happen in 
cooperation with AI, Oxfam and CAAT. CAAT, as was seen before is considered by 
Stavrianakis (2013) a transformative organisation. Working alongside CAAT and taking 
the UK to court in 2017 on selling arms to Saudi Arabia despite being a signatory of 
ATT, is a clear case of seeking a comprehensive change of the social order. 
Nevertheless, ATT Monitor has definite shades of transformative in its actions, 
particularly when discussing Yemen in the 2016 Report and other case studies within 
the framework of its website. This will become more apparent further down.  
 
Control Arms actions, whether reformative or slightly transformative, demonstrate 
the complexity in defining an organisation´s vision and how this vision is dynamic 
because it actually changes through time. What is definite is that, Control Arms, 
through its involvement in the CSPs, through the collated analysis of a diverse set of 
researchers of ATT Monitor, and through its involvement in seeking to hold the UK 
accountable for the arms trade to Saudi Arabia, is progressing in pushing for a well 
implemented ATT and therefore for a reduction in human suffering. This is also an 
example of a non-state actor, that is partially dependent on state actor funding, 
exerting force against that same state actor. It demonstrates non-state actors seeking 
a role in the power balance that states dominate. It also shows the evolution of the 
relationship between human rights and security and how non-state actors play a 
decisive role in it. This also has to do with who is behind that non-state actor, who is 
financing Control Arms and what are the interests that the organisation has. This will 
be further discussed further below when analysing NGO funding further below.  
 
Moral over material interests constructed by survival  
 
 
involvement (Ibid., pp. 99-102). With this the Landmine Monitor has become “a model for how an 
active, coordinated and engaged civil society can be integral to the negotiation, implementation and 
monitoring of an international agreement” (Ibid., p. 104) and a definite role model for ATT Monitor.  
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 The nexus of moral and material interests in this case becomes peculiar when 
understanding that the main actor in it is an NGO that has already carved its role in 
the negotiation of the Treaty and is seeking to carve it implementation identity. This 
is being constructed with every CSP, every ATT Monitor publication and basically 
every step that Control Arms takes within the realms of ATT implementation. What 
their implementation identity looks like has been outlined in the previous part of this 
chapter, what this second part of this chapter wants to display is the complexity that 
comes with it. It wants to explicate the causal chains, social processes, interactions 
and confluences that the interests of both the NGO and the member states have. In 
other words, the interactions between actors and the structure and between actors 
and other actors; the constitutive causality of the case. To do so firstly there will be 
an explanation of how identity and the politization or a-politization of Control Arms-
ATT Monitor is. Secondly, the moral interests will be put in direct opposition of those 
of the states. This because, after all and as has been said by Amb. Korhonen in the 
interview, ATT is made by states and for states. Finally, the details of Control Arms 
‘finances related to its material need for survival will elucidate how certain states also 
survive from supporting organisations like Control Arms and Control Arms-ATT 
Monitor.  
 
Identity and the politization or lack thereof of a norm implementer NGO 
 
 Traditionally, in IR theory,  what gives state actors their identity is “largely 
constituted by sovereignty and it situates nation-states in a position of authority and 
legitimacy against other actors” (Mathur, 2011, p.179).60 Identifying non-state actor’s 
identity becomes problematic because supposedly only states can have an effect over 
sovereignty. Whether anything or anyone limits state sovereignty is still an ongoing 
debate, however, human rights norms have been in fact considered as limiting 
sovereignty (Steiner et al., 2008). This results interesting when focusing on what 
NGOs, like Control Arms-ATT Monitor, are trying to achieve in the name of human 
rights based norms like the ATT. The actual power that NGOs have to achieve change 
the structure has been repeatedly proved with the negotiation of human rights based 
norms. There is no doubt that they can influence these topics, even if there is still a 
need to latch on to championing states, like in the case of the ATT negotiation and the 
UK. The power of NGOs to influence in the norm implementation of these types of 
norms and therefore push for a greater arms control and a change in the already 
settled structure around it, is more difficult to prove.  
 
60 Sovereignty, in International Relations, became centre stage after the end of the Cold War. Before 
it was not really considered since realists and liberals took the international state system for granted. 
However, some had started considering other actors in the state-centric system (Keohane and Nye, 
1972). Hedley Bull (1977) work opened up contingencies of sovereignty which led to some predicting 
its decline (Strange, 1998), while others drew the structural change international politics where 
suffering (Ruggie, 2002). Constructivists observed the normative content of sovereignty and how these 
contour the international arena (Wendt, 1992). While realists showed sovereignty as “organised 
hypocrisy” utilised by states at their convenience (Krasner, 1999). 
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An NGOs identity is directly related and defined by the motivation that each 
organisation has and the interests it wishes to fulfil. Scholarly, the identity of 
disarmament and arms control NGOs has been largely linked to their role in norm 
construction. Actually, their identity has not been precisely defined academically but 
as seen throughout this Chapter, their role on the creation and negotiation of the 
Mine Ban Treaty, the Cluster Munitions Treaty and the Arms Trade Treaty has been 
widely studied. Their identity around norm implementation is being defined by their 
current and future collaborations in the process of the fulfilment of ATT.  
 
Organizations that are seen as reformative, as described above, then are seen as 
having  a “non-threatening identity” (Mathur, 2011). It is known that humanitarian 
actors, such as Control Arms, believe that by positioning themselves securely within 
this humanitarian space, they can “issue appeals, suggest incremental measures and 
critique state behaviour that might foster a momentum for more comprehensive 
measures in the future” (Mathur, 2011, pp. 180–181). Control Arms is in most senses 
non-threatening and therefore this may be the reason for its success in advancing into 
more control over implementation in the ATT. It is important to remember that the 
ATT, despite the many non-state organisations involved in its well-being as seen in 
each CSP, is a treaty for the state parties as was said by Amb. Korhonen in chapter 4 
(Korhonen, 2018). The state parties are the leaders and the ones who hold the last 
word. Despite this, Control Arms seems to have found the identity of assisting, legally 
assisting. In fact, as it is stated on its webpage: “it supports a robust well implemented 
ATT by providing legal assistance to UN delegations, government officials and civil 
society organizations in order to facilitate the ratification and effective 
implementation of the ATT” (Control Arms). Through ATT Monitor, it seeks to have 
the identity of promoting a better use of the formal implementation tasks put in place 
by the Treaty. All looking to have an impact on the effectiveness of ATT fulfilment. 
Because of the evolving nature of Control Arms, and ATT Monitor project, its identity 
is ever-changing and therefore difficult to fully pinpoint. It is clear the direction that 
the organisation wants to give to their identity, in terms of implementation, as just 
stated. Nevertheless, in order for it to truly define itself as a separate entity from the 
state and from ATT formal implementation, it will have to continue its mission. 
Nevertheless, this means that Control Arms through ATT Monitor is the norm 
implementer of this case and has to continue constructing such role in order to 
continue its interaction in norm implementation dynamics. Control Arms and Control 
Arms- ATT Monitor´s identity and the political or a-political role it plays in the ATT is 
better defined by the nexus of moral and material interests it carries and by how these 
relate to the state parties, to the future of the organisation and of course to the 
human rights and security relationship, as will be seen below.  
 
Norm implementers, beyond organisations that have evolved from norm 
entrepreneurship, are agents that operate in order to gain implementation of the 
norm. In the case of Control Arms-ATT Monitor, these actions occur in a 
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straightforward fashion but the can also be indirect as will be seen in the following 
chapters. This is because some organisations defend the precepts of the Arms Trade 
Treaty coupled with other instruments of IHL. What is particular about these agents 
is that, like the agents defined in Rawl´s original position (Rawls, 1971) described in 
chapter 2. Norm implementers are free, mutually disinterested and rational, therefore 
they are fair in their actions. Through their actions as norm implementers they seek 
to limit the traditional power of sovereignty, therefore the traditional powers of the 
state. The actual freedom and disinterest of norm implementers is not necessarily 
entirely true. For example, below the interests of Control Arms-ATT Monitor will be 
presented and their absolute freedom might be subedited to financial survival. This 
freedom will also be confirmed or questioned in chapter 6 and 7 with the 
organisations presented.  
 
Morality in direct opposition to the state or false morality?  
 
 Control Arms-ATT Monitor is not the only actor seeking the fulfilment of the 
ATT, it faces over one hundred state parties in charge of directing the other 
implementation sources. A great majority of member parties are actually on Control 
Arms´ side, because in each CSP they engage on pushing for either greater 
transparency, universalisation, better reporting, etc. However, there are other state 
parties that can seem on Control Arms´ side for the most part but have interests 
domestically and internationally that guide them towards directly or indirectly 
choosing to slow down its progress in the full implementation of the Treaty. Of course 
these actions do not happen in broad daylight, in fact they probably do not even 
happen consciously. They are hidden behind comments, actions, and even in-actions 
during, before or after CSPs. They might have happened years, decades or centuries 
ago but continue to influence the state parties’ actions today. Nevertheless, at least 
in paper, Control Arms seeks to respond to the deficits that the Treaty cannot 
accomplish and is allowed to do so openly by states.  
 
In this context, Control Arms has defined, whether implicitly or explicitly, its moral 
and material interests that define its relationship with the member parties but also 
with the human rights and security relationship of this case in particular. In moral 
terms, Control Arms´ motivation is clear: “to control licit trade in order to impact the 
uncontrolled proliferation of arms and ammunition that fuel conflict, increase human 
rights abuses and exacerbate poverty” (Control Arms). Overall, morally it seeks the 
improved regulation of the arms trade as an underminder of human rights supporting 
the human rights side of the human rights and security relationship.61 Ensuring the 
universalization and effective implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty, is part of this 
 
61 This is one of the differences between two of the non-state actors presented in this thesis. Control Arms as a 
reformist, focuses on the improvement of the arms trade as it states on its website: “the Control Arms Coalition 
works to end the flow of arms and ammunition that fuel conflict, poverty and human rights abuses” (Control Arms). 
This is different from CAAT, as will be seen in chapter 6, that as a transformist wants to abolish the international 
trade of arms.  
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and through the ATT Monitor Project they serve as a trusted source of information to 
advance universalisation and implementation. All in all, what Control Arms´ATT 
Monitor project seeks to find political effectiveness to achieve its moral commitment.  
 
Theoretically, in terms of negotiation and creation of human rights instruments, Keck 
and Sikkink point out to how transnational advocacy networks achieve political 
effectiveness through leverage that can be material or moral. “Material leverage 
normally takes the form of some kind of issue-linkage, normally involving money or 
goods- but potentially also including votes in international organizations, prestigious 
offices, or other benefits-; moral leverage involves what some commentators have 
called the ‘mobilisation of shame’, where the behaviour of target actors is held up to 
the bright light of international scrutiny” (Keck and Sikkink, 1999, p.97). Morality is 
then defined somewhat by what the general public wants, because Control Arms, as 
an organisations of civil society, is acting as a representative of civil society´s moral 
needs. In fact, “civil society´s moral authority depends on the perception that it is 
promoting worthy causes in opposition to concentrations of power”(Florini, 2000, 
p.233). In the case of ATT Monitor, the opposition to concentrations of power are the 
over a hundred member states that represent the actual Treaty.  
 
The ATT Monitor reports have the power to morally shame those states or even all 
the member states as a whole for not following rules or for not advancing with the 
Treaty stipulations despite the excuse of it being too early to achieve full compliance. 
In some sense, the ATT Monitor reports of the last few years have done so. The report 
does, in fact, mention the areas of opportunity after an analysis of the mechanisms of 
the Treaty that have been successful or unsuccessful. For example, in the ATT Monitor 
report of 2018, there is a section dedicated to the analysis of the preparatory 
meetings for the CSP and the 2017 CSP. There is a detailed description of which states 
are doing what, which in a sense speaks positively of the involvement of such states. 
It is interesting to see that the states usually involved in these types of actions, like 
being chairs of a specific working group on transparency or universalisation, are the 
same names that are heard in other ATT matters and perhaps even in other similar 
treaties and procedures across the international arena. Names like, Finland, 
Switzerland, Belgium and Mexico are heard of often. These states represent 
progressive states usually. States that have are seeking or magnifying their moral role 
in the international scene. States that most likely have little involvement in the 
production of weapons or that even if they do they have a peaceful reputation to 
abide by. The better understanding of these types of states will be better understood 
in Chapter 7. 
 
The ATT Monitor Reports are carefully worded to make it seem like there is a lack of 
“x” or “y”, whilst praising the progress that states are making. It is almost like a 
psychotherapist would speak to a delicate patient. Perhaps this is the way to go to 
actually encourage states to progress without an undivided pressure and through a 
softer focus. This is also a reflection of the reformative nature of Control Arms, in 
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particular through ATT Monitor Reports. If there is no real pressure made towards 
pushing for full implementation or full compliance can ATT Monitor be considered as 
a completely opposing and separate entity to the state parties? Is the ATT Monitor´s 
morality in accordance with its moral compass or simply an arm of the state actors? 
In this sense, their role can be seen more in a sense of guidance as opposed to naming 
and shaming, but then is this role effective? Does this role leave the reformative 
personality without touching upon the transformative side, or does it enter at least 
slightly into the transformative?  
 
Morally, the case of Yemen brings an example of a matter that needs to be resolved 
in a less passive way, given the urgency of the matter. Saudi Arabia, through the large 
number of arms exported from ATT members, and signatories, is continuing the 
violations of human rights in the Yemen area. The ATT Monitor Reports have tackled 
this throughout the years. The progression of the reporting goes as follows. The 2015 
ATT Monitor Report only mentioned Yemen once in a list of countries reporting or not 
to UNROCA which was in the appendix. The Yemen situation had not yet exploded in 
the media, and the 2015 report reflects this. The 2016 ATT Monitor Report is the most 
focused on Yemen. The word is mentioned 50 times throughout the report which 
includes two special explanatory boxes on “dealing in double standards” and on the 
“Yemen Risk Profile” (Control Arms Secretariat, 2016) as well as notes and references 
of articles by other NGOs and by Control Arms itself. There is talk of examples of civil 
society organizations ‘activity in the attempt to hold governments accountable on 
their obligations with the ATT. This in particular on organisations in the Netherlands, 
the UK and Italy that through local pressure managed to get the vote passed in the 
European Parliament imposing an embargo on Saudi Arabia. Interestingly there is the 
shaming of Saudi Arabia as an importer signatory state upon accepting these arms 
exports. However, there is no direct shaming of the state parties that have failed to 
stop the arms exports to Saudi Arabia or even of signatories, like the United States, 
that continue to export large amounts of weapons. This does not mean that the other 
parts of the report fail to make the involved member states uncomfortable, guilty or 
morally obliged to change. In fact, the member states as a group are shamed for not 
discussing enough the topic in the CSP meeting of that year. The ATT Monitor Report, 
although the focus of this chapter, is not the only publication by Control Arms within 
the framework of the ATT Monitor. There are also particular case studies on countries, 
specific urgent topics and other interesting matters. In 2016, there is a particular case 
study on Yemen which is much quoted in the 2016 ATT Monitor Report.  
 
The following ATT Monitor reports of 2017 and 2018 mention the word Yemen 19 and 
25 times respectively. In 2017, there is a special box on the “ Arms sales to Saudi 
Arabia: United Kingdom Judicial Review or Arms Export Practice” (Control Arms 
Secretariat, 2017).62 This box is the description of the situation and the quoting of 
other articles from AI and CAAT. The box does give a sense of shaming the UK and of 
 
62 The explanation of the actual case will be the focus of the next chapter.  
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pointing out how this situation, by a state party, affects the overall functioning and 
effectivity of the Arms Trade Treaty. The 2018 ATT Monitor Report mentions how 
state parties: Norway, Germany and Belgium have halted arms trade to Saudi Arabia, 
even if previous agreed contracts are still untouched. There is mention that other 
exports have not been dealt with, but no direct mention towards the UK, for example.  
 
Overall, the trend shows a definite surge on the topic of Yemen in 2016 with a slight 
decline in the last couple of years. It reflects the characteristics of a reformative 
organisation with definite hints of transformative. The transformative sense can be 
appreciated particularly in the 2016, 2017 and 2018 Report, in the themes of the 
boxes and on the dedication of a specific case study of the country. However, there is 
still somehow a sense of using the, an indirect type of shaming, which brings a sense 
of a reformative type of NGO. Why is there no further direct mention of the UK not 
halting arms in the 2018 report? Or is it subliminal?  Why did the focus on Yemen go 
down in the last two years? Obviously there are other urgent matters in the Treaty 
mechanisms, like reporting for example, which make it difficult to concentrate on the 
Yemen topic in all reports. However, it is interesting to see that once a few state 
parties had abided by the rules and reached a major step into stopping exports to 
Saudi Arabia, the shaming somehow calmed down. It is key to mention that according 
to 2017-2018 SIPRI data Saudi Arabia bought 84% of weapon imports from the US and 
only 6% from the UK (SIPRI, 2018). The US has definitely a much significant share of 
the market, however the UK´s parts market end up in US weapons. Also, the human 
component of the UK´s deals with SA, although to date unquantifiable are a large part 
of the importance of the UK case.63 This could be the reason as to why the ATT 
Monitor Report lowered its interest in the UK.  
 
The answer as to why countries, like Norway, Germany and Belgium, progressed into 
stopping new exports that fuelled the Yemen Crisis, is complex and due to several 
international and domestic reasons. It could be seen how after the 2016 ATT Report, 
these member countries decided to stop. Does this mean that Control Arms- ATT 
Monitor´s reporting had anything to do with it? In some sense, yes when taking into 
consideration that this was not the sole reason for the halting of the arms exports, 
because as will be seen in chapter 7 there are many other domestic and even within 
the government forces implicated. Not to mention, decades of a constructed identity 
of each of these states. It can be appreciated that Control Arms ‘combination of direct 
and indirect methodology of shaming has had an impact, somehow. Does this mean 
that a mostly reformative NGO has a greater chance of success, as Stavrianakis 
(Stavrianakis, 2013) states? In the particular sense yes, because it is this relative 
closeness to the state parties that allows the ATT Monitor Reports to excerpt a certain 
amount of pressure upon states. In the general sense no, because overall the Treaty 
is not fully implemented and exports to violating states are still occurring, even by 
signatories and state parties. Despite this, there is an advancement in terms of the 
 
63 This will be explained in chapter 6.  
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human rights and security relationship, even if minor. Nevertheless, this minor 
advancement reflects the hypothesis of this thesis, were states give rights by allowing 
Control Arms to manage through the ATT Monitor Reports but the means of violence 
continue to be controlled.  
 
Moreover, and in line with a CMV lens mentioned in chapter 1, does the direct-
indirect type of shaming mechanism that Control Arms uses does justice to its moral 
fibre? For its morality to be considered that of a different entity than that of the state, 
it has to be in opposition to it, as mentioned above. The morality in this case is not 
necessarily fully in opposition to the states. This because of the lack of continuing to 
or lack of starting to shame certain violating state parties and signatories. It cannot 
be possible that Saudi Arabia is shamed as an importing signatory, but the United 
States as an exporting signatory is not. It cannot be possible that the UK is almost 
indirectly shamed in one report, but is no longer shamed in the following ones. This 
could be explained by the share of sales to SA from the UK actually went down from 
10% to 2% in the 2017-2018 period, according to SIPRI data (SIPRI, 2018). However, 
there is still a sense of lack of continuity, despite the understandable focus on other 
urgent topics of the Treaty. It gives the sense of a commitment towards the moral 
interests of the organization but perhaps not fully. This is not to say that Control Arms 
is fully a-moral or as mentioned in previous chapters, false moral.  
 
False morality stands for morality that aims to be fully based on natural law but is 
associated in diverse levels to other non-moral and material interests. False morality, 
implies the use of a moral interests in the name of a further non-moral one, or simply 
moral interests used in a falsely moral way. Furthermore, false morality is also a 
morality based on Mill´s consequentialism, as seen in chapter 2. This is because the 
use of morality, without it being naturally moral or ethical leads to it being used as an 
ends to a mean, as a cloak for interests, therefore as being used falsely. This type of 
morality is in opposition to Kant, who saw the morality of an action as deriving from 
the action itself and not from the consequences it produces.   
 
The case of Control Arms- ATT Monitor Report is not fully false moral, but flirting with 
entering the realm. Therefore, it is neighbouring false morality, because as the phrase 
says it, the organisation´s actions claim to be moral but are very close to being falsely 
moral. This is mainly due because its morality seems to be in accordance with its 
actual moral statements in the majority of its actions, although there is a lack of direct 
opposition to the state as mentioned above. Morality is also not fully aligned with 
what is intended, not fully aligned with the opposing state actors, and not fully aligned 
with the human rights side of the human rights and security relationship, as will be 
further seen below. This morally aligned analysis is due to the CMV lens this thesis is 
using and as a result it addresses weaknesses in constructivist theory. It is important 
to mention that neighbouring false morality has also to do with Control Arms- ATT 
Monitor´s material interests and how maybe the not fully moral interests and actions 
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presented here are connected with the organisations material need for survival as will 
be delved with subsequently.   
 
The material need for survival of NGOs fed by certain states 
   
 In a globalized world, NGOs need material resources to survive, in particular 
financial resources. They usually pursuit donations from more than one source, either 
from: “individuals- donating money and time, states- providing grants, contracts or 
tax concessions, multilateral agencies, bilateral aid programmes, foundations- state, 
private and corporate-, religious organisations and trade unions” (Pinter, 2001, 
p.198).  Also, NGOs have evolved to becoming “subcontractors of governments” in 
certain areas, this is “increasingly channelling funds for service provision, 
development projects and humanitarian relief” (Florini, 2000, p.213). This has meant 
that number of foundational sources has grown extensively in the last decades which 
has been one of the reasons of the recent explosion in the number of NGOs 
worldwide. Kim Reimann (2006) argues that this is due to the globalization of political 
structures, institutions, and Western democratic values (Reimann, 2006, p.46). She 
estimates that this has led to the universe of NGO sponsors multiplying, from the 
exponential growth of UN based funding to regional organisation support, like the 
European Union. This has developed parallel to the evolution of the international 
system of governance as “a larger, more complex and inclusive set of organisations, 
regimes and gatherings where there is greater political access and participation in 
policy-making, implementation, and collaborative efforts” (Ibid., p. 55). Also, coupled 
with the normative progression that constructivists refer to and that has been deeply 
dealt with in the theory part of this thesis.  
 
Most of the rest of the literature on funding NGOs is focused on international 
development studies and on the dysfunctions that survival for funding provokes 
(Cooley and Ron, 2002; Duffield, 1997; Edwards and Hulme, 1996; Fruttero and Gauri, 
2005; Gauri and Fruttero, 2003; Molina-Gallart, 2014). Access to secure and stable 
funding allows NGOs to ensure continuation of their tasks, although achieving it is not 
easy. Therefore, many large NGOs or International NGOs (INGOs)64 seek partnership 
with funders to ensure this. Amnesty International, for example, does not have 
funding from states, in order fully keep it its credibility as counter actor against states. 
Other organisations, like Oxfam, clearly receive funds from DfiD and continue to 
receive them annually. Volker Heins (2008), has described NGOs as “benign 
parasites”. This is because NGOs do not operate in a distinct sphere outside the state, 
they work within them. He claims that “global civil society theorists, like the ones 
mentioned in the first part of this chapter, have misread the independence of NGOs” 
(Heins, 2008, p.41). Also, that NGOs may think as themselves as harbingers of a “post-
sovereign” global civil society but this is at best an illusion (Ibid., p.159). NGOs actually 
 
64 INGOs does not necessarily refer to NGOs with representation in almost every country, but to NGOs 
at least a diverse set of offices and worldwide reputation.  
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seek to “infect” and thereby change the behaviour of their hosts without harming 
them; they are independent in that they choose their own programmes and targets, 
but need a powerful agent to support them (Ibid., p.2). They slip information and 
legitimacy to states in exchange for reputation, funds and social contacts (Ibid., p. 
159). This goes hand in hand with what reformative NGOs, like Control Arms, seek to 
achieve. Even more so, with what was discussed in the previous part, were Control 
Arms is seeking to infect state parties with the itch to fully comply with the ATT, even 
if the illness is taking a long time to develop.   
 
Not all states are willing to be hosts. Some do so in an indirect manner. In the case of 
Control Arms, due to its nature of coalition between many international, national and 
local organisations it is difficult to pin point where their funds are coming from and 
how they are divided.65 Control Arms´ funding is separated from funding allocated to 
the ATT Monitor Project. It is interesting to look at both, since despite ATT Monitor 
being the major focus of this chapter, Control Arms is the pilot as well as the 
organisation that participates and exposes information every year at the CSP 
meetings. First of all, Control Arms´ website appears to be out of date, because many 
of the NGOs claiming to be members of the Steering Committee no longer seem to 
exists, like the Africa Peace Forum from Kenya, or the Asociación para Políticas 
Públicas (APP) from Argentina. Not to mention that several of the staff members no 
longer work for Control Arms. There are ten members of the Steering Committee from 
most continents except Oceania and Asia. Table 1 shows the organisations, 
foundations, states and private individuals that finance these members. Some of 
these organisations are also financed by private donations that do not appear in the 
financing part of their websites. It can be appreciated that governments- in bold- 
appear in most of the members. The states that participate seem to repeat 
themselves and are: Sweden, Finland, Norway, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, 
Denmark, Ireland and UK. The UK appears with less frequency and only in UK based 
organisations like Oxfam or Saferworld. The US appears indirectly through USAID, 
nevertheless this organisation is completely independent from the federal 
government. Therefore, the US, should not be included in this list of countries. Other 
sponsors are large organisations that most likely receive state financing. The 
European Union is also stated as financing the Arias Foundation. So, indirectly other 
states beside the ones specifically mention are supporting these NGOS. However, it is 
obvious to see that the names that repeat themselves are classified as being 
progressive states. Countries that have accepted, consciously or subconsciously, to 
have “benign parasites” with or within them. Second of all, the financing of the ATT 
Monitor project, it is clearly stated in the ATT Monitor website. The governments that 
contribute are: Australia, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland. 
 
65 It is also very difficult to contact people in Control Arms, even worst to get them to talk about 
funding. This is nothing new, for decades scholars have stated the same about other civil society 
organisations (Florini, 2000, p.228). 
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The type of states that tend to donate directly and have their names on Control Arms 
and ATT Monitor, are primarily progressive states.66 Why these type of states are 
willing to participate and be publicly named for doing so could be due to two main 
reasons related to state socialization. On the one hand, it might be related to what 
was discussed in chapter 4 on Jennifer Erickson´s view and the states´ will of 
maintaining their international reputation intact while enhancing their reputations as 
responsible citizens of the international community (Erickson, 2015; Erickson, 2009). 
On the other hand, it could have to do with  Benjamin de Carvalho and Iver B Neuman 
(2014) view on status seeking of small states.  For them, a state’s place in the hierarchy 
of states is also a place on the map of global politics, therefore, status-seeking 
pursued through foreign policy becomes key to a small state´s identity. De Carvalho 
and Neuman focus specifically to Norway as a small state, but it is clear that this can 
be relatable to the progressive states like Australia, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden 
and Switzerland involved in the ATT Monitor. Most of the progressive states that 
finance or have financed Control Arms, to date maintain their status by continuing 
their full involvement in humanitarian causes. Germany, was actually a major arm 
exporter that recently abided by the rules of ATT and decided to stop sending arms to 
Saudi Arabia. The case of the UK, although a major arm exporter too, is different. It 
encounters a duality. On one hand, it has for many years gotten involved indirectly 
and directly with NGOs farther than as a financial partner. It was the number one 
championing state in the process of ATT and pushed for a arms control despite its 
exporter status. On the other hand, lately, it has fallen out of the grace of possibly 
considering itself a progressive state. It has continued to export arms to Saudi Arabia 
arming one of the deadliest conflicts of our times. This duality is complex and due to 
many factors that will be delved to in detail in the next Chapter of this thesis.   
 
Materially, it is evident that securing funding is key to NGO while utilizing NGOs for 
certain domestic and international benefits is crucial for some states. Material 
interests of both NGOs and states are set in a multilayer fashion that is directly 
connected with moral interests. NGOs, like Control Arms, have decided that attracting 
bees with honey is easier when staying in a reformative methodology, with tints of 
transformative, and states, like the progressive states financing Control Arms, have 
extend money towards an apparent selfless cause with hints of selfishness 
throughout. There is a deliberative sense of supporting morality in both cases, but in 
the case of Control Arms when collated with financing neighbouring false morality can 
easily shift into false morality. However, with this strategy it turns out to be win-win 
for both Control Arms and the actual advancement of the ATT, even if the 
advancement is slow and not full. The question is if the funding from progressive 
states, or any state for that matter, comes with strings attached. Does it make a 
difference in the organisations actions? Do the material and moral interests of the 
state influence or are imposed onto the NGO? Unfortunately, it is very hard to prove 
 
66 Much more will be delved upon why progressive states get involved in this in chapter 7 with the case 
study of Norway. 
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this, it probably does not happen explicitly. However, it does put the validity of the 
NGOs morality in doubt. Thomas Risse claims that when NGOs step away from their 
supposed public interest or common good towards a private interest, NGOs can “lose 
their credibility” (Florini, 2000, p.186). Has Control Arms lost their credibility because 
it is being financed by states? Or does it depend on which states finance it? If the 
funding comes from harmless progressive states, that are maybe not large exporters 
of arms and have a peace seeking reputation, does it make a difference? Or is it that 
the population is used to such situations in relation to NGOs and decides to turn a 
blind eye and fully believe in the morality of organisation?  
 
Finding out these questions would be a whole different project, and the result would 
probably turn out to be ambiguous, as both getting through to NGOs to deliver their 
financing reasoning would be hard and understanding if the population feels 
disappointed over this would be close to impossible. What these questions display is 
the complicated nature of morality and materialism and they are the reason as to why 
this case has been designated as neighbouring false morality and not fully falsely 
moral. This because of the nature of the NGO, that despite being reformative has its 
basis in morality and human rights. The questions also lead to wonder where the NGO 
stands, is it fully a non-state actor, can it be considered a state actor, is it a mixed 
actor? The degree of how mixed an actor can be varied, as will be seen in the 
subsequent chapters, particularly chapter 6. Control Arms and ATT Monitor are in fact 
funded by states, at least states that tend to be more keen to peace and morality 
internationally. This makes them reformative NGO dependant on the state but does 
it make them mixed actors? The degree of independence of Control Arms can be 
somewhat questioned, but for the most part more than being considered a mixed 
actor, like those that will be analysed in following chapters will be, it is considered a 
non-state actor that receives funding from some states. A reformative non-state 
actor, that is. The nature of the actor is mostly carried out in the non-state sphere. 
Where actors fall if they are involved in both spheres depends mostly to the relevance 
they have in one field or the other, more importantly this complexity is a reflection of 
the multilayerness of the actors and activities involved in the norm dynamics of the 
human rights and security relationship. They also demonstrate the semi permeated 
boundaries of the state and non-state actors. What is essential for this chapter is that 
Control Arms and the ATT state parties, in particular those involved in financing, 
develop a certain dynamic understanding that allows for both parts to fulfil their 
moral and material interests whilst continuing to advance in their duties with the 
Treaty. It is also important to recall, Avant et al. (2010) and the expectation of 
surprises in the dynamics of global governance. Certainly the possibility of defining 
Control Arms as a mixed state and non-state actor is a surprise. Nevertheless, Control 
Arms, through the ATT Monitor Project seems to have found a balance that allows its 
characteristics to continue to support morality and at the same time up keeping with 
the indirect control from states. State parties have found a further way of advancing 
in their material interests and indirectly influencing an NGO. All in all, this allows 
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Control Arms to survive and dedicate to its principal duties without having its power 
of decision and its morality taken away.  
 
Particular overlap of the human rights and security relationship  
 
 The genealogical and constitutive causality framework of analysis and the 
constructivist base have showed how a reformative type of NGO acting internationally 
in favour of international and domestic issues has managed to have an effect or not 
on the norm implementation dynamics of the life cycle of the Arms Trade Treaty. In 
this sense, the particular overlap of the human rights and security relationship for the 
case of Control Arms-ATT Monitor in relation to the state parties of the ATT is the 
reflection of the constructed environment in which it lives in. It echoes the tensions 
between state and non-state actors, between security and human security, between 
morality and materialism that have developed specially in the last few decades. It 
demonstrates the social processes between NGOs and states and between structure 
and agency and the constant evolution of both. All of this, coupled with supposed 
advancements in the arms control arena, as well higher praise for civil society 
organisations. 
 
Characteristics of the human rights and security relationship today 
 
 The human rights and security relationship displays the complexity of the 
particular nexus that the moral and material interests of Control Arms- ATT Monitor 
versus the ATT exhibit and with it the evolution and obstacles that the rise of the 
human security side entails. Particularly visible is the tension between state and non-
state actors with the rise of human security and a more controlled state security 
represented by the rise in arms control that the Arms Trade Treaty seeks.  State and 
non-state actors interact in this realm and show how they have adapted, or not. For 
example, the data analysis and information gathered and published in the yearly ATT 
Monitor reports, as the verification mechanism of ATT, is evolving in such a way that 
it is having an impact upon states, whether mild and therefore can be seen as a tool 
to advance the human rights side of the human rights and security relationship. 
Another example is the multilayer effects the interaction between Control Arms- ATT 
Monitor and the state parties have upon each other, upon the evolution and 
fulfilment of the Treaty and upon the relationship.  
 
The complexity of the morality in particular gives a sense of how the human rights 
side of the relationship struggles against the security side. How flirting with false 
morality is something non-state actors have to endure in order to inflect change on 
state actions and how it is connected to the differences between a human security 
embedded in complacent militarism versus CMV that allows actors to promote 
cultures of peace in a global and local manner, as was explained in chapter 1. How 
reformative NGOs have more power in many senses because of this, because in the 
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long run their progress is slow and relative, as opposed to the gamble transformative 
organisations seek to gain absolute change. The perception of this morality has much 
to do with funding and with the survival instinct of organisations like Control Arms. 
Actually it could be said that Control Arms has evolved into this purposefully and 
knowingly that the only way to reach progress, even if relative, is through support 
from states accompanied by slight denigration of their moral side. Financing, from the 
state side, displays the dynamics that progressive states have to endure to persist the 
international hierarchical dynamics in the international scene. Progressive states, by 
supporting NGOs, have constructed a world where their status in state hierarchy is 
protected while NGOs are doing the same on the flip side. At the same time, both 
types of actors are aiding, indirectly or directly, human rights in the human rights and 
security relationship. In the case of progressive states, as opposed to great powers, 
their actions can be seen as attending their security side whilst maintaining their 
human rights side. Even if they continue to feed into giving rights whilst controlling 
the means of violence, they are also feeding into the opposite side. The truth is that 
because the ATT represents all state parties, it has to take as a whole. However, it is 
important to recognise that not all states are built the same and that they all, at one 
time or another, face a duality in the ever-changing human rights and security 
relationship.67 
 
NGOs seeking adherence to norm implementing pursue change from state actors to 
comply with international human rights and humanitarian law. This change results to 
be dynamic and therefore, implying a constant push and pull between state and non-
state actors. This dynamic varies depending on the actors involved and on the 
circumstances around it.68 Change is complex and specially in these case studies it is 
characterised by contingency, this in relation to its constructivist nature, as 
mentioned in chapter 1 and also to the genealogical framework of analysis 
approached. Complexity comes from the fact that change is constant and that change 
cannot be simplistic, otherwise it leads to failure and missed opportunities (Green, 
2016). Because of complexity organisations need to be flexible and convene and 
broker relationships (Ibid.). In order to do so, organisations need to understand power 
and with it identify the playing field. This is precisely what the non-state actors 
portrayed in this thesis have done. Control Arms, through its ATT Monitor report and 
through its history of supporting the creation of the ATT, has understood that in order 
to survive and thrive it should mould their activities to those of the powerful actors 
to ensure greater implementation of the Treaty. Specifically, the ATT Monitor Report 
has engaged in seeking to have a diverse set of experts researching, analysing and 
 
67 This dualism will become more apparent in chapter 6 and 7 with more focus on particular kinds of 
states in the implementation of ATT.  
68 As mentioned earlier on note 55, Stavrianakis identifies NGOs as being insiders or outsiders, this based on Grant 
(Grant, 1978). Insiders will be better able to generate change, but that change will likely be incremental, technical 
in nature and featuring high potential for co-option; outsider strategies involve more transformatory demands 
that cannot be accommodated in the current state of affairs, but are less likely to be listened to by 
policymakers(Stavrianakis, 2013, p.63). For more see Chapter 3 of Ibid.  
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writing the report. Experts from different NGOs, global and local, academic 
institutions and other organisations. Financing, as discussed above, also influences 
ATT Monitor’s actions and therefore influences the amount of change that can 
actually happen given the compromises the organisation must follow to ensure 
financial survival. Because of these characteristics, coupled with the moral and 
material interests described in Figure 1, it can be seen how far the ATT Monitor has 
gotten into reaching its objective. In overall terms, CA-ATT Monitor has struggled to 
make a clear impact on the improvement of the regulation of the Arms Trade since its 
activities has stayed within the framework of the states that fund it. The weight of 
those that are behind the organisation, the states, is only allowing CA to reach the 
potential that those actors decide. ATT Monitor reports reflect the strains between 
different state actors, those who support openly and directly CA and those who seek 
reassurance of their interests. This then is reflected in the human rights and security 
relationship and on its degree of false morality as has been discussed throughout the 
chapter.  
 
Figure 1 shows in concrete form the human rights and security relationship for this 
chapter´s case. Here, the complexity of the moral and material interests of the actors 
in question becomes more apparent and seen in table form allows for a better 
understanding of the how the moral and material interests of the actors collide. In 
terms of the Venn diagram, it looks almost like both sides are equal due to the input 
that both have in this case. However, it is actually a constant inflation and deflation 
of the bubble, the HR one in particular. The intention is there, in many senses morally 
authentic, to become bigger, but the material survival of both the CA and the state 
parties obtrudes with it. The security circle has not swallowed the human rights one, 
at least not tangibly. The human rights and security relationship of this case overall 
reflect that the ATT has advanced, but states continue to giver rights whilst controlling 
the means of violence. The relationship shows how through a CMV lens, the analysis 
gives centre stage to morality issues, like false morality, aiding in addressing the 







Implications for future ATT implementation 
 
 The particular nexus of key interests of Control Arms-ATT Monitor and of the 
state parties of the ATT exposes the nuisances that come with having an NGO involved 
in treaty mechanisms. The fact that Control Arms has decided to enter this multilevel 
game of players and interests and the fact of how this attitude has evolved questions 
the organisations independence and its implications for its future and for the future 
of the Treaty. Control Arms-ATT Monitor survival results contingent to the willingness 
of states to finance it which indirectly imply certain degree of power of the state over 
the organisation. In this case, ATT Monitor has diverse states supporting its financial 
needs, most of which could possible not be expecting anything in exchange. However, 
the prerogative of Control Arms is still unclear. If this continues into the future, which 
it most likely will as it is set up to be like this, this would mean that Control Arms´ 
actions would always be viewed as not entirely independent. Within this, the morality 
that is supposed to be a reflection of what the population as a whole wants can 
continue to be eroded and further enter the realm of false morality.69  
 
Whatever progress ATT Monitor, as a reformative organisation of the civil society has 
achieved, whether real or perceived, is certainly slow and very relative. This relative 
progress questions the real advancement in terms of ATT implementation that can be 
 
69 More on how NGOs that have clear support from states are managing the implementation of the 
ATT will be understood in chapter 7 with Redd Barna (Norwegian Save the Children) and Norway.    
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reached by Control Arms. Will the it continue to progress along the same lines, will it 
stay in the same grey area that it has been in for the past 4 reports? Would a more 
transformative type of NGO advance more?70 This is tricky because the reason that 
Control Arms has been chosen to inside the treaty mechanism, even if it is as a 
subcontractor of governments, with relative gains, is because it is seen as a harmless 
organisation. It is seen as an organisation that can be tamed, or at least that knows 
its place within the hierarchy of international actors. However, it may be, these first 
few reports are further constructing and defining the identity of Control Arms and of 
ATT Monitor within the ATT life now and tomorrow. What is true is that these reports, 
the ATT Monitor case studies and Control Arms´ actions in the CSPs have shaken the 
normality of the Treaty, at least superficially. Nevertheless, this progress is relative, 
especially when considering the case of Yemen. Yemen has been the hot topic and 
used particularly in the 2016 Report. There has been progress, in the sense of certain 
states stopping their exports to Saudi Arabia. This is not necessarily due to the 2016 
report, it is probably due to a mix of multilayered pressures from above and from 
below, from the past and from the future of these states. Then, have the publications 
on Yemen by ATT Monitor reports and otherwise, made a difference? Is the progress 
real or only superficial? This leads to also the progress in terms of the implementation 
of the Arms Trade Treaty and its implications for the further evolution of the human 
rights and security relationship. Is it real? Is it perceivable tangibly today? In terms of 
realness of the evolution of the human rights and security relationship, the only real 
fact is that it is ever-changing and that real changes take time. The best example of 
this is the evolution of norms based on human rights and how they have been seeking 
change since the end of the 19th century and the creation of the First Geneva 
Convention. Put into this perspective then, the real progress and the implications of 
it on the Treaty and on the human rights and security relationship are too early to 
show.   
 
The reality of the particular overlay that the human rights and security display in this 
case is that both states and Control Arms-ATT Monitor use each other to try to achieve 
both the implementation of the ATT and their own selfish interests. Both types of 
actors are seeking to maintain their roles in the international scene, seeking to 
advance the Treaty whilst maintaining the status quo and without any real 
provocation of large exporting states that might be to blame for the lack of 
improvement in the compliance. With this, both the progressive states and Control 
Arms are defining their identity and their role within the realm of the Arms Trade 
Treaty. Because of this role, to date, lacks real tangible change and/or real impetus to 
push violating states to comply it is slowly constructing a human rights and security 
relationship that continues to allow security to overlap with human rights without 
taking much of the human rights side into consideration. This is the risk of being a 
reformative organisation, with only hints of transformative or is it? This precisely will 
 
70 Chapter 6 has a transformative NGO as its basis, CAAT. More on how these types of NGOs interplay 
with the implementation of ATT will be understood then.  
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be the topic of the next chapter were a transformative organisation has sought to 




 With a genealogical constitutive causality, this first case study chapter has 
problematized the complexity and contingency of the construction of the human 
rights and security relationship through an intricate nexus of moral and material 
interests. The ever-changing constructivist notion of the human rights and security 
relationship has pointed towards morality to address issues of the constructivist 
theory. The growing personality of an arms control- human rights based NGO has 
been evidenced and with it the intricate road to its understanding. Theoretically, this 
chapter has empirically exemplified the distinct role that organisations play in norm 
implementing and in the human rights and security relationship beyond what has 
been established previously (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; 
Muller and Wunderlich, 2013; Boli and Thomas, 1999b; Risse et al., 1999; Risse, 2008; 
Mathur, 2011; Garcia, 2014). It has also demonstrated how non state actors operate 
and influence international norms by entering into unknown territory (Anheier et al., 
2005; Chandler, 2004b; Chandler, 2004a; Kaldor, 2013b) by globally governing and 
interacting with states (Avant et al., 2010). More than that it has showed how 
constructivism and the English School cross-fertilize (Reus–Smit, 2002) to create a 
better understanding of the human rights and security relationship and beyond. This 
chapter has also introduced crucial pieces, to further understand the relationship, 
norm implementers and false morality. Norm implementers, as organisations that 
implement the norm in later phases of the cycle and are similar to the agents in Rawl´s 
original position, as they are supposedly free and fair. False morality, as a combination 
of the realist view of morality, that also happens to be Millean, and Bull´s perspective 
that also happens to be Kantian.  
 
Empirically, the chapter started by defining what the situation is with Control Arms 
and its ATT Monitor Project, with what is the approach used to succeed in the ATT. 
ATT Monitor provides independent analysis. Its staff and editorial members are 
members of Control Arms, who actually belong to different international NGOs or 
work independently as consultants. These initial reports show statistical information 
on what the treaty universalisation, implementation and functioning looks like. They 
highlight the best practices as well as the areas of opportunity. They evidence that 
Control Arms` task to ensure effectiveness of the ATT will need patience. Overall they 
display that states are in direct control of ATT practices, but that Control Arms through 
the ATT Monitor is on indirect control of practices and direct control of good practice.  
 
Control Arms is constructing its norm implementer role with every CSP, every ATT 
Monitor publication and every action in the realm of the ATT implementation. The 
power of NGOs to influence implementation, especially of arms control norms is being 
put to the test with these actions. They are also defining the political identity of the 
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NGO whether in relation to the state or otherwise. In the case of the ATT it is in 
relation to all the member parties of the Treaty, as they are the leaders. Control Arms 
has found its identity of assisting, that is its legal identity. Politically the direction the 
organisation wants is clear, however in order to truly define itself as a separate entity 
from the state it will have to continue constructing its own space. Control Arms and 
Control Arms- ATT Monitor´s political or a-political identity is better defined by the 
nexus of moral and material interests and by how these are related to the state parties 
of the ATT.   
 
The reports, particularly in relation to the Yemen case, have exposed Control Arms´s 
morality. It is not to say that Control Arms-ATT Monitor is not fully lacking morality or 
falsely moral. Nevertheless, it is flirting with it and therefore defined as neighbouring 
false morality. Control Arms- ATT Monitor as an established government 
subcontractor (Florini, 2000, p.213) is one of the many examples of the growing role 
of NGOs and of the rise in states founding them, specially in the last decades. In the 
literature, this has been argued as to do with the globalization of political structures 
and Western values (Reimann, 2006, p.46) and in international development scholars 
as causing dysfunction (Cooley and Ron, 2002; Duffield, 1997; Edwards and Hulme, 
1996; Fruttero and Gauri, 2005; Gauri and Fruttero, 2003; Molina-Gallart, 2014). 
Further than this, Heins (2008) has described this phenomenon as NGOs that become 
“benign parasites” that seek to infect and change the behaviour of their hosts. This 
resonates with the reformative nature of certain NGOs, like Control Arms. Control 
Arms’ funding is separated as the funding that goes to the actual organisation and 
what goes to the ATT Monitor Project. Both were analysed in this chapter because 
Control Arms as the pilot organisation is key to the understanding of ATT Monitor´s 
actions, as well as acting solo in the CSPs and beyond. Table 1 showed the member 
organisations and foundations of each one. Materially, for both Control Arms and 
Control Arms-ATT Monitor, interests are better understood in a multilayer style 
connected to moral interests. The question is if the neighbouring false morality can 
easily shift into false morality when its seen through the financing lens, if there are 
strings attached with the financing coming from states? Unfortunately, this is very 
hard to prove because if it happens it does not happen explicitly. Because this lack of 
proof, this case has been designated as being neighbouring false morality as opposed 
fully falsely moral. However it may be it puts the NGOs credibility on a tightrope. It is 
too early to see if Control Arms has lost credibility because it is financed by states, 
despite seeking to be opposed to them. This had led to wonder if the particular state 
the funding comes from makes a difference. Finding this out would be an entirely 
different study, nonetheless interesting to mention specially for the further 
understanding of the nexus of material and moral interest and where the human 
rights and security relationship stands. Moreover, theoretically speaking, the 
contingency in this case study, particularly in relation to morality accounts for the 
contingent core of constructivism (Kessler, 2016) and the co-constitution of societies 
(Onuf, 2009).  
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The constructed environment in which the human rights and security relationship of 
this case resides, reflect the particular overlap of the relationship. It displays the 
strains that exist between state parties and Control Arms, between morality and 
materialism and, of course, between security and human rights. It shows the 
multilayer response that the interaction between state and non-state actors creates 
as well as the complexity of the morality of NGOs and progressive states. Particularly 
how the perception of morality and even neighbouring false morality is complex and 
demonstrates what actors have to endure in order to maintain or construct their role 
in the international scene. Both non-state and state actors, particularly those involved 
heavily in financing are directly or indirectly gaining leverage for the human rights side 
of the human rights and security regime. It is important to mention that not all state 
parties are built the same, and chapter 6 and 7 will further exemplify this. 
Nevertheless, the concrete form of the human rights and security relationship in 
Figure 2 shows how it is actually a constant inflation and deflation of the bubbles, 
particularly the HR one, where the material survival of both states and Control Arms 
obtrudes its stability.  
 
The fact that Control Arms decided to enter the complex world of norm 
implementation evidences how in the construction of its role it is somewhat defining 
the future of the perception of NGOs, the future of those state parties heavily 
involved, and the future of the Arms Trade Treaty. Because of the complexity of its 
role, Control Arms still needs to define what it wants and keep in mind that its morality 
is the reflection of the population and there is a need to protect it from erosion, or 
from fully entering the realm of false morality. The progress, real or perceived, that 
ATT Monitor has achieved is still relative and it needs to be more concrete. The ATT 
Monitor studies, the actions by Control Arms in the CSPs and the Reports have at least 
superficially shaken the surface of the full implementation of the ATT. Nevertheless, 
the progress is relative when comparing to the Yemen crisis. This is also affecting the 
evolution of the human rights and security relationship. Despite this, it is important 
to take into consideration a well-known norm lifecycle, the First Geneva Convention 
and how progress takes time and it is never absolute but should always be moving 














Chapter 6- The UK, CAAT, the 2017 High Court decision and 




 As the state constructs and is constructed by the surrounding world, certain 
decisions become more sensitive than others. Following national, regional and 
international normativity tends to suffer in this process, as there is no need for 
compliance with norms despite their role in shaping national security (Jepperson et 
al., 1996).  Such is the case of the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty in the UK, 
in particular when referring to the UK arms exports to Saudi Arabia. Despite the UK 
role in the success of the creation and acceptance of the ATT, the implementation of 
the Treaty is exemplifying ignorance of the norm and preponderance of domestic and 
international interests. The UK has continually sold and signed contracts for the future 
selling of arms to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Turkey and other autocratic regimes. 
Directly or indirectly, this has put the UK in the responsible position of the continued 
violation of human rights, in particular in the Yemen Crisis.  
 
The Yemen Civil War and the civilian casualties that accompany it have been labelled 
by United Nations agencies as the world´s worst humanitarian crisis. The 
humanitarian atrocities have been primarily attributed to the use of combat aircraft 
used by the Saudi-led coalition and supplied largely by US and UK arms exports. The 
UN panel of experts, NGOs and the European Parliament have been condemning the 
use of airstrikes against Yemen and calling them unlawful. Several countries that used 
to export arms to Saudi Arabia have decided to stop, the UK has not. Under UK arms 
export licensing legislation, European Code of Conduct on Arms Exports and the Arms 
Trade Treaty, export licenses must not be granted if the equipment could be used to 
breach international humanitarian law. However, data shows that the UK has licensed 
arms worth 4.6bn pounds (The Guardian Correspondent, 2018) and sold at least 5.7bn 
pounds worth of arms to the Saudi led coalition since 2015 (The Guardian 
Correspondent, 2019). The data also shows that over 60,000 people have been killed 
in the conflict since the start of 2016, that by January 2017, more than 3,500 children 
had been killed or injured in the fighting, and that it is estimated, in November 2018, 
that 85,000 children may have died from extreme hunger or disease since April 2015 
(ACLED, 2018; ReliefWeb, 2017; Save the Children International, 2018; CAAT, n.d.).  
 
This has led to increased scrutiny and attention of the public and the parliament about 
the British supply of weapons to Saudi Arabia. Within the government, this has 
created a division amongst MPs on the committee on arms exports control over 
alleged breaches of international law in Yemen; it has led other committees, like 
business and international development, to come up with a joint report validating 
that the UK government had not answered to the allegations of violations of IHL in 
Yemen in any meaningful way; and it has also meant that the Department for 
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International Trade has been releasing statistics quarterly. These government 
measures and issues have developed parallel to the civil society campaign, led by 
CAAT (Campaign Against Arms Trade) that has scrutinized each Saudi arms deal and 
pushed so far as to demand a judicial review of whether the licensing that had been 
granted is compatible with national and international legislation. The initial High Court 
ruling of 2017, that will be explained further below, indicated ambiguity over the UK´s 
position on arms exports to Saudi Arabia and the issue of them interfering with the 
implementation of international humanitarian treaties, like the Arms Trade Treaty 
and the European Code of Conduct. In June 2019, the Court of Appeal overturned the 
2017 decision and exposed the unlawfulness of the UK government. To date the 
licenses have not been revoked and the government is violating what was stated by 
the Court of Appeal by continuing to sell arms. However, the June 2019 results do 
signify a win for civil society and overall an advancement for the human rights side of 
the human rights and security relationship.  
 
This chapter will delve into what the relationship between human rights and security 
is in the context of a large arms exporter state, specifically the United Kingdom. The 
chapter will go in line with has been happening throughout the thesis: deconstruction 
of the case, the main actors and the nexus of key moral and material interests in order 
to construct the specific constructivist human rights and security relationship. 
Deconstructing and constructing in the genealogical sense of the analytical framework 
set in chapter 1 alongside a constitutive causal analysis will be the basis for the 
problematizing this chapter. Explicitly, the first part of this chapter will explain the 
details of the implementation of the ATT in the UK exemplified by the High Court 
decision of 2017 and appeal 2019, led by CAAT.71 It will highlight the importance of 
norm implementation dynamics and the denominated norm implementers that act 
within the second phase of the life cycle of a norm domestically in the context of the 
constitutive causality of the international Treaty and therefore of the human rights 
and security relationship.72 Furthermore, this part of the chapter, will focus on 
appreciating the 2017 decision of the Court as based in procedural matters and in 
international hard and soft law. This, in the context of the analytical framework used 
across this thesis, genealogy linked to constitutive causality. The second part of this 
chapter focuses on the nexus of material and moral interests that are ever-changing 
 
71 CAAT is not the only UK NGO with interests of balancing out the human rights and security 
relationship. However, it is the leader working directly to against the arms trade within the UK and 
particularly with the Saudi Arabia case. This is why, CAAT, will be considered later as a norm 
implementer. However, the other NGOs involved are also dedicated to researching more on the issue. 
For example, Human Rights Watch is investigating civilian attacks made by sea by the Saudi led 
coalition. It is also relevant to mention, as will be seen throughout the chapter, that CAAT considers as 
working domestically, without any causality upon international norms as well as not directly working 
with controlling arms just with stopping the promotion of them. This taken from the interview with 
Ann Feltham from CAAT (Feltham, 2019). However, indirectly they are aiding in the construction of a 
better human rights and security relationship as will be seen in this chapter.  
72 Norm implementers have been explained in detail previously in chapter 5.  
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and constantly intertwined. It will explain the state´s false morality, as well as the 
morality of a transformative organisation of civil society, CAAT, needed to balance out 
the human rights and security relationship.73 Exposing false morality and morality of 
non-state actors will demonstrate the CMV lens used in this thesis, where actors, 
whether state, mixed or non-state, do to promote cultures of peace in a global-local 
manner in order to avoid relation to an embedded militarism. It will also, focus on the 
nexus and how it is largely defined by answering to the question of why states export 
arms despite belonging to IHL/HRL instruments, like the ATT. The final part of the 
chapter, centres on the particular overlap of the human rights and security 
relationship and its main actors. Equally as in the previous chapter, this last part 
includes a Figure to aid in the understanding of the human rights and security 
relationship and how complexity and contingency exemplify it as typically 
constructivist.  
 
This chapter, like chapter 5 and 7, will contribute with this thesis´s objective of 
understanding constructivist norms further by keeping in mind past studies 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Keck and Sikkink, 1998) and the growing literature 
around them (Florini, 2000; Price, 1998). Also, the contingent and complex 
characteristics of the human rights and security relationship and its relation to 
morality will continue to expose and aid the weaknesses of constructivist theory. The 
chapter, seeks to continue with the evolution of non-state actors role in the evolution 
of norms (Boli and Thomas, 1999b; Price, 2003) particularly into those acting within 
the realms of arms control regimes and in later phases of the lifecycle of norm. This 
chapter will also stem from theories on non-state actors and their influence on global 
norms (Chandler, 2004b; Chandler, 2004a) and their operation beyond national 
confines (Anheier et al., 2005) and into new cross-border spaces (Kaldor, 2013a) that 
demonstrate the semi permeability and limits of the actors involved. The explanation, 
on the second part of this chapter, of the nexus of moral and material interests will 
be aided by the understanding of seeing norms as explained by the evolution of 
society (Buzan, 2001) and in connection with what constitutes ethical conduct (Reus–
Smit, 2002).  
 
The High Court judgement of 2017 and appeal of 2019   
 
 The case around which this chapter is based is the High Court decision of 2017 
as well as its main actors, its background, its analysis and its consequences, 
particularly those related to the implementation or lack thereof of the Arms Trade 
Treaty. Today the Court of Appeal has overturned the 2017 decision and with it forced 
the British government to suspend the approval of weapons licences that could be 
used in Yemen. The government, through the Secretary of State for International 
Trade (SoSIT) Liam Fox, has said that it will appeal this decision (Fox, 2019).  
 
 
73 Refer to chapter 5 for a definition of False morality.   
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It is important to note that the case will be better understood by the end of this 
chapter, due to the fact that its analysis will continue and fully develop into the second 
part of the chapter. Nevertheless, this first part seeks to briefly introduce and start 
the analysis of the topic. Without being overly descriptive, this subpart will need to 
first focus on the introduction of the case, including its main actors and its main 
conclusions. This will aid in the analysis that will be done throughout this chapter. The 
actors´ full set of interests will be elucidated with greater detail and in more reference 
to theory in the following subpart. In the meantime, this will serve as a basis for 
deconstructing the issue. The second subpart will seek to continue with the analysis 
of the actors, but in particular with the High Court of Justice. To continue with the 
deconstruction, it will be focus on the constitutive causality of the High Court and on 
the construct of the conscious or subconscious use of hard and soft international law 
to achieve its 2017 decision.  
 
Introducing the actors of the 2017 decision and 2019 appeal 
  
 This issue started when CAAT´s solicitor presented a letter claiming that “the 
UK Government was acting unlawfully in continuing to grant export licences, and in 
not suspending extant licences, for the supply of UK-produced military equipment to 
Saudi Arabia that could be used in Yemen”(High Court of Justice, 2017a). This 
continued with a back and forth bouncing of letters that ended with the Judgment of 
July 2017. The actors involved are: (a) the claimant, Campaign Against the Arms Trade 
(CAAT); (b) the defendant, the Secretary of State for International Trade, Liam Fox 
(MP, conservative); and (c) the intervenors, Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights 
Watch (HRW), Rights Watch UK and Oxfam. Also, interested parties BAE Systems and 
Raytheon Systems Limited are included. The issue claimed by CAAT, was whether the 
SoSIT is obliged by law to suspend current export licences and deny new licences as 
there is “a clear risk that the arms might be used in the commission of a serious 
violation of International Humanitarian Law”(High Court of Justice, 2017a).CAAT 
pursued this on three main grounds of challenge against the defendant that can be 
summarized in failure to ask correct questions, making sufficient inquiries and not 
fully taking into consideration the consolidated criteria for the licensing of arms 
exports. All in the hopes of stopping the crisis in Yemen from rising further. Because 
of the result of the Judgement, in favour of the SoSIT, CAAT appealed. The appeal took 
place in April 2019 and the result came out to the public in June 2019.   
 
The High Court held open and closed judgments, due to national security reasons. The 
closed material procedure enabled the Court to consider a “full range of evidence… 
that provided valuable additional support for the conclusion that the judgements 
made by the Secretary of State were rational” (High Court of Justice, 2017a). Like this, 
the High Court of Justice concluded the following: (1) the MoD has crucial information 
on uses of armament and provides significant training to the Saudi armed forces on 
the respect of IHL; (2) Saudi Arabia is committed with complying with IHL; and (3) 
there was no duty on the Secretary of State to make a determination of the likelihood 
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of a breach of IHL and his decision not to suspend export licences to the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia was not irrational or unlawful” (High Court of Justice, 2017b)74. Also, in 
relation to the main ground challenges, the court says that: “the fact that the 
Secretary of State did not expressly consider or address each or any of the questions 
does not mean that he failed to discharge his Tameside duty” (High Court of Justice, 
2017a).75 The latter comes from the understanding that: “the process of 
governmental decision-making is highly sophisticated, structured and multi-faceted 
process…involving many levels of seniority and particular expertise”, “there is a 
significant qualitative difference between the risk analysis which government 
agencies carry out and the reports of the NGOs… reports of the NGOs and press suffer 
from a number of weaknesses including: such organisations have often not visited and 
conducted investigations in Yemen and are reliant on second-hand information”, “the 
UK´s MoD is not involved in identifying targets and does not have access to the 
operational intelligence, and “the question of arms sales to Saudi Arabia for use in 
Yemen was the subject of intense genuine concern and debate by those officials 
charged with advising the Foreign Secretary and Secretary of State- this is apparent 
from the documents of February 2016”(Ibid.). 76 In other words, this means that, 
according to the High Court, there is evidence to demonstrate that the licensing of 
arms exports was done in a carefully, thoughtful and considerate way and that the 
government´s expertise in the topic are higher than those made by the claimant and 
by the documents, made by NGOs and the press, that the claimant is supported by.  
 
Part of the basis for the decision was the consolidated criteria established on the 25 
of March 2014.77 These criteria are the compendium of crucial points from 
international law instruments that the Secretary of State for Business and Innovation 
and Skills should be guided by when making decisions on licencing of arms exports. It 
was changed in 2014 to fit the Arms Trade Treaty and was last changed before that in 
2000. Interestingly, according to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and 
Skills, Vince Cable in 2014, the criteria indicate that it will not be “applied 
mechanistically but on a case-by-case basis taking into account all relevant 
information available at the time” and that “while the Government recognise that 
there are situations where transfers must not take place, as set out in the criteria, we 
will not refuse a licence on the grounds of a purely theoretical risk of a breach of one 
or more of those criteria” (Cable, 2014). The High Court decision was based on these 
criteria without questioning the secretary´s decision by saying the following: “in an 
 
74 Important to note that the courts did not seek to adjudicate if the coalition was committing breaches of 
International Humanitarian Law. 
75 The duty of a decision maker is referred to as Tameside duty, stemming from the case of:  the House 
of Lords in Secretary of State for Education and Science v. Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council 
from 1977. If this case had not existed, maybe the High Court´s decision might have been different.   
76 It is important to note that this is an overview of the judgement and not every conclusion and 
argument is reported here. Notwithstanding, these are the relevant conclusions needed to analyse and 
understand the case throughout this chapter.  
77 The predecessor of the consolidated criteria is the Export Control Act 2002.  
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area where the court is not possessed of the institutional expertise to make the 
judgements in question, it should be especially cautious before interfering with a 
finely balanced decision reached after careful and anxious consideration by those who 
do have relevant expertise to make the necessary judgements”(High Court of Justice, 
2017a, para.209).  
This judgement had effects beyond this specific case and reflect a lack of balance 
between the different sections of the British government. This is, of course, if the 
British government is seen not as a unitary entity but as a sum of many sections. And 
therefore capable of giving rights to itself, as mentioned in chapter 1. On the one 
hand, there is the SoSIT that will allegedly not take into consideration “theoretical 
risks” despite the tangible proof that this type of decisions can affect thousands of 
Yemeni´s, for example.78 On the other, is the High Court, that seems to only follow 
procedure and squarely adopt stances that might be violating international instances. 
On an even further opposite hand, there are other government dependencies that 
have supported either the defendant, like the Foreign Secretary for example, or the 
Department for International Development (DfID), who actually indirectly opposed 
the SoSIT and the High Court in this case. DfID financially supported Oxfam who acted 
as an intervener in the judgement and therefore indirectly supported the CAAT side 
of the judgement.79 It has to be taken into consideration that Oxfam´s intervention is 
minor, and although on the CAAT side of the discussion it does not stand in the same 
position as the Secretary of State for Trade or the Foreign Secretary’s position. 
However, it is important to note that indirectly and also outside of the realm of the 
High Court, there is an effort from within the government to support the human rights 
side of the conundrum. For example, in February 2019 the House of Lord Committee 
on International Relations exposed in a report on Yemen that the UK government is 
“narrowly on the wrong side” of international humanitarian law “given the volume 
and type of arms being exported to the Saudi-led coalition” that are “highly likely to 
be the cause of significant civilian causalities in Yemen” (House of Lords, 2019).   
It could be therefore said that in a remote indirect way, DfID through Oxfam is a norm 
implementer and even a type of mixed actor between state and non-state. This 
because, it aids in the full implementation of a norm, like the Arms Trade Treaty or 
any other IHL norm mentioned in the Consolidated Criteria of the UK Government. 
The norm implementing role of the House of Lords, is more distant and other 
Parliamentary Committees and individual MPs could be also seen as indirect norm 
implementers. Also, their actions did not occur within the realms of the High Court 
decision or the Appeal. However, norm implementation can in fact come from within 
the state. DfiD´s intervention, the House of Lords report and other´s actions are not 
 
78 See the introduction of this chapter for the effects of the crisis on Yemeni population.  
79 At the time of the High Court judgement, Oxfam was still receiving funds from the UK government. 
However, Dfid will no longer support Oxfam, as of February 2018. This because of the abuse allegations 
against Oxfam. Oxfam agreed to no longer bid for government support. Oxfam will be able to bid again, 
until DfID is satisfied that they can meet high standards.  
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strong enough to directly enter the norm implementing role. This will be further 
demonstrated in the Norwegian case in chapter 7 where there is an actor within the 
state that acts directly upon norm implementing. Nevertheless, this demonstrates the 
multilayerness of the issue and how it goes beyond the typical boundaries of the state 
and non-state actors. 
Mixed actors come in many shapes and forms, and because of their nature are 
sometimes difficult to pin point. They represent the semi permeable boundaries of 
actors as well as the complex and multilayer nature of norm dynamics in the human 
rights and security arena. Also, they are a direct reflection that, as Avant et al. (2010) 
mentioned in chapter 3, of the surprises to be expected in the multilayered dynamic 
of global governance, whether represented domestically or internationally. Although 
these actors are in a domestic layer, their actions still construct the international 
outcome of the norm. Further than DfID, the High Court case and the appeal have had 
another type of actor: special advocates. Special advocates are basically lawyers with 
security clearance, which can enter the closed part of the case as representatives of 
the appellant. These advocates have restrictions as they cannot work with others, 
they enter alone, they cannot communicate to anybody what they heard or saw in 
the closed case and most importantly they are not responsible for the appellant.80 
According to Ann Feltham from CAAT, they are sent from a specific office and “are 
paid for in the end by tax payer money” (Feltham, 2019). What is interesting about 
the 2017 case is that the closed judgement was also appealed in 2019 by the special 
advocates, and although what actually happen will never come to light it is apparently 
not common for special advocates to appeal, this also mentioned by Ann Feltham 
(Ibid.). Special advocates, due to the fact that they are paid by the government, in 
some way or form, but are also siding, even if behind closed doors, with CAAT are 
then another example of mixed actors. These actors would imply that what is being 
pushed for by CAAT is in some ways aided by the state and it could even imply that 
the state has a siding apparently in the human rights side of the human rights and 
security relationship. However, perhaps the significance of the special advocate is 
dubious, especially since whatever result it might arrive to will always remain behind 
closed doors.  
It could be said that the High Court should have been the tie breaker within the two 
sides, but this was not the case. However, the Court of Appeal in 2019 has had that 
tie breaker role. It is expected of the judiciary branch of the government to balance 
out the overlap in the human rights and security relationship, at least one part of this 
branch has done so. In paper, the High Court has achieved its duty of objectively 
assessing the situation, however, in reality some issues were not fully taken into 
 
80 The figure of the special advocate was born in Canada, adopted by the EU and then by the UK. In the 
UK the first case where it was used was in 1997 with the Chahal case, an immigration case by the Special 
Immigration Appeals Commision (SIAC). It was then used during terrorism cases in Northern Ireland. 
For more information, see: (Chamberlain, 2018; Chamberlain, 2009; Select Committee on 
Constitutional Affairs, 2003) 
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consideration and that is why the claimant asked for an appeal. To set the High Court 
and Court of Appeal´s role it is important to understand that the High Court of Justice 
for England and Wales, also known as High Court and abbreviated as HCJ, HC or EWHC, 
is, together with the Court of Appeal and the Crown Court, the Senior Courts of 
England and Wales. They sit above the county, family and magistrate courts and 
below the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. The HC deals with high value and 
high importance cases and is bound by its own previous decisions. In the 2017 
judgement there had not been an exactly equal precedent and therefore the basis 
was other cases in which Secretaries of State of diverse divisions, like Education or 
Justice, had had their decision making skills put under doubt.  
Arguably, the High Court misread or even ignored certain issues, whether due to real 
believe of the righteousness of the SoSIT or due to the evidence showed behind closed 
doors, because of national security. The assumption or the value placed on the 
assumption that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is committed to International 
Humanitarian Law and therefore to adherence to respect for human rights, was 
wrongfully presumed. There are many domestic and international examples that 
demonstrate the contrary and question Saudi Arabia´s commitment to IHL. For 
example, domestically Saudi Arabia is placed as one of the 30 countries on the UK´s 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office´s list of human rights and democracy countries 
(FCO, 2017); or internationally the UN Secretary General included Saudi Arabia and 
the Coalition members as “parties that recruit or use children, kill or maim, commit 
rape children, and other forms of sexual violence against children, or engage in attacks 
on schools and/or hospitals, or abduct children in situations of armed conflict” (UNSG, 
2016).81 Other ignored issues include: the Saudi use of cluster munitions, also 
advocated by the UK in the 2008 Convention Cluster Munitions; the use of not pre-
planned targeting or dynamic targeting by the Coalition; the fact that the Joint 
Incidents Assessment Team, body established by the Coalition as investigator of 
allegations of misconduct, was set up seven months after the UK had approved 
licences to export arms; to name a few (Ibster, 2017).82 The High Court´s decision 
showed the elevated position in which the SoSIT was put in. This will be further 
understood when elucidating the different historical, material and even moral forces 
behind the decision. Nonetheless, the 2017 decision signifies a lack of unison between 
the domestic spheres and a divide based on key interests specific to certain parts of 
the government.83 Also, due the nature of the 2017 judgement in favour of the SoSIT, 
it could be said that the High Court did not take into consideration IHL, specially a 
crucial treaty like the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties (1969). Under the 
Vienna Convention, ratification means: “in each case the international act so named 
whereby a State establishes on the international plane its consent to be bound by a 
 
81 Even if these allegations were removed allegedly by pressure from Saudi allies.  
82 These issues and others are well set and deeply delved by Roy Ibster of Saferworld in the document 
“Reflections on the UK High Court Decision on arms sales to Saudi Arabia” (Ibster, 2017). 
83 These key interests will be dealt with in detail in the next part of this chapter. 
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treaty” (Article 2(b) 1969). The state, in this case the UK, has given “consent to be 
bound by a treaty expressed by ratification, acceptance or approval” according to 
Article 14 of the Convention (Article 14 1969). In good faith, or pacta sunt servanda 
Article 26, the UK must upkeep the agreements made when signing and ratifying 
Treaties. Also in good faith, the UK has to interpret the treaty “ in their context and in 
the light of its object and purpose” (Article 31.1 1969). However, the issue in question 
and the judgement is assuming that the SoSIT did follow the Criteria, therefore the 
Arms Trade Treaty, therefore the Vienna Convention. In those grounds it is difficult to 
argue or to prove that the UK is necessarily violating the pacta sunt servanda. 
The choice of the High Court of empowering the SoSIT, by disregarding these issues, 
can be seen as ignorance and/or lack of clear investigation of the evidence. It also 
reflects a lack of confrontation from that subdivision of the judiciary that consciously 
or subconsciously has a reason of being, where the key material interests come into 
play, as will be seen better further below. Moreover, the 2017 decision and the 2019 
appeal become instances that show the role of diverse actors seeking to balance the 
human rights and security relationship. They also expose an imbalance within the UK 
government balanced out by a multilayer response from within the state and specially 
from outside the state by non-state actor, CAAT. The 2019 appeal that CAAT fought 
for has, not only clear consequences for the possibility of stopping future licensing of 
arms exports and protecting human rights, but it gives NGOs greater power as agents 
in the implementation of instruments of International Humanitarian Law, like the 
Arms Trade Treaty. It empowers their role past the negotiation of such treaties in the 
earlier phase of the lifecycle of the norm (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998), and into 
actual application and operation in the norm cascade phase. Despite most of their 
actions occurring domestically, their causality has international consequences, 
whether directly or indirectly.84 
In this light, CAAT can be seen as a norm implementer, one that acts within the state 
but as a local non-state independent actor. CAAT, as opposed to Control Arms, is a 
transformative type of NGO. As explored in chapter 5, transformative civil society 
organisations come from a Gramscian understanding of dependency or lack thereof 
of the organisation to the state. Jan Art Scholte meaning of transformative NGOs 
refers to: “those civil society associations that aim for a comprehensive change of the 
social order (whether in a progressive or a reactionary fashion)” (Scholte, 2002, 
p.284).85 CAAT is a transformist because it seeks the end of the international trade of 
arms through stopping the procurement or export of arms where they might 
exacerbate conflict, through ending all government political and financial support for 
arms exports and through the promotion of progressive demilitarisation within arms 
producing countries, as stated in its website (CAAT, n.d.). Also interesting, as specified 
 
84 The empowerment has to be taken with caution as the next few paragraphs will detail.  
85 This definition had already been quoted on chapter 5. It is being recalled here for terms of full 
understanding of CAAT.  
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in its aims, is the fact that it considers that security needs be seen in “broader terms, 
not dominated by military and arms company interests”(CAAT, n.d.). Specifying this 
makes CAAT an organisation concretely pursuing a human rights and security view, 
where security is not only seen as related to the state or to securitization reasoning 
but also to human security and therefore human rights side. This makes CAAT an 
organisation that opposes the state and could have trouble achieving its goals, at least 
substantially. The role of CAAT in the High Court´s decision and the procedure that 
precedes it, is that of “a constructivist contextualisation of agents´ action within a 
formal causal context which is shaping the agents perception, thinking process and 
hence its role in the situation” (Kurki, 2006, p.212). This is understood by Milja Kurki, 
as coming from Koslowski and Kratochwil (1994). Kurki, Koslowski and Kratochwil, see 
the contextualisation of agents actions as referring mostly to states in world politics. 
What this case and this chapter are doing, is going farther from that understanding 
into seeing the agent as an NGO acting domestically but in favour of an international 
instrument (IHL and HRL, ATT included). It is also exposing the CMV nature of CAAT 
that includes radical and inclusive forms of global and local action, particularly local, 
in order to avoid embedding with militarism.  
 
CAAT´s actions although domestic have causation internationally. Not only that, but 
the causation is also seen into the further layer of the human rights and security 
relationship. Because the actions surrounding the 2017 ruling and the 2019 appeal 
have endowed confrontational capabilities to the NGOs as an agent seeking a more 
balanced human rights and security relationship in the realm of arms control. 
Nevertheless, the empowerment that such organisations achieve with this has to be 
understood with caution. This because when comparing to chapter 5 it is difficult to 
decide which type of NGO achieves or has a greater chance of achieving change in 
favour of human rights in the human rights and security relationship. In chapter 5, 
Control Arms as a reformative international NGO has begun to achieve a certain 
amount of change, or at least has not been stopped from continuing to do so. In this 
chapter, CAAT as a transformist local NGO has sought definite change, achieved it but 
will continue to fight against a non-accepting SoSIT. Then, which type of NGO has a 
greater chance to reach farther? Certainly the transformative NGO has a greater 
chance of success, however the answer to this questions is that it depends. It depends 
on the case, on the topic and over all on where these issues are being developed. As 
will be seen in chapter 7, a local branch of an NGO, with government funding, has 
achieved more in concrete terms, than Control Arms or CAAT. It definitely depends 
on the context in which these actors are set in, more than that it also depends on the 
background and nexus of key material and moral interests that each case has. This, 
will be continued to be understood as this chapter and chapter 7 carry along and 
establish the nexus of moral and material interests.  
 
Constitutive Causality of the 2017 High Court´s decision: use of international 
hard and soft law  
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 Despite the 2019 win of the appeal, it is still relevant to understand where the 
2017 decision came from, especially if the UK government intends to appeal and 
continues to sell arms. It is important to remember to take into consideration that the 
UK government is not unitary, however the decision made by the High Court is in fact 
only one decision and will therefore be analysed in this sense. Also, in the actual 
judgement of the Court and in the Claimant´s original arguments, although the 
specific situation is put upon Liam Fox, the case is referred to as against the UK 
government. This subpart of the chapter continues with the deconstruction of the 
case that will lead to its reconstruction and full understanding by the end of the 
chapter. In terms of the High Court´s decision, what stands behind is a complex set of 
interests and values that have probably been constructed since the start of the demise 
of the Great British Empire in the 19th Century and particularly since the acceptance 
of the fact that the US had become a higher power than the UK in the 20th Century. 
It is also directly related to the nexus of key interests, moral and material, that will be 
delved within the next subpart of this chapter. However, what is in the foreground is 
the UK, through the High Court, using instruments of international law to its 
advantage. This recalls an action that coincides with normative construction of UNSC 
Resolutions and a use of indirect soft power to feed the state´s interests. As will be 
seen in this subpart, the High Court´s decision is a clear example of constitutive 
causality (Lebow, 2009; Ruggie, 2002) and of the social processes, interactions and 
confluences that it entails, not only within the state actor itself but also in relation to 
non-state actors and to the international structure. In order to understand the sense 
of morality or lack thereof the UK in the High Court´s decision, the union between 
constructivism and the English School is needed, much like Christian Reus-Smith 
claimed (2009) and how it was discussed in chapter 3. This is why, in English School 
terms, it will see the practice of the UK in 2017 as shaped by: (1) international norms: 
the ATT as hard international law and the UNSC Resolutions as soft international law, 
(2) international institutions: the UN and the UNSC and (3) with the morality of IHL 
and IHRL behind it (Dunne, 2011).86 How these elements of the genealogical 
constitutive causality of the decision came into being have been explained above, like 
the ATT. Explained underneath, the UNSC Resolutions and the international 
institutions involved. Further explained in the next part of the chapter, the morality 
of the case.   
 
The UN, the EU, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)87 and other Western states had 
been actively involved in Yemen since the Arab Spring in 2010. They came to the 
realisation that the Yemen regime, at the time, needed to be replaced to focus on 
counter terrorism. This was exemplified by the UNSC Resolution 2014 of 2011. The 
 
86 In Tim Dunne´s work, Inventing International Society the History of the English School (1998), he 
elaborates on the claims that led Bull, Buzan, Butterfield and Vincent to include morality in the English 
School Equation. Particularly Bull and Vincent. Much reference is done to Realist, E.H. Carr and its 
intrusion of power. This has been mentioned in chapter 3 of this thesis. 
87 Members of the GCC are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. 
The GCC exists since 1981.  
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transition put President Hadi in power, while a UN Special Adviser stayed closed by. 
Transition led to war and the states through the UN decided to tackle it with 
Resolution 2216 (R2216). Such resolution, of the United Nations Security Council is 
based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter,88 which means that not following it would 
lead to additional measures by the Council. Interestingly, the Resolution is specifically 
set as part of the background written by the High Court in its Approved 
Judgement(High Court of Justice, 2017a). The Resolution intends to stop Al-Qaida, and 
wants the Yemen Houthis to end all violence. With this, it recognises the intervention 
of the Saudi-led coalition and therefore excuses the UK for its arms exports and 
guidance to the Saudi air force. What is interesting here is that the UK is not the only 
state involved in what can be called the “formal excuse” known as R2216. In fact, UN 
Resolutions are considered international norms, part of the international soft law and 
considered binding under article 25 of the UN Charter. Like this, soft power is used in 
the shape of foreign policy within the UN arena (Keohane and Nye, 1977; Nye, 1990; 
Nye, 2004), by the involved states, by the UN and particularly by the UK to feed its 
arms exporting decision. It is clear that these set of UNSC Resolutions are favouring 
certain parts more than others and that they were perhaps created to fulfil certain 
interests of certain states in the region. What is observable is that the UK decided to 
carry on with these Resolutions that also solved political, economic and security 
conundrums domestically. This resembles what Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal 
argued when stating that international actors choose to order their relations through 
international law and design treaties and other legal arrangements to solve specific 
substantive and political problems (Abbott and Snidal, 2000, p.421). This works both 
ways and alongside the dichotomy that the UK faces when implementing the ATT, and 
other international instruments, whilst continuing arms exports to an IHL violator. On 
one hand, the UK champions and pushes for the ATT, and on the other it helps design 
UNSC Resolutions 2014 and 2216 to upkeep with its security, economic and political 
interests. Whether the UK directly was the sole influencer of these Resolutions or not, 
the UK is a long standing member of the Security Council. This also shows that the 
UK´s High Court 2017 decision is contingent not only to local key interests but also to 
those of the states involved in the Yemen Crisis. In this sense, the High Court´s 
judgement represents a multilayer constitutive causality that goes beyond a two-level 
game and into a complex bouncing of commitments and interests to other states, 
other government dependencies, as well as other non-state actors, like the GCC.  
 
The use of soft law, like the UN Resolutions, to attain goals can not only be viewed 
through an English School lens, where powerful states have greater control over 
international action. It also, has a rational institutionalist point of view, that “norms 
have real effects, resulting in a disjuncture between the distribution of power and 
benefits in the system” (Abbott and Snidal, 2000, p.448) and that “states use 
International Organisations to create social orderings appropriate to their pursuit of 
 
88 Chapter VII of the UN Charter refers to: Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the 
peace, and acts of aggression (‘UN Charter’, 2016). 
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shared goals, by taking advantage of the centralization and independence of the 
organisations” (Abbott and Snidal, 1998). This view focuses on states within a society 
of states where world culture influences organisations and individuals as well as states 
(Boli and Thomas, 1999b; Finnemore, 1996), as mentioned in chapter 3. In other 
words, the use of soft international law as soft power to produce the outcomes that 
certain states want, in this case, hard power in the shape of the Yemen War. This 
combination of soft and hard power with soft and hard law leads to a sort of smart 
power (Nossel, 2004; Nye Jr, 2009).89 It reminds us that in the decision of the High 
Court, international relations and international law are not coincidentally intertwined 
but constructed in an ever evolving fashion to influence the human rights and security 
relationship of the UK. Two different types of law, hard in the shape of ATT, and soft 
in the shape of UNSC R2014 and 2216 also exemplify a dichotomy of the High Court´s 
decision, as well as the continuous UK arms deals with Saudi Arabia.  
 
Moral and Material interests constructed by state and non-state actors  
 
 The deconstruction of the High Court decision and appeal 2019 have even 
more depth than has been presented above, specially the initial decision of 2017. The 
nexus of moral and material interests, particularly those of the UK government 
present the case for further reasons to explain the specific human rights and security 
dynamics. Moral interests are complex, but as will be seen below they capture 
material interests. The same occurs the other way around. Set in the motion of 
circularity, throughout this next subparts of the chapter the complexity and over 
connection of diverse facets of the life of a large arm exporting state will be 
appreciated.  
 
UK moral interest seeking compliance through civil society 
 
 At first glance, moral interests are what gives most of the reason for being to 
the human rights side of the human rights and security relationship in the case of the 
UK implementing the Arms Trade Treaty. Morality, whether derived from the UK 
government, like the Court of Appeal, 90 DfiD, the House of Lords, the special 
advocates, the actual government in the championing of ATT, or from UK civil society 
institutions, like CAAT, pushes for human rights to be taken into consideration in the 
relationship. Morality is also in a constant battle for centre stage with other material 
interests, as was seen in chapter 5 and will be seen throughout this chapter´s section. 
Of course morality is a charged term and what is moral in one nation might be 
unmoral to another. The fact that the UK´s morality is somehow questioned in this 
subpart of the chapter, does not entail that other UK actions are necessarily void of 
 
89 The term “Smart power” has been attributed to both S. Nossel and J. Nye.  
90 It is important to mention that the Court of Appeal was “adjudicating purely on the basis of law, not 
morality” but the British government has a moral duty of restricting arms exports (Oppenheim, 2019).  
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morality. In this subpart of this chapter morality is used in relations to human rights 
awareness, support and protection; the moral carrier per excellence in the 
implementation of the ATT in the UK case are CAAT and the other organisations that 
brought the government to the High Court and Court of Appeal. Overall, the focus on 
the analysis of morality, has been allowed because of the CMV lens that this thesis 
has. Also, it addresses weaknesses in constructivist theory and in the concept of 
human security, as explained in chapter 1.  
 
Morality has been present alongside security in many ways at least since Ancient 
Greece. It was not until the late 19th Century that the Geneva Conventions defined it 
within an international legal boundary. Domestically, within the UK, since the British 
Empire started its global conquest, there was resistance charged with moral fibre. This 
morality usually came from the religious officials who did not agree with the 
oppression of people. Today, it can be said that the majority of UK´s morality lies in 
civil society if taking into consideration the result of the Appeal pushed for by CAAT. 
It also lays in certain institutions, like DfiD, the House of Lords, the Court of Appeal 
itself or in certain individuals91 within the government. Indirectly even, Control Arms 
through the ATT Monitor yearly document is also supporting and enhancing the UK´s 
and other countries’ moral perspectives in the case of arms exports.  
 
In the case of the ATT implementation, it is civil society organisations like CAAT that 
become the agents that challenge the government to enforce the morality through 
the absolute respect for human and humanitarian rights of the arms exports. CAAT, 
as a transformative NGO, taking the government to Courts is the greatest example. 
This does not mean that the UK government and its actions are completely void of 
morality as explained above. or that the people that work in it are as well. Also, export 
controls and all the legal instruments that have been created are based on human 
rights protection. However, these are at times used to the nations convenience but 
providing the mechanism to control, improve and verify the humanitarian morality of 
the state. Sometimes, suppliers may have concerns about human rights in a state and 
yet still sell arms because “they conclude that these arms won’t exacerbate the 
problem” (Johnson and Willardson, 2018, p.2); like the High Court Judgment of 2017. 
Other times, because “different weapons have different likelihood of facilitating 
domestic repression, some exporters concerned with human rights may treat them 
differently” (Ibid.).92  
 
91 For example, it is widely known that Jeremy Corbyn Labour Party Leader has continuously challenged 
the current government in Parliament over morality (Prime Minister’s Questions: 7 March 2018 - News 
from Parliament, 2018). Another example, in a recent interview with Ann Feltham, the Parliamentary 
Coordinator for CAAT she said the following: “civil servants agree with refusing arms export licensing, 
in fact I know from the Court Case that the head of arms export controls said that his gut was telling 
him that he should be refusing the arms export licencing “ (Feltham, 2019) 
92Richard Johnson and Spencer Willardson (2018) analysed the arms export data from USA and major 
European exporters- Germany, France and the UK, between 1976 and 2009, and found that human 
rights violations do not prevent arms transfers from advanced industrialized democracies. The only 
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Domestic action, whether coming from government or civil society agents, influences 
the international actions a government takes, at least partly.93 In global governance 
there are distinct authorities, and local NGOs seeking to influence state behaviour are 
one of them. Domestic politics and international relations are often entangled 
(Putnam, 1988), making reasons for change a combination of domestic, international 
and everything-in-between circumstances, as discussed in chapter 3 (Avant et al., 
2010). This means that decision making stems from more than a two-level game 
(Putnam, 1988) and into a multilayer situation that is in constant deconstruction and 
reconstruction. NGOs, like CAAT, have a widespread direct and indirect agency to 
influence this multilayerness not only in the creation of norms but also in their 
implementation. This is a matter of global governance being the result of constraints 
generated not only by structure but also by agents (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). 
CAAT is an example of how within its role of agent it is not only trying to influence 
structure but also trying to change the other agent´s actions and aim to co-create full 
implementation.  
 
Morality in this case has two sides, a moral one and a falsely moral one. The moral 
side, is CAAT´s side, the Appeal´s side and the other government facilitator´s side 
which have been explained throughout. It could be said that CAAT´s morality is 
Kantian in the sense that the morality of their actions derive from the action itself and 
not from the consequences that it might produce, as explained in chapter 2. The false 
morality side is that of the UK government, expressly the SoSIT and the High Court. 
The High Court decision claims that the SoSIT is following the carefully set plans to 
protect human rights when giving arms export licences. By saying this, the Court is 
implying that it believes that the actions of the government are truly moral. However, 
this morality is falsely moral. It is more a cynical expression of interests, as Carr says 
(Carr, 1945) or of using it in a Millean way as a means to an end as delved in chapter 
2.94 In a way, this is also the case of morality of the UK championing the ATT because 
material interests were also behind this decision. In fact, the UK giving way and 
championing the ATT is a further example of how states give rights but continue 
controlling the means of violence. Material interests are also behind CAAT´s morality, 
however at least externally, these interests appear to not be economical or damaging 
the human rights side of the human rights and security relationship. At least in terms 
of funding, CAAT does not depend on governments and due to its transformative 
nature it focuses solely on achieving its main goals, morally.  
 
 
exception is the United States, where it was found that when there are higher human rights violations 
there is a reduced chance of the state exporting (Johnson and Willardson, 2018).  
93 Other interests, like material interests also influence a state’s action internationally, as will be seen 
further below and as was seen in the case of Control Arms previously.  As a reminder, the combination 
of moral and material interests is what defines the particular overlap between human rights and 
security in the human rights and security relationship.  
94 False morality has been used already in chapter 5. For more information, refer to such chapter.  
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The degree of falsehood is not the same in all cases, like in comparison with chapter 
5´s case. In the case of the UK implementing the ATT, the level of falsehood in the 
2017 decision results high, while in the 2019 appeal it becomes low. Besides CAAT, 
mixed actors, like DfID, the special advocates, and to a certain extent the House of 
Lords and other civil servants, play a role in reducing the falsehood. The actual 
compensation that these mixed actors give towards the human rights side of the 
human rights and security relationship is perhaps minimal. This leads to conclude that 
what enhances even more the implementation of the Treaty as well as the human 
rights and security relationship is not only what happens in the early lifecycle of a 
norm, but actually what happens in a later phase of internalization and therefore 
implementation of the norm.  
 
In IR terms, CAAT´s moral actions exemplify Keck and Sikkink´s boomerang effect 
(1998), because they put national and international NGOs, social movements and 
networks as exerting pressure on the state from above and from below to bring 
change. These action are also characteristic of Risse et al´s spiral model studied in 
chapter 3 (Risse et al., 1999; Risse et al., 2013). The phases in the model- repression, 
denial, tactical concession, prescriptive status and rule-consistent behaviour- work 
progressively by first exposing human rights violations. The 2017 High Court´s decision 
is an example of the state failing to comply and setting its reasoning publicly and in a 
judicially legal way, all in the name of false morality and putting material interests 
first. The 2019 appeal is an example of the state complying with a push from a non-
state organisation and aided directly and indirectly by actors within the state. Overall, 
both decisions imply the push and pull that the human rights and security relationship 
encounters within the strains of different actors.   
 
Nexus of material interests collide: security, military, economics and politics 
 
 Given that the 2017 decision and the 2019 appeal, have happened during a 
Conservative government, it could be thought that with another party in the 
government this might have not occurred. It is difficult to speculate; however, it is not 
difficult to note that also Labour governments have kept the long tradition of arms 
sales to Saudi Arabia. For example, Prime Minister Tony Blair even stopped a 
corruption investigation into such arms sales claiming that: “Our relationship with 
Saudi Arabia is vitally important for our country in terms of counter-terrorism, in 
terms of the broader Middle East, in terms of helping in respect of Israel and Palestine; 
strategic interest comes first” (BBC News, 2006). What this means is that there is a 
clear pattern of dealings with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It also signifies that there 
is much more behind the 2017 decision and the SoSIT decision to appeal the 2019 
decision. All of this is influenced by several factors included within the nexus of key 
interests studied in this chapter, such as: economic, political, military/security. These 
interests are used and connected beyond Putnam´s “two-level game” (Putnam, 1988) 
and more into a multilevel game. Statesmen, in Robert Putnam´s words play a two-
level game when representing the government´s position, set between two tables, 
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the domestic tactics and the international negotiation (Evans et al., 1993; Putnam, 
1988). What these decisions show is that governments go beyond domestic tactics, 
and international negotiation, they go into military/security strategies, economic and 
political domestic interests that affect how they deal internationally. Nationally, there 
are several key interests to be considered: political, economic and military/security. 
Together they compile by forming a nexus that defines the strategy of the UK´s 
decisions and therefore the composition and overlap of the particular human rights 
and security relationship. Due to ever-changing positions, this strategy is in constant 
movement. However, certain basic aspects remain the same and give the relationship 
its peculiarity. Below, these key interests will be explained by understanding how they 
have been defined and how they conform the nexus leading to the human rights and 
security overlap. It will also become clear that there is a nexus within the different 
interests, like the definite relation between economic and security or the political and 
security connection.  
 
Security/military interests and strategies are tangibly defined, usually, by certain 
white papers published by the government and by the position of governmental 
institutions such as the MoD. Changes in certain white papers define the UK´s strategy 
in several areas, whether to deal with internal or external pressures and 
opportunities. For example, the National Security Strategy changes every 5 years, but 
it can have amendments in between. The latest document of this kind is from 2015, 
created under the Conservative and Liberal Democrat Coalition. In the forward of this 
document, the then Prime Minister David Cameron speaks of a link: “Our national 
security depends on our economic security, and vice versa; so the first step in our 
National Security Strategy is to ensure our economy is, and remains, strong” (HM 
Government, 2015). This clearly reflects the nexus between the economy, security, 
military and politics. It also paints a picture of where Britain wants to lead in security 
terms and how the connections with the economy define it, as will be continuously 
seen further down. This document was crafted not only with the ruling parties´ 
interests in mind but as a reflection of the international arena of the time and the 
international forecast expected. All to allow for Britain to maintain its position in the 
international security environment. This position sprung particularly from the UK´s 
role in defining international relations after the Cold War and leading European 
security policies. The Anglo-French Declaration at St. Malo in 1998 proposed that 
Europe´s defence be handled through the EU. The key and leading role that the UK 
played in this proposition has allowed for its prominent position within the EU but 
also to seek to be a strong parallel to the United States. Key developments derived 
from this Declaration, like the appointment of Javier Solana as High Representative 
for Common Foreign and Security Policy and the formal establishment of European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP, or CSDP after the Lisbon Treaty). This has also 
resulted in a higher number of negotiations between the US, NATO and EU member 
states, which in theory means that the US and EU face military decisions together, 
because they share values that give strength to the institutions that form the core of 
their relationship. All of this was particularly led by the United Kingdom alongside 
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France and Germany. This triad of leaders is now changing and will change, at least in 
terms of European Institutions after Brexit. However, for now it still defines the British 
perspective on security where their labour runs parallel to the US, NATO, the EU 
without neglecting Britain´s still somewhat nostalgic imperialistic ambition.  
 
British security policy cannot be understood without the production and acquirement 
of weapons to fortify its military. Specially with the preamble of the ever influencing 
National Security Strategy 2015. This creates an economic sphere that has grown 
exponentially in the last decades within and outside the UK. In order to keep the 
weapons´ market flowing, the demand for weapons needs to be kept at least stable. 
It is widely known that for the US, during and after the Cold War an ongoing 
involvement in conflict was a sure predictor of arms sales (Kinsella, 1995). In some 
ways, the UK is no different. The UK´s arms exports needs not to be created by 
necessarily direct involvement in conflict, it can be an indirect one. Like the ongoing 
arms sales to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia exacerbated and maintained by continuous 
arms deals. With this constant need for war, arms transfers represent behaviour both 
of the supplier, the UK, and the recipient, Saudi Arabia. This gives a sense that the 
concern of the UK of maintaining its military and security interests are connected with 
the economical ones, particularly in the context of the implementation or lack thereof 
of the Arms Trade Treaty. The state has the need for survival, in order to do this the 
state acquires or makes military equipment which lead to an economical 
phenomenon that defines domestic, national and international politics. Like a circle, 
politics define security, security defines economics, and so the circle starts again. This 
circle, is in line with a constitutive causality of sorts, whereas Lebow (2009) sets it 
explains causal chains. However, although these interests are well intertwined they 
are not necessarily defined solely by themselves, the morality aspect of the equation, 
represented by civil society and certain government facets.95  
 
In order to cover the needs for state socialization, a large arms exporter like the UK 
also involves politicians within other aspects of the nexus. There are several cases of 
involvement of politicians or government officials in arms companies and vice versa. 
These links have been well exposed by CAAT, but also by academics like Anna 
Stavrianakis (2012). Former Defence Secretaries Michael Portillo, George Robertson 
and Geoff Hoon, and former Defence Procurement Ministers Geoffrey Pattie and 
Jonathan Aitken, as well as a number of other MoD staff and senior military personnel, 
have moved to senior positions in major arms companies such as BAE Systems, Smiths 
and AgustaWestland after their time in public office (CAAT 2005 in (Stavrianakis, 2012, 
p. 228)). This also happens, the other way around, like arms companies having a 
significant presence on military advisory bodies such as the National Defence 
Industries Council (NDIC), through which industry works in partnership with 
government to set policy priorities (Ibid.). In fact, this is even set in government white 
 
95 The case of the UK lightly touches upon this connection, the case in the next chapter will delve more 
upon it. 
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papers, like the 2005 Defence Industrial Strategy that seeks to: “ share objectives, 
risks and rewards” with the defence industry, in order to “ maintain appropriate 
sovereignty and thereby protect our national sovereignty” (MoD 2005, p. 132 in 
(Stavrianakis, 2012, p. 229). Again, this demonstrates that the circle existing between 
the economic, political, military/security interests of the state is rich. What is not 
necessarily clear is which prevails, or which one has the most influence upon the 
others. Nonetheless, the common theme behind them is the survival of the state 
domestically and internationally.  
 
Even though Britain promotes arms exports it has also for decades set humanitarian 
provisions within their policies, which connects the moral side with the material side 
of the nexus, at least with the false moral side. Internal Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office documents from the late 1970s took into consideration the potential 
aggressiveness and internal suppression of the potential costumer (Johnson and 
Willardson, 2018). In the 1980s, guidelines stating that exports would be forbidden in 
case the state posed a threat to the UK, NATO or where human rights considerations 
were a barrier (Ibid.). Despite this, weapons were transferred to Iraq in the 1980s as 
they are transferred to Saudi Arabia today. The reasoning back then, similar as it is 
now, was that “Britain exports or dies” as David Mellor, Minister of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs in Margaret Thatcher´s government stated in 1992 
(Miller, 1996 in Ibid.). This stems from the fact that the British economy is heavily 
dependent on military sales. Similar reasoning is happening today. Due to the eminent 
exit of Britain from the EU, arms exports to countries outside the realm of NATO 
members have been exacerbated. Even, despite Britain´s ratification and 
championing of the ATT and other IHL instruments. This is no longer only speculation, 
but reality. In September 2017, Defence Secretary Michael Fallon speaking at the 
Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEI) event in London said: that the 
UK will “spread its wings across the world” with increased arms and equipment 
exports after Brexit and that it is time to build exportability with the alignment of what 
is required by international clients to hit new heights in promoting British 
manufacturing and international partnerships (The Independent, 2017). More recent, 
is the case of the visit of the Saudi Arabian prince in March 2018 that was branded as 
post-Brexit opportunity. However, besides the Brexit talk, Britain´s strong link 
between military and economics has been strong for decades, as will be seen in the 
next subpart of this chapter. Nonetheless, the fact that Brexit is used as an economical 
reason or excuse is an overstatement. Brexit does not only have the possibility of 
affecting the economy, but also the well cured space the UK has carved in the 
international hierarchy of states. Raising arms exports to non-Western countries has 
also the possibility of opening and preserving doors where the UK can influence 
international relations. This, again, creating a nexus between the material interests of 
economics, politics and security and influencing the particular overlap between 
human rights and security. 
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Why states export arms if they belong to IHL instruments like the ATT?  
 
 In a highly globalized, market-dependant world, exports enhance a state´s 
economic capacity. In the case of certain powerful states, they also elevate and 
upkeep their strategical reasons, in order to fulfil their diverse interests. It is also true 
that in certain markets, exports become a sensitive subject and raise concerns in a 
normative sense. Why states export arms despite belonging, or even championing, 
humanitarian normative instruments, like the Arms Trade Treaty has and will be a 
complex question in the past, present and future. Nevertheless, whatever the answer 
it will demonstrate an ever-changing construction of the nexus of interests that shape 
each state´s specific case. For this chapter and this thesis, this construct also 
influences the particular overlap between human rights and security. The reasons 
exposed below can be divided into: economic, strategic (including foreign policy, 
security and military), historical and sociological. They should also be seen holistically, 
like in the previous subpart of this chapter, in order to fully understand the connection 
between them as well as their constitutive causality.    
 
There are two facts that are important to take into consideration in order to 
understand why states like the UK transfer weapons despite having signed IHL 
instruments, particularly in the last decades. First, different weapons may be more 
easily used to violate human rights in different scales. For example, the harm 
conventional weapons might do in an hour is not the same as what a bomb dropped 
by a fighter jet or drone might do in seconds. This is something that arms exporters 
like the UK take into consideration when analysing the human rights side of the arms 
export licensing equation. Richard Johnson and Spencer Willardson (2018) analyse the 
four major arms exporting countries by weapon type between 1976 and 2009. They 
wager that because some kinds of weapons systems are more likely to facilitate 
domestic repression, “exporters concerned with human rights may treat them 
differently when it comes to approving arms transfers” (Johnson and Willardson, 
2018, p.2). The authors conclude that actually “human rights violations do not prevent 
arms transfers from advanced industrialized democracies” (Ibid.). The only exception, 
in the case of the US, is that “higher human rights violations reduce the likelihood of 
exporting land weapons to offending regimes” (ibid.). This means that the UK, at least 
until 2009, like the data shown in this study, had not restricted its export licensing due 
to human rights violations. Second, it is also important to note that recent studies 
found that democracies are 60 percent less likely to trade arms with autocracies than 
with democracies, particularly after the Cold War (Akerman and Seim, 2014; Johnson 
and Willardson, 2018). These results demonstrate that the security concerns during 
the Cold War were sufficiently strong to deter states from trading with states with 
differing polity and how it has changed since (Akerman and Seim, 2014). The finding 
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that polity has not mattered after the Cold War suggests that “democracies have not 
been as altruistic or ethical as they have claimed in recent years” (Ibid.).96  
 
Economic reasons carry a large weight when answering why countries, like the UK, 
export weapons despite belonging to IHL instruments. In the specific case of the UK, 
it has also to do with a particular nostalgia of better Empire times and the so called 
Pax Britannica that feeds upon British material interests, as will be seen further below. 
As put by economists, the initial momentum of arms exports was provided by 
strategic and political objectives that led to dependency and therefore to the creation 
of powerful economic lobby, despite the commercial logic of arms transfers (Smith et 
al., 1985). Governments subsidies for domestic producers and recipients desire to 
diversify have proved to be stronger than the high overhead costs for research and 
development that the industry entails (Ibid.). In other words, it is government forces, 
not market ones that drive the expansion and permanence of the weapons industry. 
Governments are interested in maintaining an indigenous arms industry in order to 
ensure: weapons designed exactly to their requirements, national independence of 
supply and access to the latest military technology (Ibid. 242). In the UK, for example, 
most equipment is designed for the UK Armed Forces, however, at strategic times 
weapons might be designed to fit the export markets, like the BAE Hawk and some 
Vickers Tanks (Hartley, 2000). 
 
Internationalists have long studied arms transfer and outlined historical waves of 
arms transfer and production since the 15th Century (Krause, 1995). Recently these 
have shifted towards a focus on SALW and their structural effects on inter and intra 
state conflict, norms building and international relations (Bourne, 2007, 2013; Garcia, 
2006; Grillot, Stapley, & Hanna, 2006; A. Stavrianakis, 2011). Economists and 
Internationalists alike have, with these studies, realised that despite the commonly 
held view that arms transfers are partly to blame for the frequency, duration and 
severity of armed conflict, there is no relationship between the two (As found by 
Craft, (Craft, 1999)). This acknowledges the element of truth in: “weapons do not 
make wars, men do” (Kinsella, 2011). It also relates well to the fact that it is 
governments in control of the weapon transfer industry, not the supply and demand. 
This is why governments, like the UK spend considerable amounts of money 
promoting arms exports in order to reduce the MoD´s defence procurement costs, for 
example. Stephen Martin analysed this in the 1990s and found that in the UK each job 
generated by arms exports is subsidised by just under £2,000 per annum and that a 
one‐third reduction in UK defence exports would save the taxpayer some £76 million 
per annum at 1995 prices (Martin, 1999). Today, it is estimated that for export 
contracts direct subsidies for arms exports estimated to be between £104-£142 
million (CAAT et al., 2016). 
 
 
96 This fact is also consistent with (Perkins and Neumayer, 2010) as will be seen a few paragraphs 
below.  
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Because of this supposed economic importance, the UK government, as was seen in 
the High Court decision of 2017, claims that arms transfers are in the best interests of 
the whole country. Although, the UK weapon industry is in fact one of the largest 
worldwide, almost all of the UK companies derive significant proportion of their 
turnover from their US subsidiaries (CAAT et al., 2016). In fact, in the case of BAE, 
Britain’s largest arms export company, the US is the major costumer, with almost all 
sales coming from BAE´s US operations, rather than exports from the UK (Ibid. p. 7). 
This suggests that the UK arms industry is not as big as it is led to believe by 
government officials. Turnover, without services, is estimated to be around 1% of 
GDP, where 45% comes from arms exports; thus, arms exports cannot be said to 
represent an important part of the UK economy or the UK´s labour market (Ibid. p. 9). 
Perhaps, even the Brexit excuse that the government has come up with recently has 
in reality little to do with the actual state and economic significance of the UK arms 
industry. 
 
So then, why does the UK export arms, if the economic reason is almost null? 
Furthermore, why does the UK provide more than hardware whilst reaching arms 
export agreements? A recent report by Mike Lewis and Katherine Templar (2018) has 
shed a light on the B side of the UK´s arms exports to Saudi Arabia: its human 
component. The supply of services that come alongside the arms export do not 
require licenses or authorisation from the UK government. Besides UK military 
personnel, there is a massive human operation included under the terms of the 
agreements that Saudi Arabia and the UK have made. In fact, extracts from one of the 
secret agreements, signed in 1985 but still in force, show that “it includes a blanket 
commitment for UK personnel to remain available in Saudi Arabia for arming and 
support during active armed conflict, without reference to the conflict´s authorisation 
or lawfulness” (Lewis and Templar, 2018, p.6). Lewis and Templar, estimate around 
7000 employees UK contractor companies, UK civil servants and seconded UK military 
personnel, currently present in Saudi Arabia to support RSAF (Royal Saudi Arabia 
Airforce) and other Saudi security forces (Ibid.). These services are also void of any UK 
MoD guidance on reporting possible violations of International Humanitarian Law, 
contrasting with what the High Court decision of 2017 claims that UK arms export 
officials gauge IHL violation risk and that it cannot know how the RSAF is using UK 
weapons (Ibid. pp. 7, 25). Further to this, another more concrete human component 
has come recently into limelight. Over 40 Saudi cadets have been trained in British 
military colleges since 2015 (The Guardian Correspondent, 2019). The information 
was released by the MoD following the freedom of information act but the data on 
the cost of these trainings is not yet shared.  
 
Strategically and in an International Relations theory argument, states seek to 
maintain their position within the hierarchy of states. Arms transfers provide the 
supplier with political leverage over the importer because they render the latter 
reliant on ordnance, maintenance, and spare parts; if these are withheld from the 
importer, then their weapon systems become less effective over time until they finally 
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become useless (Johnson and Willardson, 2018). In this sense, arms transfers give 
states like the UK, certain power over others as well as the upkeep of its status 
internationally. Is this then one of the reasons why the UK exports arms to human 
right violating states?  Yes, and no. In 2005, Shannon Lindsey Blanton published a 
paper analysing the US´s arms exports before and after the Cold War. Her findings 
indicated that during the Cold War human rights were not significant determinant of 
arms transfers as opposed to the post- Cold War period were democracy and human 
rights had an impact in determining the eligibility of a country to receive weapons 
(Blanton, 2005). Over a decade later, President Trump has, like the UK, also completed 
large arms deals with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia despite the possible use of the 
weapons towards civilians in the Yemen conflict. The US case, is in some ways 
mirrored by the UK case exposed in this chapter. Similarly, both the US and the UK 
have signed the ATT, both have internal arms exports methods to analyse the 
recipient country and both are very large exporters of arms globally. Differently, the 
UK has ratified the ATT, even championed its creation and now has been pushed by a 
non-state actor to implement it properly. Both countries have a reputation and a 
place in the hierarchy of states to upkeep, however, the UK´s position is rather weaker 
and therefore its actions towards endurance might be more radical, which is part of 
the reasoning behind the 2017 decision.  
 
Blanton´s results have been contested by Richard Perkins and Eric Neumayer (2010), 
who found that the same states in the period between 1992 and 2004 have not 
discriminated against human rights abusing or autocratic countries. Perkins and 
Neumayer expose how these countries self-declared to have had an ethical turn post- 
Cold War and are actually serving an organised hypocrisy of ongoing territorial 
egoism, serving the states´ domestic, economic and security interests (Perkins and 
Neumayer, 2010). In this sense, is it true that there was a move towards prioritizing 
human rights? Is there a move away from it since 9/11? Actually, selling arms to 
countries after 9/11 continued and is suspected to be to combat the war on terror, 
particularly in the Middle East, where the UK has sold weapons not only to Saudi 
Arabia but to Turkey as well. In the before mention recent study by Johnson and 
Willardson, and in another one carried out by De Soysa and Midford it was found that 
human rights was insignificant statistically, making human rights consideration less 
important (De Soysa and Midford, 2012; Johnson and Willardson, 2018, p.10).97 This 
also exemplifies that whilst security, may drive the decision, states also have a 
strategic reasoning behind the decision of their sales.  
 
Also, in strategical terms, Jennifer Erickson (2015) argument of the desire to enhance 
their reputations as responsible citizens of the international community, shapes well 
 
97 De Soysa and Midford had a study made comparing the US and China in the post-Cold War era. They 
concluded: “China relative to the United States transfers greater amounts of arms to democracies 
rather than autocracies, whereas the United States seems to prefer more autocratic regimes, despite 
rhetoric that claims an ethical foreign policy”(De Soysa and Midford, 2012).  
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with why states strategically decide to export arms to human right violating 
countries.98 She moves away from the defence industry and focuses on states 
compliance to keep scandals at bay. However, there is something more behind a 
state’s strategy of choosing to export arms: history. History in the sense of nostalgia 
of the Empire in the case of the UK. In the decades following the demise of World War 
II, the UK came to the realisation that economic levels in West Germany and France 
had become stronger than British ones. Michael Kenny and Nick Pearce claim that this 
relative economic decline prompted Britain to turn decisively towards Europe but also 
to rethink their global ambitions (Kenny and Pearce, 2018). It also exposed Britain´s 
global defence commitments, which in 1965 stood at 7 percent of the GDP (Ibid. p. 
79). The government made the decision to reduce defence spending in Suez, Malaysia 
and Singapore, and although Britain remained a nuclear power and a permanent 
member of the UN Security Council, its military world island role had come to an end 
along with its great power status (Ibid., pp. 79–83). It is no coincidence that these 
were the years when the UK started arms export agreements with Saudi Arabia. 
Perhaps, with sense of grasping the straws of the long gone Pax Britannica. 
Strategically speaking, this move heavily influenced by the past also affected Britain´s 
future. Like a snowball, a certain economic downfall, led to a security and 
militarization one, which took Britain´s interests into new places, like Saudi Arabia. 
Like this, today, what started in the 1960s has constructed and is now engrained in 
British strategy that has somewhat a mind of its own with the birth and strengthening 
of lobbying groups, subsidies and further deals with Saudi Arabia and other countries. 
And with a history of over six decades has gotten more and more complicated but has 
also, to the eyes of the British government, fostered a new international position for 
the UK. Today, this is largely the reasoning behind the 2017 High Court´s decision and 
the SoSIT´s decision to appeal the 2019 decision. 
 
The different dimensions afore mentioned, strategical, historical and economic, have 
different effects on the state´s decision to continue arms deals with human rights 
violating countries. They also depend on the interactions the state makes because and 
for them. David Kinsella has theorized on this and has come to conclude that: “as a 
transfer of military capability, weapons shipments increase the tendency of the 
recipient to strike a conflictual posture in its foreign policy, while arms transfer 
dependence restrains that tendency”(1998). This, of course, in a Post Cold War world. 
However, arms transfers have either a positive or negative impact on the stability of 
the importing region and on the stability- be it economic, strategic or political- of the 
exporting state. Not only that, but they signify the degree of dependence. Is this 
dependence of the importing or of the exporting party? In the case of the UK, the 
British state explicitly says that it depends upon the sales of weapons to Saudi Arabia 
because of the supposed weight they have on the local economy. Implicitly it also 
 
98 This argument is explained in chapter 4 when taking about why states accepted ATT. Earlier in this 
chapter, it was explained why the UK accepted and even supported ATT during and after the 
negotiation.  
 148 
depends on them for continuing its dying imperialistic role in the international scene. 
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, depends on British weapons to carry on their own 
regional interests. So then, which state depends more on the arms transfer? The 
dependence is a function of the extent to which the state must rely on them (Ibid.). 
Kinsella, claims that dependence seems to restrain the impulse the importer has to 
engage on conflictual foreign policy behaviour, however, in the specific case of the UK 
and Saudi Arabia it seems that the importers dependence on arms actually 
exacerbates its conflictual behaviour, even leading to human rights violations. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting the evident connection or dependence of not only the 
importers international actions but especially those of the exporter, like in the UK 
case.  
 
The reason or reasons behind why states, like the UK, export arms despite being 
aware of human rights violations that these weapons might do, is a strategic construct 
influenced by the nexus of key interests. In detail it has most likely been formed, like 
a snowball, from the relative economic decline in the 1960s that led the UK to seek 
improvements in its economy by, among other things, reaching arms agreements with 
Saudi Arabia. The situation, influenced by a historical sense of nostalgia of the empire 
took a mind of its own incrementing lobbying groups, subsidies, further deals and of 
course a set of strategical reasons that pursued a heighten sense of security and 
military response that fulfilled national and international politics alike. The recent 
pressure felt by what Brexit might do to the key interests has also meant that Britain 
continues to grasp at straws to maintain their role in Europe, with the US and NATO, 
and of course its place in internationally. These reasons allow to further understand 
the particular case of the UK´s human rights and security relationship and how they 
come from the past but are also continuously constructed by the present and the 
concerns for the future.    
 
Particular overlap of human rights and security relationship of the UK 
 
 The nexus of key interests, moral and material, are what largely define the 
constructivist human rights and security relationship. As has been seen throughout 
the chapter, but in particular in the second part of it, the interests tend to be 
interconnected and influence each other in diverse ways. The weight of history is also 
felt, particularly when aiming to understand why states, like the UK, export arms 
despite having signed, ratified and championed international treaties like the ATT. All 
these reasons amalgamate to create a particular human rights and security 
relationship. The key interests of the state in question are without a doubt key, 
however due to the nature of how the implementation of the ATT has been evolving 
in the UK other actors´ interests, like CAAT´s are also significant.  
 
Characteristics of the human rights and security relationship today  
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 Although the High Court decision of 2017 and the 2019 appeal, do not 
specifically revolve solely around the Arms Trade Treaty, they denote the 
implementation of it. Several NGOs are on the limelight in this case, but in particular 
CAAT, as the leader in the call for judgement from the High Court and appeal on the 
case for weapons sales to Saudi Arabia.  Through this, CAAT becomes carrier of the 
human rights distancing from the classic understanding where only state actors can 
be so. It also exemplifies actors that, distancing from human security notions and in a 
CMV sense, do not consider embedded militarism and actually promote cultures of 
peace in a global and local manner. The scope of the NGOs will in the implementation 
of the ATT in this case is still in some way contingent to the state´s will, especially 
when considering that the state will appeal the 2019 decision. However, this 
organisation´s actions are examples of the agency that non-state actors, particularly 
transformative ones, have managed to achieve in order to reach a certain degree of 
influence. CAAT´s agency in this case is direct, whilst in the case of chapter 5, Control 
Arms and ATT Monitor have a less direct role. This does not mean, necessarily, that 
the state has lost full or partial agency. If anything, this has made the state aim to 
push further to defend their interests. This dynamic, involving the nexus of key 
interests from the state and the human rights interests of the non-state actor, is 
impacting the later phase of the norm and therefore the relationship between human 
rights and security.  
 
Like this, the agents have allowed for human rights to permeate security, but also for 
security to permeate into human rights. This is nothing new, philosophically, as was 
seen in chapter 2, the role of nations and the political community in making the rights 
real and tangible can be seen through the study of the universality of rights, Kant´s 
liberalism and Rawls´Law of the Peoples. The continuous constructive role of agents 
in the implementation of the ATT, is just one of the latest examples of the evolution 
of how security entered society tied up to human rights since the birth of the 
contemporary relationship between human rights and security in the late 19th 
Century. Agents, in this case the UK and CAAT, are not norm entrepreneurs anymore 
due to the advanced phase of the norm cycle. However, they become norm 
implementers and their duties, whether in pro or con of the norm, construct the 
further definition and fulfilment of the norm. Mixed actors can also be norm 
implementers to a lesser and perhaps indirect extent, like DfID or the special 
advocates. They also reduce the falsehood of the false morality that the state carries. 
The causality of the High Court´s decision 2017 and the 2019 appeal can be seen as 
empowering for agents, like CAAT. This has allowed for their actions to acquire more 
importance domestically and internationally.99 As seen theoretically in chapter 3, 
these agents are subject to constant change and are driven by constraints that go 
further than Putnam´s two level game into a multilevel game defined by the nexus of 
key interests that have been explained throughout this chapter. Their actions, or norm 
implementation dynamics are domestic but with international constitutive causality 
 
99 Under the next subtitle, the international importance will become apparent.  
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that seek to impact the structure. This chapter has demonstrated that through a nexus 
of moral and material interests, the dynamics between state and non-state actors 
impact the implementation of the ATT. Also, similar to the boomerang effect (Keck 
and Sikkink, 1998), they expert pressure from below to have constitutive causality 
over the ATT and therefore over the specific human rights and security overlap for 
this case.  
 
CAAT, as a transformative NGO seeking comprehensive change through the abolition 
of the Arms Trade has achieved change through diverse activities that take into 
consideration the power structure that has been built around the dynamics between 
state and non-state actors and between the norm implementing dynamics, 
particularly in this case for the international human rights and humanitarian law 
dedicated to the control of arms. CAAT through years of experience has understood 
the power structure and due to its financial independence has been able to focus on 
aspects of change that Control Arms have not been able to use. CAAT has built its 
efficacy through campaigning, whether online via twitter, webpage or email, offline 
via weekly, monthly and occasional demonstrations, meetings and events with their 
followers and the general public. It has built networks with universities to enlarge its 
campaigning, as well as alliances with other organisations like AI, Oxfam and HRW. As 
part of their activities, petitions and constituency campaigning have been used to 
influence MPs from below. The research within the organisation and its use to share 
on websites, social media has further enhanced advocacy and increase the precision 
of campaigning. Through this plus the work with Leigh Day and other law officers, like 
the special advocates, CAAT has been able to continue chipping away into their 
defined moral and material interests in particular to ensuring the full implementation 
of instruments of IHL and IHRL like the ATT. Their perspective on change and on the 
activities used to achieve it can be reflected on Figure 2: the human rights and security 
relationship. 
 
Figure 2 visually represents and summarizes the key interests discussed throughout 
this chapter that define the particular overlap between human rights and security in 
the UK today.100 It is purposely divided to highlight the state´s key interests. Such 
interests represent the state, but also how its contingent to other states and 
international organisations. They also denote the false morality, that despite the 
negative connotations of its name, influences both the security and human rights side 
of the conundrum as well as aiding in improving weaknesses in the constructivist 
theory. The key interests of the NGO mainly indicate those of CAAT due to its 
leadership role in the judicial review of 2017 and the 2019 appeal. CAAT, as 
mentioned before, is a transformative NGO that seeks a comprehensive change of 
society, like the abolition of the international arms trade because it undermines 
human rights, security and economic development (Scholte, 2002; Stavrianakis, 
 
100 History is not considered as an actual interest, but should be kept in mind as a definitive author of 
the reason for being of certain interests.  
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2013). Both the interests of the UK and CAAT are injected into either/or the security 
and human rights side of the overlap equating to a slightly larger security circle and a 
smaller human rights one with somewhat of an overlap amongst the two. The HR 
circle does not yet have a full circle, due to the fact that the UK government will still 
appeal the 2019 decision as well as due to the weight of the nexus of moral and 
material interests. This overlap, allows to conclude that even though moral interests 
have a definite say, at times this morality is false and therefore material interests can 
prevail. This finding coincides, not only with the hypothesis of this thesis, but also with 
the views of recent arms trade regulation scholarship, where arms exports regimes 
are usually seen as moral, but with a taste of controlling the means of violence 
(Cooper, 2011; Cooper and Mutimer, 2011; Hansen, 2016).  The complexity and 
contingency of the human rights and security relationship is an example of the 
contingency as core of constructivism (Kessler, 2016) and as co-constitution of 






Implications for future ATT implementation locally and globally 
 
 The case of the UK and the particular nexus of moral and material interests, 
exemplifies how HAC (humanitarian arms control) have generated norms with moral 
aspirations thwarted by state’s particularistic national security interests (Wisotski, 
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2010).101 Particularly, this chapter shows that this has gone further than the creation 
of the norm, but continues to influence the implementation of it. Because of the 
special characteristics of ATT, particularly its enforcement mechanisms or lack 
thereof, state and non-state actor activity has been crucial to the Treaty´s fulfilment. 
The only official mechanism, reporting, to date is not yet proven trustworthy. 
Therefore, action from member parties and in this case of non-state actors involved 
in the domestic issues of a member party also explain the construct of treaty 
implementation. Particularly, since the UK was a vital supporter for the Treaty in its 
negotiation, its role in the implementation is central.  
 
Essentially, CAATs actions and the result of the appeal, empower the role of the 
organisation as well as the norm implementation dynamics of the Treaty. Despite the 
fact that since July 2020 the UK government has decidedly continued arms sales to 
Saudi Arabia, the July 2019 win did set a legal precedent for further non-compliance 
of the ATT and other IHL/IHRL instruments within the UK. In fact, a few days after the 
Trade Secretary announced (Parliament, 2019) that arms sales to Saudi Arabia were 
going to be suspended pending the Government´s appeal to the appeal, the ban was 
extended to United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Bahrain and Kuwait, and refers to weapons 
or military equipment that could be used in the war for human rights violations 
(Department for International Trade, 2019). The extension of the ban, further to 
adherence towards the ATT and other international instruments, placed CAATs 
actions indirectly as influence in the decrease of weapons and military equipment 
used within the Yemen conflict and therefore a decrease in the possible violations of 
human rights within the region. However, since autumn 2019 and particularly in 
summer 2020, with the UK governments continued sales and violation of the 2019 
Appeal, these wins were in practice only temporary. It remains to be seen how the 
issue will develop, CAAT and their solicitors Leigh Day, are carefully considering the 
government’s decision and have publicly condemned the new licenses approved. 
What this means for the human rights and security relationship is that much like the 
core of constructivist theory (Kessler, 2016) it is contingent to actors changes and 
circumstances. This is an example of the every-changing nature of the relationship 
and of how norms, or the adherence to them, are used as a method to control this 
contingency (Onuf, 2009).  
 
Conclusion   
 
 As has been explained throughout this thesis, but in particular in chapters 2 
and 3, the concepts of human rights and security are seen by many as separate 
entities and therefore incomparable. However, security and human rights are deeply 
intertwined and have been perhaps even since their origins, like the similitude 
between the concepts of security and safety. In International Law, security norms are 
human rights norms; humanitarian norms. In International Relations theory, the 
 
101 See more on HAC in chapter 3.  
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concepts do overlap and are continuously constructed by actors and circumstances 
surrounding them. In constructivism, norms have actually been used as a solution to 
the ever-changing and contingent nature of the theory.  
 
Empirically, through a genealogical understanding that has problematized the 
constructivist human rights and security relationship of the case, this chapter of the 
UK and the implementation of the ATT allows to recognise further constituted 
causalities of the actors involved, of the treaty and its norm phases and of the 
consequences of its current construct. This despite the fact that, although it has only 
been a few years since the start of the Arms Trade Treaty, the case of the UK selling 
arms to Saudi Arabia is already a case of a broken implementation of the Treaty. Even 
more so, the High Court decision of 2017, brought by the demand of CAAT and several 
other NGOs. The 2017 decision and the win of 2019 have become instances that show 
the diverse roles of actors seeking to balance the human rights and security 
relationship. It has empowered NGOs role past the negotiation phase of the norm and 
into actual application and operation. CAAT´s actions reside in multiple levels, by 
acting domestically in favour of IHL and HRL and seeking international change, 
whether conscious of it or not. CAAT, as a transformative NGO is then seen as a norm 
implementer, that acts within the state boundaries as a local non-state independent 
actor with inspiration and impact internationally. In the UK government, there is a 
glimpse of norm implementation, fair norm implementation, and not the supposed 
implementation that the SoSIT and the High Court claim to have. This lies in the Court 
of Appeal, DfiD, and the special advocates. Specially, DfID and the special advocates 
become mixed actors that can be carriers of morality and human rights as well as in 
an indirect manner norm implementers.102 In this sense, the 2017 decision becomes a 
clear example of constitutive causality, where the practice of the UK is shaped by: (1) 
the state using international hard law norms, the ATT, and international soft law 
norms, the UNSC R216; (2) the state taking advantage of the centralization and 
independence of international organisations, the UN and UNSC; and (3) by the state 
having the morality of the ATT, and IHL and IHRL behind it. The UK´s practice speaks 
also of a combination of soft and hard power with soft and hard law that leads to a 
sort of smart power (Nossel, 2004; Nye Jr, 2009). 
  
The constructivist complexity that the norm implementers face in this case has been 
an example of how far non-state actors, or other types of actors as represented here, 
have come since they were first studied in IR (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Keck and 
Sikkink, 1998; Price, 1998). Also on how their role has evolved within the different 
phases of the norm lifecycle(Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Boli and Thomas, 1999a; Price, 
2003), beyond entrepreneurship and compliance of human rights regimes (Risse et 
 
102 In this case, Oxfam although a reformative NGO, it does not have centre stage in the judicial 
procedure. DfID, does not have centre stage, however it represents a rare finding within the 
government institutions that tangibly support the human rights side of the human rights and security 
relationship. As in chapter 5 and 7, this is a reflection of the multilayered nature of norm dynamics as 
well as of the semi permeated boundaries of the state and non-state actors.  
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al., 1999; Risse et al., 2013; Garcia, 2011) and further into arms control. This has 
allowed for the role of a unique norm implementer to emerge and to further 
understand how the state´s decisions have been constructed.  
 
Why the state reached the 2017 High Court´s decision, and is seeking to appeal the 
2019 appeal is constructed by the nexus of material and moral interests that give 
shape to the UK´s implementation of the ATT and therefore the human rights and 
security relationship. Moral interests, in this case, are derived from the UK, but also 
from CAAT´s involvement in the implementation of arms control. Both the 
government and civil society become agents that have the power of constitutive 
causality in defining reality of national and international morality. Moral interests are 
not the sole owners of the human rights side of the relationship, just like material 
interests are not completely void of morality. In fact, the UK has used material 
interests in the name of moral ones, which is more a false morality. This term has 
been used previously on the Control Arms case, and will also resonate with the 
Norwegian case on chapter 7. What the 2017 High Court´s decision and the UK´s false 
morality, combined with the 2019 appeal and CAAT´s morality enhance more the 
human rights and security relationship and exemplifies that what happens in the later 
part of the lifecycle of the norm, crucial for norm fulfilment or lack thereof. 
Furthermore, what the UK´s morality, or lack thereof demonstrates is that states 
continue to give rights, through false morality, in an effort to controlling the means 
of violence. States give these rights to others, but also to themselves through mixed 
actors, as has been seen throughout this case.  
 
Morality, or false morality, particularly in the case of the UK government has a 
connection with material interests, just like in between these interests there is a 
correlation as well. The government´s National Security Strategy even claims how 
national security depends on economic security and vice versa. In a circular fashion 
all interests somehow define each other, without it being clear which one prevails. 
Depending on the characteristics of the time, it may lead to believe that perhaps all 
material interests are steered by security priorities. However, in Brexit times the 
interests of up keeping the economic, and strategical interests of the country are 
perhaps more important. This conundrum is better defined when finding the answer 
for why states export arms despite belonging to humanitarian normative instruments, 
like the ATT. This answer, entails not only moral and material interests but other 
circumstantial and structural characteristics that play a defining role. It also, 
demonstrates an ever-changing construction in the nexus of economic, strategic 
(including foreign policy, security and military), historical and sociological interests. 
Arms transfers give states political leverage, and certain power to keep its status 
internationally. This comes from a historical sense of nostalgia of the Empire with a 
sense of grasping the straws of the long gone Pax Britannica. Arms transfers to Saudi 
Arabia started in the 1960s influenced like a snowball, first by a certain economic 
downfall, that led to security and militarization strategy. These interests have been 
changing and constructing the now engrained British strategy that has achieved a 
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mind of its own with the birth and strengthening of lobbying groups, subsidies and 
further deals with Saudi Arabia and other countries. Like this, today, the British state 
explicitly says that it depends upon the sales of weapons to Saudi Arabia because of 
the supposed weight they have on the local economy. Implicitly it also depends on 
them for continuing its dying imperialistic role in the international scene. Then, the 
reason or reasons behind why states, like the UK, export arms despite being aware of 
human rights violations that these weapons might do, is a strategic construct 
influenced by the nexus of key interests. Morality and its focus have been possible 
due to the CMV lens that this thesis has aimed to achieve in order to showcase what 
actors do to promote cultures of peace in a global and local manner.  
 
The particular overlap of the implementation of the ATT in the UK exemplifies the 
constant constitutive causality of the nexus of material and moral interests that the 
agents involved suffer throughout. It has more importantly found that the role of 
agents, governmental or non-governmental is plagued with a genealogy of 
characteristics defined over time and ever fluctuating to adapt to the economic, 
strategic, security and political standards. The nexus between these interests are 
what largely defines the particular security and human rights relationship, by injecting 
into either the human rights, security or both sides of the situation. An important 
finding of this chapter has been that due to the false morality of the state, the moral 
role of civil society is ever more important. Giving civil society a stronger sense of 
agency, past the negotiation phase of the norm, but making it a crucial moderator in 
the implementation of the norm domestically with international effects. Like this, the 
so called norm implementers through norm implementation dynamics have 
constitutive causality defined by the nexus of material and moral interests that act 
domestically to achieve internationally. Their actions seek to causally constitute the 
ATT implementation and therefore over the specific human rights and security 
overlap of the case of a large arms exporting state. Norm implementers, are also an 
example of the continuous actions made to give rights and avoid the control of the 
means of violence. CAAT demonstrates that, despite the UK´s interests being in 
preponderance and the continuing sales of weapons, there is a certain erosion of state 
dominance over all things security through the win of summer 2019. This continues 
to provide strength to the hypothesis of this thesis by giving rights, through false 











Chapter 7- Norway´s state and non-state actors pursuing the 




 As the number of Arms Trade Treaty members grow, higher is the 
responsibility of already member party states to comply with the Treaty´s precepts. 
The ATT evolution is not contingent only to Treaty’s actions or yearly collective efforts 
of improvement of its principles. It is particularly reliant on the correct 
implementation, even despite arms export control violations. In this sense, domestic 
policies related to arms control have a direct impact globally, they also construct the 
future actions of similar actors and adjacent mechanisms. Norway, highly recognized 
for its moral peace engagement internationally and its advanced domestic strategies, 
becomes a key actor in this ATT realm. Although not one of the larger arms exporters, 
its policies and its worldwide peacemaker and peacebuilding reputation, give it a 
particular set of causes that reflect upon an almost parity between human rights and 
security. Norway´s involvement with regional and international institutions are what 
gives it its particularity for this case. In the same way, its security, foreign policy and 
military strategies are fed by such commitments. As a non-EU member that follows 
EU security standards and position in arms control, keen NATO member, UN 
protecting and top ten wealthiest state, its international posture carries great weight 
in the region and with the countries it interacts. This, coupled with a precise view on 
management of non-state actors is another reason as to why Norway case creates an 
important example for this thesis.  
 
Practically, recent data estimates that Norway´s total value of defence-related 
exports 2017 was approximately NOK 6.3 billion (USD 773 million), which signifies a 
rise of 33% compared to 2016 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018). Exports have been 
increasing since 2014, mainly due to investments in new technology development and 
to large sales of military equipment to Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, 
Kuwait, Oman and Poland. In 2015, Norway sold military equipment for USD 139 
million to Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Kuwait.103 Today, arms 
export licences have been revoked to most of this countries, in the search for a 
protection of human rights in the Yemen conflict. Globally, these revocations have put 
Norway at the forefront of the Arms Trade Treaty implementation and are setting an 
example for further arms export violators. Locally, it has entailed a multilevel game of 




103 These are the countries whose exports licenses are being rejected (TNP, 2017). Oman and Poland 
represent most of the 33% increase of 2017 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018). Oman is an interesting 
buyer, as it is one of Saudi Arabia´s main allies and is also widely known to be a human rights offender 
domestically. 
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The genealogical analytical framework and the causal construction of these activities 
will draw attention to the nexus of key interests that actors involved have. As these 
actors construct and are constructed by global and local mechanisms and social 
interactions, the intricate intertwined set of reasons becomes apparent. This is what 
the case of Norway and the halt of sales to Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, 
will exemplify. This chapter, like previous chapters, will be using genealogy linked to 
constitutive causality with the aim of capturing the social processes, interaction and 
accidents of the case (Lebow, 2009). Like its counterparts, this chapter will 
deconstruct in order to construct and understand a significant human rights and 
security relationship problematized by a genealogical framework of analysis. 
Specifically, this case will show the implications of how a diverse composition of 
actors, actions, and the background of both conclude in a particular overlap of the 
constructivist human rights and security relationship. Norway´s peculiarities are what 
will be explained in this chapter and directly and indirectly co-related to the vision of 
giving rights while still controlling the means of violence by focusing on actors that 
seek to lower the embedded militarism of the Treaty implementation through global 
and local actions to promote cultures of peace. The first subpart of this Chapter will 
focus on the analysis of the implementation of the ATT, whilst explaining the issue or 
issues involved. To do so, its military strategy will be elucidated and the role of within-
state actors will be introduced The second subpart of this chapter will centre upon 
Norway´s identity based on peace and status seeking. It will explain the Norwegian 
Model and how it is all reflected upon Norway´s interests. Finally, it will finish with 
the collision of moral and material interests influencing the parity between human 
rights and security in the human rights and security relationship. The analysis of 
morality will address the weaknesses of constructivism. The final subpart of this 
chapter concentrates on the particular overlap that the set case has created for the 
human rights and security relationship. This overlap will be represented visually, in 
order to summarize the actors and the key nexus of interests that each one brings to 
the table. Finally, this part will also explain the constitutively causal implication of this 
overlap locally and globally over the ATT.  
 
All of this will stem from the theoretical background elucidated in the theory chapters 
of this thesis. With this, seeking to aid in the weaknesses of constructivism through 
the analysis of morality and also to contribute the ever growing literature on the role 
of non-state actors in the later phases of a norm particularly in arms control regimes 
(Garcia, 2011; Mathur, 2011), beyond contemporary arms control, humanitarian arms 
control(Greene, 2010; Hynek, 2007; Wisotzki, 2010; Cooper, 2011) and humanitarian 
disarmament (Borrie, 2009; Borrie and Randin, 2006; Krause, 2011; Cooper, 2011). 
Also, understanding how governments have been seeking to work together with civil 
society (Axworthy, 2001) within an international scene with a broad range of actors 
seeking mutual constitutivity of agency and structure (Wendt, 1987) that coincides 
with ethical conduct (Reus–Smit, 2002), with non-state actors working beyond their 
boundaries (Anheier et al., 2005) to influence norms (Chandler, 2004b; Chandler, 
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2004a) and with the interactions between actors and everything in between them 
(Avant et al., 2010). 
 
ATT implementation in Norway led by actors outside and within the state  
 
 For international standards, Norway meets and surpasses exports controls, it 
was one of the first countries to support the Arms Trade Treaty and has proven its 
successful implementation by the rejection of countless export licences in the last few 
years. However, for internal standards, the non-governing opposition continuously 
confronts the government because of the ongoing interest in the exports to Middle 
Eastern Countries. A coalition led by the, political opposition, the Socialist Left Party 
(SV) has been pushing for tighter controls and for more checks and balances to 
prevent Norwegian weapons and munitions from being used in crisis like Yemen. The 
SV, according to SV lawmaker and member of the Parliamentary Committee, Petter 
Eide, claimed that Norwegian controls are not as tight as they seem since the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs is not truly able to say if their weapons are being used in such 
conflicts (O’Dwyer, 2017). Nevertheless, some recent arms deals, like the ones to 
United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, have been stopped and ideally, the SV, would 
like to ban all sales to the Saudi led coalition fighting in Yemen, including Oman.104  
 
The disagreement between the conservative government and the SV will continue, 
also because the three main military companies, Kongsberg Defense, AIM Norway and 
Nammo, are partially owned by the government. The Norwegian government´s open 
interests in the military industry gives it a peculiar sense as well as a particular twist 
to the role the state actors and non-state actors play in arms control dynamics and 
therefore in the human rights and security relationship. State actors and non-state 
actor’s limits become easily undefined, for non-state actors like the military 
companies are in fact state actors. In other cases, the collusion between the military 
industry and the state exists, but it is not as open as in Norway where stipulations of 
this are written all over White Papers, as will be seen below. Further than that, 
Norway has an endless approach to openly managing and financially supporting 
diverse non-state actors, that will also be discussed in detail further below.  
 
Norway´s military and security strategies: union or division between human 
rights and security  
 
 When understanding why Norway stopped selling arms to certain Middle 
Eastern countries, it is first important to analyse Norway´s particular military and 
 
104 Oman might not be openly involved in the Yemen conflict; however, it is an authoritarian regime 
that has been known for human rights violations. The arms deal with Oman is actually the largest in 
the history of Norway. It was signed in 2014, but finally happened in 2017. The Green Party has actually 
claimed that the sale is unforgivable and that this is a clear violation of the arms exports control from 
the part of the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Wijnen, 2018).  
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security strategy. This, in the search for an understanding of the construction of the 
conundrum of a so called peace seeking nation but with a rather robust and well 
organised security strategy and industry. The human rights and security relationship 
of Norway will be clearly reflected in this conundrum, and its defence strategy will 
help elucidate the security and even the human rights sides of the relationship. White 
Papers and other governmental documents, are the best example to further analyse 
Norway´s strategy, as they are plagued with representations of the push and pull 
between human rights and security. As will be seen next, at times, security´s 
preponderance is easily identifiable. However, Norway´s history and experience has 
led it to seek means of controlling the overspread of security over human rights, that 
will also be seen throughout this Chapter.  
 
According to the 2015-2016 White Paper on the National Defence Industry Strategy 
(Forsvarsdepartementet, 2015a), Norway is concerned with having independence, 
military preparedness of their own and most importantly national freedom of action, 
despite the importance of NATO in its security policy.105 Throughout the Paper, the 
reasons behind Norway´s need to create and export arms can be easily understood. 
It is grasped that the state is aware that although Norway´s addition to NATO and 
close links with the European Union are robust, the state must avoid an addiction to 
a foreign supplier in order to avoid an impact on national security and their national 
freedom of action. The White Paper, is very specific in this as it considers it 
unacceptable. Preparedness prevails and behind it the reflection of the government´s 
direct and open involvement with the defence industry. Because the national defence 
industry is considered to be strongly linked to national security needs, such White 
Papers are in constant evolution to support both the industry, the armed forces and 
therefore the state. The government´s involvement is not only through exposed and 
written consideration of the military industry, but also throughout marketing and 
industrial cooperation, as it is exalted in this and other government documents 
(Forsvarsdepartement, 2018). In fact, Innovation Norway, the government´s 
instrument for innovation and development, assists Norwegian military companies 
through consulting, competence services and network access all over the world. 
These tasks can be also carried out by the foreign affairs service if necessary. The state 
is also aware that the success of the link between the defence officials and the 
defence industry needs to be maintained, otherwise it can quickly deteriorate. This 
makes for a well coordinated military industry, with partial ownership and leadership 
from the state.   
 
What can be understood between the lines, and in the lines as well, of Norway´s 
official documents, is that there is a need to sell arms triggered by diverse internal 
 
105This White Paper is found in Norwegian in: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/meld.-st.-
9-20152016/id2459606/sec3. For purposes of this chapter, the appropriate parts were unofficially 
translated into English in Google Translate.  
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and external reasons. Different from the UK and other cases, the economic end is not 
used as an argument, at least not explicitly. Nevertheless, it can be understood that it 
is in the state´s best interest to have a strong military industry. It is not clear in these 
Papers how selling arms makes the industry robust, but it is clear that there is an 
interests in maintaining the industry in order to continue developing their own 
military equipment to be safe within their security needs. In the Papers, the explicit 
reasons behind the protection of arms sales rely elsewhere. Externally, Norway reacts 
to the fact that after the Cold War, the international defence industry changed and 
the number of arms providers fell. Furthermore, it is responding to current 
international characteristics where transnational cooperation has not increased as 
expected and therefore the search for new markets has become key. Globalization 
has also changed the setting by bringing new suppliers from Asia and Latin America 
and more rivalry due to overcapacity in certain areas. This has made the NATO market 
fall and caused the reduction of budgets in the US and other countries. Not only 
Norway but the entire Western military markets have been pushed to look for other 
markets. Competition has grown in this process and Norway has invested in 
knowledge and expertise which have contributed to the Norwegian military industry 
to have competitive products and competencies in the global market. Internally, 
Norway has a military industry composed of 150 companies to maintain. Although 
only three of these companies, Kongsberg Defense & Aerospace, Nammo and AIM 
Norway, are considered large defence companies internationally, they are rather 
small in international terms. The three companies are explicitly partially owned by the 
Government, 106 which defers from the other example analysed in this thesis and 
makes for a very particular influence and mix of state and non-state actors on the 
human rights and security relationship specific for Norway. 
 
The country´s neighbourhood has also had an impact into its security strategy. 
Norway tends to protect its mainland and islands from foreign threats, Russia being 
the biggest one. It also has antecedents of sea issues with the well-known Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries case sentenced in the mid- twentieth century by ICJ. Norway has 
a good overall relationship with other Nordic countries and despite not being part of 
the EU, it has incorporated European Defence Policies into its internal strategy. It is 
Norway’s best interests to have a close cooperation with the EU, and therefore to 
coincide with Europe´s crisis management. All of this has made the Norwegian 
defence industry have the same framework as the industry it competes against. It has 
 
106 Kongsberg Defence and Aerospace is part of the Kongsberg Grouppen ASA partially owned by the 
Norwegian government and with a history of over 100 years in defence production. Nammo is fifty 
percent owned by the Norwegian government, represented by the Norwegian Ministry of Trade, 
Industry and Fisheries and fifty percent owned by the Finnish government. AIM Norway was founded 
as a state owned enterprise in 2011, but has since been given the mandate to reduce state ownership 
to 50% and to become a limited company. This is because the government decided that state-
ownership should be decided on a case by case scenario and on how private ownership would enhance 
the development of the company. (Defence, 2016; Forsvarsdepartementet, 2015b; Kongsberg 
Gruppen, n.d.; Nammo, n.d.)   
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meant, as well, that Norway is part of jointly-funded defence solutions within NATO 
and also in cooperation with Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden in 
NORDEFCO (Nordic Defence Cooperation). Also, Nammo and Kongsberg have had 
good relation with the US weapons market and are also starting to relate to the British 
Defence Industry.  
 
Further than this, the importance of the close relationship between the defence 
industry and national security has been established in the Proposal for Parliamentary 
Resolution- Prop. 73 S (2011-2012)- and in the Recommendation from the Foreign and 
Defence Committee on A defence of our time-  388 S (2011-2012) 
(Forsvarsdepartementet, 2012; Stortinget, 2012).107 In these documents it has also 
been established that NATO is the cornerstone of Norwegian security policy, but that 
in a globalized world, security must be considered in a broader context. By this, it is 
exalted on and on of the importance of Norway in contributing to peace and stability. 
Particularly through UN-led efforts of legal order, defence of human rights and 
strengthening of intergovernmental cooperation. Two actors are essential in this 
Norwegian equation: the UN and the Norwegian Armed Forces. The UN plays a vital 
part in the survival of what is referred to as small states,108 and thus its role as a 
multilateral forum for cooperation, dialogue, conflict resolution, legality and 
legitimacy of military power, must be kept strong. Norway should help to maintain 
this role. With this, Norway prioritizes contributions to international crisis 
management and peace operations. However, beyond the willingness of 
strengthening, stabilizing and protecting the UN, there are historical and practical 
reasons that have made Norway a keen peace leader in international crisis which will 
be discussed in further in this chapter.109 Armed forces constitute the other essential 
element. Although primarily geared to handle external aggression against Norway, 
Armed forces also contribute to building peace and cooperation in different regions. 
They are, as said by the government documents: “Norway´s contribution to creating 
a better world”. Nevertheless, in 388 S document, the duties of the Armed Forces are 
summarized into nine points and participation in peace support operations is number 
seven whilst the first few points are based on NATO membership and collective 
defence frameworks. These points, are not necessarily hierarchical, it is however 
important to note the order of the duties specially when considering the constitutive 
causality of the human rights and security relationship and the state´s involvement in 
it. It is also important in relation to understanding the reasons behind why Norway 
sells military material.  
 
Two further observations can be added. One, that Norway, in its 2015 White Paper 
previously mentioned, claims that many large countries consider the ability to supply 
 
107 Both documents found in Norwegian, unofficially translated to English with Google Translate.  
108 This document emphasizes that Norway considers itself a small state.  
109 It is interesting to mention that the first Secretary General of the United Nations was Norwegian, 
Trygve Lie from 1946- 1952. 
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defence materials to others as an integral part of their defence capabilities. It is not 
clear if Norway, also considers this as important too, as it does not consider itself a 
large country but a small one. Nevertheless, its preponderance over the military 
industry, capable Armed Forces and security interests indicate so. Two, that in the 
same White Paper, peace operations are not mentioned, which indicates a certain 
divide between human rights and security and a separation between security 
interests- represented by the need to export arms- and the strengthening of Armed 
Forces to cooperate in international peace. All in all, Norway seeks to contribute to 
NATO´s war prevention and to a UN-led world order through ensuring a quality 
contribution to international operations of peace and stability. This again, becoming 
a clear example of the constant push and pull between human rights and security in 
the human rights and security relationship within the Norwegian framework. In this 
there is also an example of the push and pull between an underlying human security 
complacent with a military agenda versus a more CMV like security aiming to promote 
cultures of peace in a global and local manner.   
 
A significant addition to the push and pull of human rights and security in Norway´s 
governmental strategies is its export control history. Although obviously not the first 
state to institute modern export control, it has had significant cases of export licenses 
denied to the sale of arms in states that might violate human rights. Also, since the 
mid-nineties a clarification of the original resolution110 has further provided the basis 
for an assessment of questions related to democracy and human rights in the 
recipient country. In December 2017, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, after much 
campaigning from human rights groups and several parliament members, decided to 
suspend the licences that had already been granted to the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), as a precaution even though there was no evidence that Norwegian 
ammunition had been used in the Yemen Crisis. Interestingly, Norwegian legislation 
on arms exports control states that licences can be revoked or suspended if misused 
(Kytomaki, 2015). This speaks of a well-rounded export control, evidently based on a 
holistic understanding of human rights and of the international instruments 
defending them. It also speaks of a definite push towards the human rights side of the 
human rights and security relationship pertinent for Norway. However, the halt of 
exports in the UAE case is not as straightforward as it seems. From 2015 to 2016, 
weapon and ammunition sales to the UAE rose from 41 million (NOK) to 79 million 
(NOK) (Reuters, 2018). It was until the end of 2017, after the Yemen humanitarian 
crisis began to make headlines that the exports were stopped.  
 
This demonstrates a system of checks and balances in the Norwegian government, 
carried out by diverse actors, within and outside the government. It also represents a 
 
110 This was originally installed in 1935, then clarified in 1959 and in 1997. Norway´s export control 
system is much more complex than what is explained in these paragraphs, it has had periods of 
tightening and relaxation and in 1991 it had the most stringent monitoring system of any NATO 
country. For more, see (Castellacci and Fevolden, 2015) and (Kytomaki, 2015, pp.21–49).  
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well-oiled machine that denotes the constant push and pull of human rights and 
security in the country. There is a definite need for controlling the means of violence 
in Norway, because, in fact, export controls are not only about not selling those that 
might violate human rights, but also to those countries that signify a threat to Norway 
or to its allies. CONCL There is also a close relationship with the defence industry, 
which in some ways sets it as a stakeholder in the implementation of ATT that must 
follow regulations- as stated in the preamble of the Treaty. In other ways, it allows for 
economic survival interests to become clear part of the state. Norway´s relationship 
between the defence industry and the relevant transfer control regulations and 
practices allows for good cooperation with authorities (Kytomaki, 2015).111 All in all, 
this situation demonstrates the continuous involvement of diverse actors and the 
semi permeated boundaries of state and non-state actors. This makes for an even 
more particular implementation of ATT, through Norwegian laws and causes a unique 
constitution of the human rights and security relationship and the actors surrounding 
it.    
 
Within-state actors and non-state actors as norm implementers  
 
 The Socialist Left Party (SV) of Norway was born in the 1970s but did not rule 
until 2005 under the Red Green Coalition. Following the 2013 election, the party lost 
its ruling seat and was reduced to the seventh largest political party. With respect to 
international relations, the SV has been known for its stance against Norway accessing 
the European Union and against Norway´s membership to NATO. However, Jens 
Stoltenberg, the former SV prime minister 2005-2013 is now head of NATO. Despite 
the SV´s position on arms control, security, and diplomacy in general, that tend to be 
of a left wing tradition, Stoltenberg is considered a right wing politician and actually 
favoured increased military spending and dialogue about military participation in US 
wars, like Afghanistan. During Stoltenberg´s mandate, Norway´s military spending 
increased constantly making it the highest NATO member expenditure. He dedicated 
to modernising the armed forces and supported Norwegian contributions to NATO 
operations. Stolenberg was the one that stressed Norway´s need to aid allied security 
challenges in order to enhance their own security. On the other hand, during the 12 
years of government tighter export controls were installed and are kept to date by 
the conservative government. The SV government is another perfect example of the 
contradicting dichotomy, or more like a polytomy, between supporting a more 
enhanced security, improvement of the armed forces, whilst emphasizing arms 
controls and encouraging support for peace and human rights locally, regionally and 
globally. It is also an example of state security interests put at the forefront of it all. It 
is contradicting in some ways, that the SV, previous to being the ruling party, was 
known for its stance against NATO and how the prime minister representing it 
enhanced NATO support and is today the head of NATO.  
 
 
111 This is not unique to Norway, it happens in all Nordic cases (Kytomaki, 2015).  
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Today, the SV´s actions speak of a more left wing tendency and highlight its interest 
in protecting human rights via the correct implementation of laws enhanced after 
Norway´s accession to the Arms Trade Treaty. The SV has been putting forward 
proposals in parliament (Storting, in Norwegian) to cease the supply of defence 
equipment to countries involved in the Yemen Crisis. Most proposals have failed, or 
have had very little support from other parties. In December the stop of weapons and 
ammunition to UAE and in January to Saudi Arabia. However, there is still much to do, 
transactions of auxiliary equipment have not been stopped. Actually what would be 
ideal is that all sales to countries involved in the Yemen crisis get retracted. The SV 
does not work alone, it is also constantly pushed by two major NGOs in Norway Save 
the Children (also called Redd Barna)112 and Changemaker. The Christian Democratic 
Party (KRF) has also supported the SV in Storting in matters related to the halt of arms, 
when others would not.113 The actions by the SV, backed by NGOs and other parties, 
are not necessarily completely unique, as other like-minded parties have pushed for 
legality of arms control elsewhere.114 What the case of Norway halting sales to Saudi 
Arabia and UAE shows is the intricate understanding of the multilevel game that state 
decisions have and therefore of the repercussions these decisions have on the human 
rights and security relationship.115 The SV´s activities are part of this intricate 
multilevel game and demonstrate that the norm implementing action can come from 
within the state. Actually, the fact that Redd Barna and Changemaker are actively 
involved also leads to a further intricate multilevel game. It also, adds on to global civil 
society and the multilayered system that was analysed in chapter 3 along with the 
other two case studies of this thesis. This system, as in the case of Norway, is 
increasingly composed of layers of political institutions, individuals, groups, and even 
companies, as well as states and international institutions (Anheier et al., 2005; 
Kaldor, 2003). The activities of the SV, Redd Barna and Changemaker, are examples 
of more radical and inclusive forms of global and local action avoiding embedded 
militarism and coinciding the CMV lens of this thesis´s hypothesis. Also, as will be seen 
further in the chapter they allow for the focus to be on morality and therefore on 
improving the weaknesses of constructivist theory.  
 
 
112 Save the Children Norway, although the local branch of a well-known international organisation 
does apparently receive funding from the Norwegian Government, as will be detailed in the next part 
of this chapter.  
113 It is important to note that international news of the topic, mostly focuses on the SV´s role and fails 
to mention civil society or other parties. This is perhaps due to the leading role of the SV, but also 
perhaps due to the fact that the SV was an important and famous part of Norway´s recent history. 
114 Germany has also recently stopped all sales to Saudi Arabia in January 2018. It was also the 
opposition which gave notice to the government of almost quintupled sales to Saudi Arabia from 2016 
to 2017 (Deutsche Welle, 2018).  
115 Note: As will be seen in the next subpart of this chapter, the decision as understood as coming from 
the state as a whole has moreover moral and material interests attached to it. These interests also add 
to the complexity of the game. 
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According to Irene Dotterud-Flaa, Senior Advocacy Adviser for Redd Barna, or Save 
the Children Norway, the organisation considers itself as non-political and for the 
Saudi case has directed to politicians by giving input and expertise based on its three 
pillars: advocacy, mobilization and media (Dotterud-Flaa, 2018).116 With this they seek 
to influence the review of White Papers, the changes in policies and the government 
strategies on arms exports to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Coalition countries. As 
opposed to Changemaker, who works broadly on exports to authoritarian regimes, 
Redd Barna focuses on export to the Saudi led coalition. However, they have worked 
and supported each other. Redd Barna has found that discussion in the government 
are so layered that it is difficult to pinpoint what needs to be done in terms of halting 
arms exports. It is relatable to a well-known Norwegian quote: “it is like discussing the 
snow that fell last year” (Ibid.). There is no point of discussing a topic that has already 
maybe melted away. This, coupled with the everyday difficulties that non-state actors 
encounter is how Redd Barna has been working on the improvement of the situation 
in Yemen.  
 
In terms of this thesis and of this multilayered system, who would be the actor 
operating as norm implementer?117 The Norwegian state or civil society represented 
by Redd Barna and Changemaker? Is it that the norm implementer is the state as a 
whole or does the state and the SV become separate entities? If so, does the SV count 
as a state actor within the state or as a confronter of the state? Furthermore, what 
are the boundaries of the state, the actors within it and their actions? Are they 
permeable? One of the main details to be considered when answering the questions 
above, and looking back on global civil society analysis from chapter 3, is that global 
civil society and the activities they carry out that have allowed for a shift from formal 
national institutions to new cross-border spaces (Kaldor, 2013a, p.148), like the Arms 
Trade Treaty. Thus, actors within the state that push towards norm implementing and 
are opposite to what the rest of the state desires will be named within-state actors, 
like the SV. Within-state actors are born from the necessity of pushing against the 
state in certain issues, they become within-state lobbyist to achieve their tasks. 
Because political parties, especially opposition ones, tend to have different and 
sometimes opposing views from the state, they cannot be considered state actors per 
se. Their interests rely on their voters, and not on maintaining their current role but 
upon improving it. Sometimes, like SV they receive input and expertise from non-state 
actors, like Redd Barna. Whether these actors execute this duty by matter of influence 
from civil society, influence from national historical baggage, influence from 
international morality, or a combination of all is not well known.118 However, their 
 
116 The information provided on Redd Barna is a compilation of notes on the Interview to their Senior 
Advocacy Adviser as well as data and a case study shared by them to me. 
117 Norm implementers have been used throughout the empirical cases of this thesis, but were 
properly and introduced and defined in chapter 5.  
118 This point would be a point of further research for a subsequent paper for the deeper 
understanding of IHL norm implementation within state dynamics.  
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activities have also shed light on the power of these international human rights and 
humanitarian based norms and the importance of moral and ethical ideas that have 
allowed for a new agenda to stand above state sovereignty and over the importance 
of power relations, in a new post-Westphalian era, as Chandler argues (Chandler, 
2004b). Evidently, this has not occurred in a straightforward manner, and some might 
argue that it has not occurred at all. The cases in this thesis demonstrate that actually 
it is a constant push and pull between moral and ethical ideas over sovereignty and 
state preponderance, a constant push and pull between human rights and security. 
These cases show that the preponderance of the state and its nexus of interests 
continues to, at times, conquer the interests of global and local civil society. What is 
interesting about Norway, is that it has happened in a multilayer, multilevel fashion 
of international and local non-state actors, Redd Barna and Changemaker, and a 
concerned political party that have been campaigning to stand above the security 
needs of Norway and embrace an ethical arms control. Even if aware or not, these 
non-state and within-state actors are pressuring the state through international 
normative structures that have been internalized into Norwegian law and that come 
for international human rights based law, like the ATT. With this, the constant 
interaction between structure and agency is evident and so is its complexity and 
casuistic nature.  
 
When considering global governance and how international human rights and 
humanitarian regimes affect it, most scholars had tended to focus on the governors 
to understand change. However, as was seen in chapter 3, Avant, Finnemore and Sell 
have focused on change being led by agents (2010). This is what this thesis has been 
aiming to do. These agents do not live in a vacuum and their relationship and acting 
dynamics are driven by exogenous and endogenous factors and well as structural 
constraints. Like Avant et al. (2010), this thesis has been finding that the game is way 
past a two-level one (Putnam, 1988) and it is actually in multiple levels that build upon 
themselves to create a distinct game within each state that affects global governance 
in a distinctive way, as was seen particularly in chapter 6. Avant et al. determined that 
surprises are to be expected when studying global governance and its governors. This 
thesis, specifically this chapter is finding that Norway´s case of implementing the ATT 
involves this surprises in the shape of actors that are beyond the typical governors of 
change in global governance. It has non-state actors that are local and partially 
international, Changemaker and Redd Barna, as well as within-state actors that push 
for the correct implementation of the norm from inside the state actor. It must be 
noted that Avant et al.´s work has its focus on how these governors, state and non-
state actors, influence the structures of global power. Although the cases presented 
in this chapter and in this thesis, entail more a preceding step to global governance, 
they still influence the final outcome of it. It is also interesting to see the diverse actors 
and the multilayer game that they create whilst doing so. These cases and the diverse 
actors within them become the precursors of state actions that affect global 
implementation of the norm. Also, like the UK case, Norway´s case highlights the 
importance of norm implementation dynamics that the norm implementers carry out 
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domestically in the second phase of the lifecycle of the norm, in the context of the 
constitutive causality of the ATT and therefore of the human rights and security 
relationship. This empowers non-typical actors, local non-state and within-state 
actors, into having a crucial role in the norm cascade phase of the norm. Their actions 
occur domestically, however the implications and causality of them has tangible and 
intangible consequences internationally.  
 
Moral and Material interests constructed by its peace discourse 
 
 The previous sub- part of this chapter has allowed to begin to understand the 
tangible reasons of why Norway has certain arms deals with human right violating 
regimes and also why and how it has stopped them. It has delved upon the security, 
military and economic-military interests of Norway, that as will be seen below are 
profoundly linked with the intangible reasons behind this case. These intangible 
reasons are an amalgamation of historical and philosophical moral features that give 
Norway its particular view of global interactions and its exceptionalism. As will be seen 
below, here moral and material interests are constantly intertwined but also deeply 
related to Norway´s peace identity. At times, material interests define moral ones, 
and other times, the other way around. Behind them is the state´s identity and with 
it its constant need for status seeking that contemplate a morality that is also 
materiality and vice versa. This is why there is no specific subtitle for material interests 
and this will also be further understood as the Norwegian human rights and security 
relationship continues to be constructed in this chapter.  
 
Norway´s need to adulate the UN and engage in peace operations globally goes 
further than a security need, as was pointed out before. It goes back to the country´s 
birth in the 1890s and to the its 20th Century response to world issues, like WWII and 
the Cold War (Skanland, 2010). The fact that the peace discourse has been an 
important part of Norway´s foreign policy since the start, has allowed for its 
international presence to be felt much stronger than its size would normally imply. In 
terms of this thesis, the Norwegian peace rhetoric implies a high level of morality and 
therefore great interest in ensuring moral stability in its actions. Pertinent to this 
chapter come the questions of where this peace discourse comes from and what are 
its implications on the state and non-state actor’s actions in relation to 
implementation of international human rights and humanitarian law, arms control, 
the Arms Trade Treaty and, of course, the human rights and security relationship. This 
subpart of the chapter will elucidate upon Norway´s identity based on peace and 
status seeking. It will explain the Norwegian Model and how it is all reflected upon 
Norway´s interests. Finally, it will finish with the merging of moral and material 
interests influencing the parity between human rights and security in the human 
rights and security relationship.  
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Norway´s peace identity and status seeking in foreign policy 
 
 It is well known that the Nordic states are globally considered humanitarian 
superpowers. They have been described as: agents of a world common good, forces 
for good, global good Samaritans, moral superpowers, or simply good states 
((Bergman, 2004; Bergman, 2007; Brysk, 1993; Dahl, 2006; Lawler, 2005) in (Langford 
and Schaffer, 2015)). These terms stem from years of identity formation attached to 
a peace discourse and a need for status. In Norway, they also stem from Jan Egeland´s 
work named: Impotent superpower- Potent Small State (Egeland, 1988).  Specifically, 
status rhetoric in Norway is found in the country´s discourse since the nineteenth 
century and further developed with a more specific construction of it close to turn of 
this century (Leira, 2014, pp.30–31). Aforesaid discourse involved the concern of what 
the state should do in the world. Some scholars believe that such discourse was an 
important concept that organized Norwegian foreign policy thought in the 20th 
Century (Leira, 2004; Leira, 2005; Steine and Vogt, 2004), while others think that the 
true peace foreign policy was not significant until the 1990s when Norway began 
institutionalizing its peace and reconciliation efforts (Neumann, 2011; Skanland, 
2010). Peace significance in Norway´s foreign policy took many years to define and to 
date continues undergoing setbacks and changes. It continues to exemplify the push 
and pull between human rights and security, or between an underlying human 
security understanding embedded on militarism or a CMV one. In the White Papers 
between the 1987 and 1992, no specific strategy for peace promotion was outlined, 
it was actually generally constructed as a subcategory of, or tool in, development aid, 
humanitarian assistance or democracy promotion (Skanland, 2010, p.36). It was until 
the period between 1993 and 2003 that the peace discourse began stabilizing and 
consolidating due to Norway´s involvement in peace operations in the Middle East, 
Guatemala, Cyprus, Haiti, Mali, Sudan, Sri Lanka and Colombia, and its peace-
promoting work in Europe and Eurasia through the OSCE (Ibid.). Later, the peace 
discourse became controversial during the Iraq, Kosovo and Afghanistan conflicts. 
Despite the changes it has suffered, peace has been constructing Norway´s foreign 
policy as well as continuously permeating into development and military policy as this 
chapter has shown and will continue to do so.  
 
The genealogy and therefore the construction of the peace discourse has gone hand 
in hand with Norway´s relation to global and domestic actors. Therefore, it is also 
closely related to the definition of its identity and how this affects Norway´s interests 
of upholding the international system. In constructivist theory, state identity 
formation, influenced by poststructuralism, is related to the relationship of the self 
with the other and how this affects the construction of politics (Wendt, 1992; Wendt, 
1994). In the interaction with the other, is where states socialize to constitute norms, 
institutions, ideas, and collective meanings (Jepperson et al., 1996). Like this, state 
socialization allows for states to have an identity and in respect with the other while 
also defining their interests. Protecting its own interests, then becomes a matter of 
protecting their identity. Giving rights, then becomes about giving rights to itself, or 
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as legal entities possessing rights and duties. Norway, has in fact defined its peace 
identity through its interactions, first with its neighbouring states, later with the 
interaction with larger and more dominant ones. Norway has defined its peace 
identity as key to its foreign policy, security, military and humanitarian interests. It is 
in Norway´s best interest to uphold the international system, in particular the UN, in 
order to maintain its international status. Even more so, now that it is seeking a place 
in the Security Council for 2021. The theoretical reasons behind a state doing so, 
through peace engagement, like Norway, can be seen from different perspectives. 
System oriented realist and English School scholars, Henry Kissinger and Adam 
Watson, believe that system maintenance is an exogenous byproduct of the balance 
of power ((Kissinger, 2012; Watson, 1990) in (Neumann, 2011)). This understanding 
would exclude the endogenous sources and agents of causation and therefore the 
multilayered case of Norway. Iver Neumann suggests that Norway´s case shows the 
mix of exogenous and endogenous causes that form Norwegian perspective and have 
transformed diplomacy by necessarily involving non-state agents (Neumann, 2011). 
The so called “Norwegian Model” is the best example of this, and entails the 
government supporting NGOs supposedly with the aim of improving their foreign 
policy. This Model will be further discussed below and as will be seen, it is not 
necessarily entirely foreign policy oriented. However, it has also further defined 
Norway´s peace identity. Peace operations and the actors involved in them, state and 
non-state, are just part of the stronger strategy that the state is constructing in order 
to promote status seeking internationally.  
 
Then, how and why does a state seek status and create these type of strategies to do 
so? Rasmus Pedersen (2018) has taken inspiration from Mearsheimer´s offensive 
realism to explain Nordic status-seeking. First, Pedersen defines status as a state´s 
position in the international deference hierarchy. Where large states compete for 
power and the place to be security guarantor of its allies, while small states desire to 
be seen by being recognized by their contributions (de Carvalho and Neumann, 
2014).119 Pedersen then claims that, in order for status-seeking to be successful, the 
role played by the small state has to be noticed and publicly recognized by the large 
power (Pedersen, 2018). Norway has not participated in all of the preparation for US-
led coalition conflicts, it did not participate in the Iraq War preparation. And in recent 
years it has lowered the number of troops in UN operations while focusing more on 
NATO led ones. Pedersen claims that is due to Norway compensating to the fact that 
NATO and the US where overlooked by the state, in the period after the Cold War, 
and in order to avoid marginalization support is needed (Pedersen, 2018). Peter Viggo 
Jakobsen, Jens Ringsmose & Håkon Lunde Saxi claim that Norway is actually 
bandwagoning (Waltz, 1979) for prestige and reputation (2016). However, Norway´s 
 
119 As has been discussed in other Chapters, status and reputation are not necessarily interchangeable. 
Reputation and prestige are in some ways in the control of the actor; while status, is often regarded as 
a function of the global or regional system since it is granted or accorded by others, even though it can 
be influenced by a state’s reputation (Pedersen, 2018; Wohlforth, 2009). 
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strategy might be better understood as part of a synthesis between self-interest with 
NATO and solidarity with the UN, as John Karlsrud and Kari Osland assert (2016). This 
synthesis, actually reflects Norway´s want to upkeep with their peace history, their 
population´s desires and their civil society institutions, whilst keeping their place in 
the hierarchy of states. There is no obligation in having to choose one of these 
perspectives or the other, but what is true is that they reflect a recent construction of 
Norwegian foreign policy based on viewing value giving actions, like humanitarian and 
development aid, and actions based purely on interests in the same equation 
((Graeger, 2014; Laegreid, 1996) in Ibid.). These views, also reflect Norway´s constant 
dilemma of the push and pull between human rights and security and how on a 
casuistic basis one will at times win over the other. This does not necessarily mean 
that Norway´s peace interactions are void of humanity, it just shows the intricate 
multilayered Norwegian foreign policy and its ability to affect as an agent in the 
international scene while also having an effect over the human rights and security 
relationship.  
 
To analyse status seeking further and connect it to Norway´s peace discourse, it is 
important to point out that status seeking can be related to morality and therefore to 
the peace rhetoric. Wohlforth et al. state that small states gain moral authority 
internationally and in respect to great powers by assisting in international affairs 
(Wohlforth et al., 2017). States do this by: taking a cue from their tradition, by 
supporting in system maintenance, and by continuing the endurance of great powers 
(Ibid.). Wohlforth et al. claim this assuming that the system has a hegemon, which is 
in many ways debatable and not necessarily a topic for this thesis. However, it is 
interesting that this Wohlforth et al.´s small state actions correspond accordingly to 
Norway´s foreign policy activities as well as encompassing both the human rights and 
security sides of the conundrum. First of all, Norway bases its actions, consciously or 
subconsciously, on it peace discourse that has a historical tradition dated to the end 
of the 19th Century. Second, Norway is interested in maintaining the status quo and 
specifically in maintaining the UN. Interestingly, related to this second point, Norway 
is currently in the running for a sit in the UN Security Council 2021 where peace is a 
large part of the agenda that Norway has set for its candidacy. Finally, it involves itself 
in NATO, perhaps for a selfish security reason, but also perhaps to upkeep the US´s 
global status. These three actions reflect Norway´s rapport with the human rights and 
security relationship, one of constant push and pull constitutively caused by diverse 
reasons in a multilayered approach. For example, oscillating between bidding for a 
position in the Security Council but focusing on a peace campaign, is the perfect 
example of Norway´s fluctuation between human rights and security while at the 
same time assembling of human rights and of security. These actions also reflect a 
sense of morality that similarly affects Norway´s human rights and security 
relationship and its actions in the efforts of halting arms to human right violating 
states. More importantly, this enhances the argument of this thesis, were human 
rights are given but there is an obvious control over the means of violence, where 
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there is a tension between sustaining human security embedding militarism or 
focusing on promoting cultures of peace not embedded militarily.  
 
The “Norwegian Model” and false morality  
 
 One of the most recent key aspects of Norway´s peace discourse is the state´s 
relation with civil society, domestic and international. In fact, Norwegian Foreign 
Policy has at the forefront, this relationship (Melissen 2005a, 2007; Cull 2009, Rugh 
2011 in (Pisarska, 2016)). Also referred to as the “Norwegian Model”, this relationship 
was born from Jan Egeland120 and the Oslo Middle East Accord of the early 1990s. It 
refers to the idea that government, civil society organisations and research 
institutions are organised for coordinated efforts of foreign policy directed by the 
state with substantial government funding (Toje, 2011). The model implies that 
private actors, like non-governmental organisations, research institutes, consultancy 
firms merge with government agencies and official policymakers and gain semi-
official status as extensions of Norwegian diplomacy (Østerud, 2005). It also implies 
that the relationship between the state and non-state actors does not have to be a 
zero-sum game, but it actually defines rules, practices and techniques of this global 
governance segment (Sending and Neumann, 2006). Nevertheless, the Norwegian 
Model has had positive and negative outcomes. NGO financial dependence or 
independence from the state has made other sources of funding basically 
disappeared (Sending and Neumann, 2006). It also can create: i) constraints on 
freedom of determination; ii) personnel no longer able to make independent 
assessments of whether they have sacrificed agency integrity or acting in good 
conscience and iii) it can weaken NGOs contribution to fundamental analysis and 
debate, as stated since 1973 by a USAID document ((USAID, 1973, p.18)in (Toje, 2011, 
p.23)). In fact, in Norway, due to high financial dependency, NGOs are expected to 
implement policy requests from authorities as the Government White Paper # 35 
states ((Stortingsmelding nr 35 (2003–2004) in (Toje, 2011)). Like this, organisations 
are sometimes forced to leave their morality on a shelf whilst a humanitarian 
misfortune is used as a financial opportunity  to “agenda chase” or “rent seek” (Toje, 
2011; Tullock, 2008). 
 
What is left to be seen is if despite NGOs contingency to their financial patron, it has 
the ability to influence the supporter´s behaviour. As discussed in chapter 5, Volker 
Heins (2008) describes NGOs as  “benign parasites” because they seek to “infect” and 
thereby change the behaviour of their hosts without harming them (Heins, 2008, p.2). 
They slip information and legitimacy to states in exchange for reputation, funds and 
social contacts (Ibid., p. 159). All of this also depends on the level of dependency 
 
120 Jan Egeland is a renowned political scientist, humanitarian leader, and Norwegian diplomat. He was 
Foreign Minister in the 1990s and has occupied high roles in international and national NGOs, like the 
Red Cross, AI and HRW. His ideas have transcended Norwegian foreign policy and now rule the state´s 
relationship with NGOs.  
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between state and non-state actors, as well as the degree to which one tries to 
influence the other. In this sense, do Redd Barna and Changemaker´s actions indicate 
“benign parasites” characteristics? Or does the Norwegian government have 
influence over them? In 2008, a detailed study by Kjetil Fretheim (2008), carried many 
interviews to find out, among other things, how the Norwegian state and the NGOs 
where connected. In this study, it was implied by interviewees that Save the Children 
(Redd Barna) receives a small amount of funds from the government. It is not defined, 
if these funds go towards Save the Children´s activities outside of Norway or inside. 
However, the interviewees from Save the Children voice their concern for at times 
have felt like their direction comes from the Norwegian Agency or Development 
Cooperation (NORAD). Still they do insist on the small size of the funding the 
organisation receives from the government. This goes along with what one interview 
from the Norwegian government said about Norwegian NGOs: “I would not 
characterise them as our extended arm, by no means…we have no professional 
follow-up, no professional directions and no Budget control (Fretheim, 2008)”. This 
study, in particular refers mostly to the international development duties that both 
the Norwegian government and the NGOs carry out globally. Nevertheless, it can be 
a reflection of what happens domestically.  
 
When interviewing Red Barna, Irene Dotterud-Flaa said that funding is a mix of public 
and private (Dotterud-Flaa, 2018). Although the topic was not discussed at length, it 
gave me the sense that it did not matter that Norway gave funds to Redd Barna, Redd 
Barna still kept its objectives of seeking the halt of arms even if this could affect the 
government. However, if the Redd Barna, in charge of pushing for an indirect 
implementation of ATT, does receive money from the Norwegian government, does 
this imply that part of its decision making comes from the state? and then how 
trustworthy can their moral actions be? If, Redd Barna receives funding from the 
government, and according to White Paper #35 previously mentioned, the 
organisation NGOs are expected to implement state policy requests. Again, most of 
the cases studied by diverse scholars and by White Papers, refer mostly to NGOs 
working in the international development arena outside the state. So this means, that 
the possible degree to which Redd Barna´s actions, inside the state as opposed to in 
international development, are tainted by state´s policies cannot be estimated. 
Nevertheless, there is in fact a minimum of financial support and influence over Redd 
Barna, then it would mean that the state and the non-state act, in a way, together. 
Would this make Redd Barna a somewhat mixed actor? An actor that in some hidden 
and even remote way is representing the moral side of the state? This would mean 
that the non-state actor has no free will. However, after speaking with the Senior 
Advocacy Adviser from Redd Barna this was not the sensation, despite her 
confirmation that their funding is mixed. It was more like the actor is a non-state 
reformative actor, that in some ways is dependant from the state but acts alone. The 
actor has free will, and is actually fortifying its morality with a push from the state, 
even if it will later be in exact opposition of the state too.  
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Beside the Norwegian state´s influence, or not, on NGOs actions why has the state 
even invaded civil society? Partially as a consequence of the historical peace baggage 
that Norway carries. Also and according to Terje Tvedt in order to diversify national 
foreign policy instruments (Tvedt, 2007). If this is true, then the NGO- state 
relationship leads to what is called the Nordic Human Rights Paradox (Langford and 
Schaffer, 2015). This paradox wonders why national values, norms and traditions 
produce commitment to human rights abroad but scepticism toward human rights at 
home (Ibid, p. 2). It also refers to the Norwegian or Nordic contradiction towards 
human rights where on the one hand it takes pride in promoting them and on the 
other policymakers are increasingly opposed to the expansion of IHL rights 
mechanisms in case these limit the foreign policy leeway (Pisarska, 2016). In some 
ways, this is relatable to the case presented on this chapter, where the state has to 
be pushed by other actors-  be it within-state, non-state actors, or mixed actors- to 
correctly follow and implement international instruments like the ATT. It is also an 
example of the morality of the Norwegian state, a paradoxical morality. Norway 
constantly pushes to maintain its international status of peace and highly moral state 
whilst domestically is a different story. Domestically it can be seen as paradoxically 
moral, and it can also be seen in relation to the Norwegian model of NGO support. On 
one hand, it is enticing NGO financial health while on the other hand, it influences 
their actions due to this. Internationally, this morality becomes false morality, which 
similar to the case in chapter 5 and 6 comes from a combination of Carr´s morality as 
a cloak for great power interests (1946) and a Grotian/English School perspective 
(Bull, 1977; Vincent, 1986).121 It is as if the state is the ultimate carrier of morality 
internationally but not as much internally and this paradox gives forth to a false 
morality. The degree of falsehood between the false morality of the three cases 
presented in this thesis is not the same, and in the case of Norway it is preceded by a 
paradoxical morality that is easily identifiable with the peace baggage. More than 
anything, this paradox in the shape of false morality suits Norway because it 
exemplifies, once more the constant push and pull between human rights and state 
interests and of course in the human rights and security relationship. Once again, this 
false morality gives greater force to this thesis argument where rights are given but 
the means of violence are sought to be controlled and with the contribution of 
focusing on morality to alleviate the weaknesses of constructivism.  
 
Interests and the parity of human rights and security merge  
 
 With what has been explained throughout this chapter, material interests in 
the shape of military, security and foreign policy can be found. Indirectly, economic 
interests can be found too, through Norway´s protection of its oil via neighbourhood 
policy and through the support of Norway´s half state owned military industry. After 
interviewing Irene Dotterud-Flaa from Redd Barna, something interesting came up. 
She mentioned that in Norway´s need to upkeep old arms export licensing to Saudi 
 
121 The concept of false morality is explained in detail in chapter 5.  
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Arabia, it seeks to be seen internationally as a stable business partner and therefore 
will not entirely give up its exports (Dotterud-Flaa, 2018). Also, that although 
Norway´s economy is strong the weapons industry is connected to other industries 
and it will seek to protect them as well as work places (Ibid.). In this sense, economic 
interests have not been dealt with directly, not because lack of existence but because 
in many ways Norway´s economy is healthy. Economic interests are directly and 
indirectly related to other interests. Indirectly, it becomes apparent that all these 
interests are related between them as well as profoundly intertwined with Norway´s 
moral interest. The ruthless prioritization (Leonard et al., 2002, p.169) of interests is 
what gives Norwegian global policy its peculiarity but also what leads to believe that 
in Norway the human rights side and the security side of the human rights and security 
relationship is almost the same or severely linked. Similar to how security in other 
languages is a synonym for safeguarding and protecting, Norway is protecting its 
security by ensuring human rights globally. The peace discourse itself is plagued with 
securitization, which is also a large part of Norway´s interests. Then, moral interests 
and material interests are inundated with both a human rights and a security rhetoric.  
 
In economic terms, Norway´s policies are also relatable to its best interests in up 
keeping a good security policy in its neighbourhood, to protect its oil. Another reason 
to support NATO and to control Russia from entering its oil territory. Norway can in 
fact be very protective of its oil territory, an example of how protective it can be, is 
the Fisheries International Court of Justice 1951 case. It could also be argued, 
although no real evidence of this is found, that Norway unconsciously or consciously 
pushed from restraining arms to in a way of undermining one of the largest oil 
producing and oil exporting states, Saudi Arabia.  
 
One of the largest example of the collision of moral and material interests and human 
rights and security lies in Norway´s mission with NATO. As was explained in the upper 
part of this Chapter, Norway is deeply related with NATO, even more so when Jens 
Stoltenberg is its current head. The first three words that appear when entering the 
Permanent Delegation of Norway to NATO website (Utenriksdepartementet, n.d.) 
are: peace, stability and security. No other three words could more perfectly describe 
Norway´s world vision and of course its constant push and pull between the human 
rights and security relationship. In the website, it is claimed that both the UN and 
NATO are key to Norwegian foreign and security policy, where activities like: peace 
and reconciliation efforts, peace diplomacy, verifiable disarmament and development 
policy are needed to address global security challenges. Like this, by protecting human 
rights Norway is ensuring security for itself, its neighbours and allies. This not only 
substantiates the human rights and security cause, but also the further implications 
of the multilayerness between state actors and international institutions. It further 
proves that human rights and security are interconnected, and that the state while 
giving human rights preponderance it is also always controlling the means of violence, 
as this thesis argument entails. 
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Particular overlap of human rights and security relationship of Norway  
 
 The genealogical point of view has allowed to appreciate the particular 
characteristics of the constructivist human rights and security relationship in the 
Norway case. It has also showcased the complexity and contingency characteristic of 
both genealogy and constructivism and the co- constitution of societies. Throughout 
this analysis it has been showed that this relationship is being constructed probably 
since the start of Norway as an independent state, or even before. It is also constantly 
evolving and involving diverse actors from diverse layers of norm dynamics all with 
the objective of advancing or not human rights and security treaties. The human rights 
and security relationship displays the peaceful nature of the state without forgetting 
its involvement with other states, other non-state actors and even with actors within 
the state. It also shows, the constant tension between an underlying identification 
with the embedded militarism of human security understandings versus a CMV view 
seeking to promote cultures of peace.  
 
Characteristics of the human rights and security relationship 
 
 The overlap between human rights and security in this Norwegian case of 
implementing ATT by halting arms to certain Arab countries, can seem either 
overcomplicated or simple. Overcomplicated, because the nexus of key interests, 
material and moral, seems to be intertwined and in constant change, also the 
multilayer multilevel involvement of diverse actors from within the state, from the 
state and from outside the state. However, it is actually very simple and it is overall a 
reflection of the constant push and pull of human rights and security that has 
characterized Norway’s policies for decades. On one hand, the continuous merge of 
material and moral interests is actually exemplifying the willingness of the state to 
put human rights and security in parity. On the other, it is actually showing its 
somewhat mischievous action of using the peace discourse to gain foreign policy and 
strategic advantage. With this, it is then clearly understood that Norway gives rights, 
while controlling the means of violence and by involving diverse state, non-state and 
within-state that causally constitute a multilevel game where boundaries at moments 
seem undefined but that give hence to a higher connection between human rights 
and security.  
 
Redd Barna has sought change and the implementation of the norm through respect 
for arms control. Although its state funding could in principal stop the organisation 
from outreaching into certain areas of change, because of the nature of the 
Norwegian model, as has been discussed throughout the chapter, this was not the 
case. Redd Barna, similarly to CAAT in chapter 6, utilised campaigning online and 
offline as well as articles on specific suffering from Yemen on their website and social 
media. Redd Barna allied with Changemaker. The organisations focused on different 
aspects which allowed for their success to be more eloquent, Changemaker worked 
on export to authoritarian regimes, whilst Redd Barna more on exports to the Saudi 
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led coalition (Dotterud-Flaa, 2018). Redd Barna also had an alliance with the SV to 
influence parliament; talks were also held with the KRF and Green party, although the 
more organic cooperation occurred with the SV. Through this alliance, Redd Barna 
utilised its research and knowledge to input the SV´s parliament proposal. The 
alliance´s force and effectiveness to reach norm implementation can be seen further 
in Figure 3 in the human rights and security relationship of this case study.  
 
Like this, Norway has a particular human rights and security relationship were due to 
its diverse peculiarities, aforementioned, human rights and security are almost the 
same, or almost completely overlap. Figure 3, is the visual depiction of the 
relationship and the key summary of the nexus of key interests that have been 
discussed throughout this Chapter. The SVs key interests play a role not only in the 
actual overlap of today´s relationship, but also in how this relationship has been 
evolving in the last decades. Although not mentioned explicitly in the Figure, the SV´s 
long government by Jens Stoltenberg outlined many of the military specifications that 
are still defining Norway. Not to mention, Stoltenberg´s involvement with NATO 
during and after its government. Today´s SV is trying to rise from the ashes of a not 
so good election and therefore in this action defining and strengthening its position 
as a left wing, pro human rights, anti NATO party. Even though the degree of 
involvement of Redd Barna, is not precise, its key interests are taken into 
consideration, especially given the Norwegian Model and the possible small financing 
of the state. Redd Barna, most likely offered support or perhaps even pushed the SV 
to act in favour of Yemen and although its role was not as key as CAAT´s role, in the 
UK case in Chapter 6, it did play an important part. Norway´s interests are merged in 
this Figure, mostly because of this merging is why the state of the overlap exists. It is 
important to notice how morality, or false morality, is represented in all the material 
interests through the well-known peace discourse. In this case, then, the carriers of 
morality are all the actors involved, to more or less extent and morality has been 
clearly internalized into materiality to give this particular overlap of the human rights 
and security relationship. The focus and analysis of morality, in this cases as in the 
cases of chapters 5 and 6, has been possible due to this thesis focus on a CMV lens 
that contributes to improving the weaknesses of constructivist theory. Nevertheless, 
the overlap is not complete and this to signify that there are realms of human rights 







Implications for future ATT implementation locally and globally  
 
 The nexus of key interests in Norway that gives birth to this particular overlap 
can be seen in a positive way by appreciating the advancement of human rights in the 
evolution of its relationship with security, by applauding the work of norm 
implementers in and outside the state, and by realizing the meaningfulness and 
implications of this on the lifecycle of IHL instruments like ATT. However, the overlap 
can also be seen negatively. It exemplifies the states permeation into all realms and 
control over the human rights side of the human rights and security relationship. It 
shows how security is perhaps controlling even more human rights and using them to 
gain more supremacy. Nevertheless, the relationship and the overlap do imply a larger 
sense of morality from the state, whether its false or paradoxical, especially in 
comparison to the UK case. Also, it shows another example of how states- including 
within-state and non-state actors-, have dealt with the lack of enforcement 
mechanisms of ATT. The action of these actors, therefore is key in the advancement 
of the Treaty and should therefore be praised in that sense.  
 
The diverse actors involved in this case, and their actions in particular, are also guiding 
the behaviour and further shaping the identity of those who will follow (Onuf, 2012). 
As well as determining further the status of full implementation or not of ATT. By 
doing this, the actors are constituting further not only the future for other actors but 
also for the relationship between human rights and security that these actors cause. 
Whether the vision of constitutive causality is in a differentiating sense among the 
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two concepts, like Wendt (1998), or an overlapping belief, like Rogers Smith (Smith, 
2003) or John Ruggie (1998), the activities carried out by these actors demonstrate 
that causes have effects. Norway´s approach to an open support of non-state actors 
like the military industry and the NGOs demonstrates the intricate constructed 
composition of the specific Norwegian implementation of the ATT, and other IHL 
instruments, and the role that norm implementers have in it. Norway´s peace 
discourse, permeated upon within state, state and non-state mechanisms has had an 
effect upon creating a stop to the sale of arms in UAE and Saudi Arabia. This in turn is 
having an effect over the search of respect for human rights in Yemen, but also on the 
correct implementation of ATT, as well as other IHL instruments. It is also influencing 
the further policies that will be created within Norway and outside too. Like this, the 
constitutive causality of the halt of arms sales to such countries, is directing our 
attention to the social processes and interactions, accidents and agents that mediate 
between them and the outcome that interests us (Lebow, 2009). It is also, displaying 
that the constitutive causality has had its effects, but is also at the same time an effect 
of a causal constitution of peace discourse, security rhetoric, military preparedness, 
status up keeping, foreign policy, and all the rest of the key interests summarized in 
Figure 2. In this sense, this case is an example of a continuous circle of cause-effect 
relations that impact diverse actors at diverse levels, diverse international 
instruments, multilevel game of actors and actions that construct and constitute the 
causes for the ultimate configuration of the human rights and security relationship.    
 
Ultimately, the local and global implications of the norm implementation dynamics of 
the Norwegian case demonstrate that despite Treaty violations in other countries, 
some others have advanced past the violation and into the compliance and correct 
implementation, or at least are trying to. The case empowers, non-state actors and 
more importantly within-state that become key to the favourable evolution of the 
norm. There is also an empowerment of human rights and morality, and also a key 
role for the state´s involvement with human rights- even though in some senses they 
might be used strategically. Most notably, this case continues to provide strength to 
the argument of this Thesis by giving rights, through false morality and state 




 The genealogical and constitutive analysis of the Norwegian case has allowed 
to see how its defence, security and foreign policy strategies coupled with a historic 
sense of material and moral peace engagement are in the centre of its response to 
arms sales violating the Arms Trade Treaty terms. Also, genealogy coupled with 
constructivist theory has showcased the complexity and contingency core to both and 
therefore core to the human rights and security relationship (Bevir, 2008; Kessler, 
2016; Onuf, 2012; Onuf, 2009). The unhidden interests of cooperation and 
safeguarding the military industry give a peculiar twist to state and non-state actors 
in arms control dynamics. It has meant that limits between states can become easily 
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undefined. Supporting the industry, in particular its three main companies: Kongsberg 
Defense & Aerospace, Nammo and AIM Norway, also means that the state wants to 
avoid an addiction to foreign suppliers that could have an impact on national security 
and on national freedom of action. Government documents exalt these beliefs and 
define cooperation beyond financial aid and through marketing involvement too, 
which makes for a well-coordinated industry. It is important to point to the how the 
importance of Norway contributing to peace and stability globally is always illustrated 
in its security and defence White Papers in one way or the other. Such White Papers, 
also depict a system of checks and balances carried out by diverse actors within and 
outside the government.  
 
Within the government, especially within the parliament, opposition parties stand out 
as carriers of morality and defence over the ATT related topics. The Socialist Left Party 
(SV) is an example of the polytomy between supporting a more enhanced security and 
improvement of the armed forces, whilst emphasizing arms control and encouraging 
support for peace and human rights locally and globally. The SV´s action of pushing, 
alongside other opposing parties and NGOs: Redd Barna (Save the Children Norway) 
and Changemaker, have been actively involving themselves and making for a further 
multilevel game of actors. Like this, actors within the state that push towards norm 
implementing and are opposite to what the rest of the state desires are denominated 
within-state actors, like the SV. They are born from the necessity of pushing against 
the state, they become within-state lobbyist to achieve their tasks. Their activities 
shed light on the power of the international human rights and humanitarian based 
norms and the importance of moral and ethical ideas that have allowed for it. Non-
state actors that are reformative NGOs, like Redd Barna, receive some funding from 
the state and could be then seen as mixed actors. However, because of the sense that 
was gotten after interviewing and due to the fact that they move in an opposite realm 
to the state they are simply considered non-state reformative actors. Redd Barna and 
the SV are norm implementers that are pressuring the state through international 
normative structures that have been internalized into Norwegian law and that come 
for international human rights based law, like the ATT. Both actors, represent through 
a CMV lens, actors promoting cultures of peace in a global and local manner to push 
against the embedded militarism that human security and other understandings of 
security have.  
 
Norway´s case, as the other two cases of this thesis, demonstrate that actually it is a 
continuous push and pull between moral and ethical ideas over sovereignty and state 
preponderance joined with the nexus of key interests that permit a close interaction 
between structure and agency. In this sense, this chapter, like the two previous ones 
also show that norm implementers are, like Rawl´s original position agents´ are aiming 
to limit the traditional powers of sovereignty and seeking fairness. These cases also, 
exemplify the casuistic nature of the topic and the change led by agents that have 
evolved significantly in the last decades (Boli and Thomas, 1999a; Anheier et al., 2005; 
Kaldor, 2013a). Like most cases, Norway´s case involves surprises in the shape of 
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actors that are beyond the typical governors of change ideas in global governance 
(Avant et al., 2010). These agents are the ones pushing for the correct implementation 
of the norm from above, from below  (Keck and Sikkink, 1998)and from within the 
state actor.    
  
Norway´s agents cannot be understood without the material and moral key interests 
that define them. These interests, particularly in this case, are severely intertwined, 
whether purposefully or by chance. The material interests of Norway stem from a 
peace rhetoric, characteristic to Nordic countries, but principally formed in Norway 
since the late nineteenth century and expressly significant and institutionalized since 
the 1990s. The construction of the peace discourse has gone hand in hand with 
Norway´s relation to global and domestic actors, and therefore closely related to the 
definition of its identity. Because of this, protecting its interests becomes a matter of 
protecting its identity. This identity shows a mix of exogenous and endogenous causes 
that transform Norway´s strategies. The “Norwegian Model” is the best example of 
this, and entails government supporting NGOs financially. Status seeking goes 
alongside identity in Norway, and with the small state syndrome of having to be 
noticed and recognized by others, especially larger powers. Throughout this, it can be 
seen that Norway is consciously or subconsciously, basing its strategies on the peace 
discourse, interested in maintaining the status quo specifically the UN and the 
upcoming candidacy to the Security Council, and involving itself successfully in NATO. 
This with aims of up keeping its global status. These actions reflect Norway´s rapport 
with the human rights and security relationship, one of constant push and pull 
constitutively caused by diverse reasons in a multilayered approach. In this, a 
paradoxical morality comes into play, or more like a false morality. It is as if the state 
seems to be the ultimate carrier of morality, through its peace engagement, but not 
as much internally when it comes to arms control export licensing decisions and the 
ruthless prioritization of strategic interest. Once more exemplifying the constant push 
and pull between human rights and state interests and of course between human 
rights and security. Also, a further recalcitrant representation of giving rights whilst 
controlling the means of violence and a contribution to moral issues lacking in 
constructivist theory.  
 
Like this, the overlap between human rights and security in the case of Norway 
implementing ATT, shows a continuous merge of material and moral interests through 
the use of the peace discourse to gain foreign policy and strategic advantage. All in 
all, involving diverse state, non-state and within-state that causally constitute a 
multilevel game of actions and key interests that give birth to an almost parity 
between human rights and security. In this sense, Figure 2, visually depicted the 
relationship and summarized the key interests that have been discussed. The key 
interests play a role not only on how the overlap looks like today, but also on the 
evolutionary effect it has over the implementation of ATT locally and globally. 
Moreover, the case is an example of a continuous circle of cause-effect relations that 
empower non-state actors and more importantly within-state, key to the evolution of 
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the ATT. There is also an empowerment of human rights and morality, even if used 
strategically to enhance security, defence and foreign policy. Most notably, this case 
continues to provide strength to the argument of this Thesis by giving rights, through 





Chapter 8- Conclusion  
 
 Throughout this thesis, the genealogical constitutive framework of analysis 
has allowed to answer and problematize the question of what is the relationship 
between human rights and security and what does the Arms Trade Treaty, particularly 
its implementation, reflect about such relationship. By innovatively deconstructing, 
constructing and reconstructing, I have been developing a much further 
understanding of rights and security defined as the human rights and security 
relationship and the complex nexus of moral and material interests that accompanies 
it. A constitutive causation (Lebow, 2009) has directed the attention to the 
interactions and social processes between actors that go beyond the typical 
definitions of state and non-state. The genealogical perspective coupled with a 
constructivist set of mind has brought to the surface the contingent nature of the 
human rights and security relationship. Opening the topic to contestability and 
suggesting countless ways of interpreting depending on the circumstances and the 
actors around it, as each case study has demonstrated. It has based complexity and 
contingency in genealogical stands and core constructivist theory, as explained in 
chapter 1(Bevir, 2008; Kessler, 2016; Onuf, 2012; Onuf, 2009). Actors construct their 
agency within the state, like the SV in Norway, or to a lesser extent DfID and the 
special advocates in the UK, actors that mediate internationally to impose 
implementation nationally, like Control Arms-ATT Monitor, or organisations that 
operate domestically seeking impact internationally, like Redd Barna and CAAT. The 
combination of constructivist literature and English School understanding has allowed 
for a superior view of the practice of states and non-state actors shaping international 
norms and guided by moral purposes (Dunne, 2011). Under these precepts, the paths 
where human rights and security crossed have been proven to be socially constructed 
and dependant of the diverse actors that play in a multilayer multilevel game of moral 
and material interests. More than that, interests have been exhibited as being 
constituted by diverse factors that are entrenched in historical, political, economic, 
military/security, foreign policy values that are in continuous motion and definition of 
the actor’s decisions at a conscious and/or subconscious level. The recognition of the 
human rights and security relationship throughout this thesis aides in the further 
development of the interpretation and further implementation of the Arms Trade 
Treaty. It also helps those actors who are interested in advancing the norm. This is 
because this thesis has gone beyond previous studies of human rights and security 
norms by focusing directly on the human rights and security nexus. 
 
Taking this thesis´s hypothesis focus on controlling the means of violence, it has been 
seen that forms of global-local action have been taken into consideration. This, 
through the action of global-local NGOs and other non-state or mixed actors who have 
aimed to reduce the embedded militarism of the Arms Trade Treaty. By adding the 
CMV lens coupled with the human security lens, other actors, besides the state actors 
can have key roles in promoting cultures of peace, as it has been seen with CAAT and 
Redd Barna, for example. Effectively, this is what the human rights and security 
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relationship represents; how non-state actors balance out state action that is based 
largely on material interests. Then, material interests of state actors tend to overcome 
moral interests, where moral interests are almost always tainted with materiality 
creating false moral interests. The analysis in this thesis has addressed weaknesses in 
this constructivist theory through the explanation of moral action, particularly with 
the concept of false morality and its link to theoretical concepts, like organised 
hypocrisy. The focus of morality is made possible due to the CMV lens that enlightens 
the moral constellation of the actors and therefore addresses weaknesses in 
constructivist theory.  
 
The deconstruction of human rights and security, separately and together as well as 
their engagement with norm dynamics was carried out in chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 
2, showed in a genealogical manner that human rights and security are separate 
entities, but at the same time the same. The connection is understood as starting from 
the conception between safety and threat based on the Hobbesian precondition of 
fear. Where insecurity implies that the need for safety as a condition for human 
relations and as a condition for the state to guarantee it (Jackson, 2000; Jackson-
Preece, 2011). Security becomes “no more than safety (Bull, 1977, p.18)” and 
therefore actors, like the UK, Norway, or the ATT member states seek to protect it. 
Because of this view of security then other actors, non-state actors, like Control Arms, 
Redd Barna, CAAT and beyond also seek to guard it. This in an evolved understanding 
of security as human security based on Kant´s cosmopolitan conception of rights 
(Hernandez, 2018) and developed into the Responsibility to Protect. R2P has been 
especially important because of its advancement into norms protecting human rights, 
like the ATT, and because of the empowerment of non-state actors, like the actors in 
chapters 5, 6, and 7.  
 
Chapter 2, set the basis for two key finding of this thesis: norm implementers and false 
morality. Norms based on rights and security, like the ATT, are enhanced by Kant´s 
conception on universality of rights but especially by Rawls philosophy (Rawls, 1971; 
Rawls, 1993). By combining Kant´s universality, moral law and Rawl´s original position, 
principles of human rights emerge that manage to encompass both security and rights 
in a universal and fair manner. Rawl´s original position is crucial for understanding the 
freeness, mutual disinterests, rationality and fairness of the norm implementers of the 
case studies. Also, for comprehending how, like the law of the peoples, norm 
implementers limit the traditional powers of sovereignty. As was seen in chapters 5, 
6, and 7, norm implementers’ freedom is not necessarily true and related to if an 
organisation´s dependency on the state, or if it is reformist or transformative. For 
example, Control Arms- ATT Monitor is to a certain extent contingent to state funding 
and through the Norwegian Model, so is Redd Barna. CAAT, as a transformative 
independent organisation does have authentic freedom of movement, at least 
freedom from the state. Therefore, CAAT is a Kantian organisation because the 
morality of its actions derive from the action itself and not from the consequences it 
produces. The consequences of morality or the lack thereof, in chapter 2, are what 
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helped define false morality and the CMV lens is what allowed the focus on morality 
in the first place. False morality is based, partially, on John Stewart Mill´s 
consequentialism, where the end justifies the means and the goal of morality is reliant 
to it. As mentioned in chapter 1, false morality is a constructivist way of reflecting 
upon morality, similar to organised hypocrisy, it is also a way of addressing 
weaknesses of constructivism. In chapter 5, Control Arms-ATT Monitor is almost 
considered false moral, as opposed to chapter 6 where the UK in the High Court 
decision of 2017 is considered false moral.    
 
The rest of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, helped to understand where the human rights 
and security relationship fits in the interspace of arms control, as well as with the 
actors and interactions of global governance. Stemming from a constructivist 
conception of norms and their lifecycle (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) and specially 
from the particular role that transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; 
Price, 1998; Florini, 2000) have in influencing the evolution of norms (Boli and 
Thomas, 1999a; Price, 2003; Risse, 2008; Risse and Sikkink, 1999; Risse-Kappen, 1995), 
this thesis has confirmed the part that non-state actors, like Control Arms-ATT 
Monitor, Redd Barna and CAAT, play in the improvement of norms. Also, how these 
actors focus outside the norm creation of human rights security based regimes 
(Garcia, 2006; Garcia, 2011), like the Arms Trade Treaty (Garcia, 2014; Garcia, 2015; 
Bolton and James, 2014; Sears, 2012; Bolton and James, 2014; Casey-Maslen et al., 
2016; Spies, 2009; Bromley et al., 2012; Krause, 2002) and beyond compliance of 
human rights norms (Risse et al., 1999; Risse et al., 2013) and arms control (Mathur, 
2011; Muller and Wunderlich, 2013). Arms control has been understood further than 
the positivist view (Borrie, 2009) and more focused on critically reflecting on the 
security framing underlying current policies and functions to come up with controlling 
the means of violence (Cooper and Mutimer, 2011). In the interspace of arms control, 
human security, although helpful towards the creation of the Arms Trade Treaty, is 
actually complacent with the military agenda (Stavrianakis, 2019). That is why in this 
thesis it is used partially to understand the case studies and why a CMV lens allows to 
include other actors that promote cultures of peace in a global and local manner. This 
served as basis for part of the hypothesis of this thesis, acknowledging that states not 
control arms, but control the means of violence. This can be appreciated indirectly in 
chapter 4 and 5, with the way in which member states control the mechanisms of the 
ATT to upkeep with giving rights on one hand but controlling the means of violence 
on the other. Also, examples throughout the case studies in chapters 5, 6 and 7 
demonstrate how actors, usually non-state and mixed actors, embrace the promotion 
of cultures of peace and allow for a focus of the moral constellation of the human 
rights and security relationship to display.  
 
Chapter 2 also defined the distinctive constructivist human rights and security 
relationship. This definition went beyond the previous similar definition of the 
security and rights nexus (Sasse, 2005). First, it was outlined as the juxtaposition of 
two circles, human rights and security, where the common elements of the two are 
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denoted within their intersection. Then as being composed by the nexus of moral and 
material interests that are constructed by historical, cultural, social and other 
pertinent values. The relationship represents the practical and political implications 
of each agents’ preferences as well as the interaction that diverse actors incur in when 
seeking to change the structure of international relations. The relationship is ever-
changing in a contingent (Onuf, 2009) continuous two-way process (Onuf, 1998) much 
like the constructivist theory of International Relations. Furthermore, the relationship 
falls somewhere in between a Hobbesian security perspective and a Kantian 
universality, as explained in chapter 2. It can be seen either from a narrow 
perspective, where it develops within a state or belongs to a specific actor, or from an 
international level, where it becomes the sum of the relationships actors bring 
globally and the direct reflection of international law. The contemporary human rights 
and security relationship was born with the establishment of humanitarian law, that 
is with the creation of the First Geneva Convention in 1864. It can also be said that 
the contemporary relationship is a constant construct of the social realities that its 
interactions and its actors bring. Constructed within the international relationship 
itself, but also by the composition of ever-changing local human rights and security 
relationships. The relationship gives guidance to actors by being structure but also 
agent. Moreover, the human rights and security relationship turns out to be a 
platform where actors, directly or indirectly, consciously or subconsciously are 
influenced by cultural, social and historical facts to manipulate or accommodate the 
situations whilst constructing a defined connection between security and human 
rights.    
 
Chapter 3 allowed to appreciate the ways in which non-state actors influence global 
norms (Chandler, 2004b; Chandler, 2004a; Chandler, 2001) as actors of a global civil 
society that in the case of this thesis goes further than norm creation and into a higher 
level of the lifecycle of the norm. Global civil society pressures the state through 
international normative structures (Chandler, 2004b), like Control Arms or Redd 
Barna, demonstrating the influence of structure upon agency, the constant dynamics 
involved and the importance of ideas, morality and ethics over power (Ibid.). 
Furthermore, non-state actors where seen to operate beyond their confinements 
(Anheier et al., 2005) to cross-board spaces (Kaldor, 2013a) like Redd Barna 
interacting with political parties within the government in chapter 7. The changes that 
non-state actors, global civil society, TANs or NGOs inflict have been also considered 
to be a combination of national, international and everything-in-between 
circumstances (Avant et al., 2010). This combination of reasons has been important 
for this thesis, as it encompasses the nexus of key moral and material interests that 
push for the enhancing the human rights and security relationship. More importantly, 
are how these agents interplay in constant change and they are constrained by, not 
only intermestic factors (Putnam, 1988) but constraints from multiple levels, as has 
been seen in the three cases presented. Also, because global governance is constantly 
changing, as are its agents, and surprises are to be expected (Avant et al., 2010). These 
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surprises, in the form of new norm implementers, that can be actors within- state, like 
the SV in Norway or to a lesser extent DfID and the special advocates in the UK.  
 
Overall, the theoretical stands from chapters 2 and 3 display a cross- fertilization 
between constructivist and the English School that seeks to explain international 
society and the nature of ethical conduct (Reus-Smit, 2009). This distinctive 
connection is what has allowed to comprehend the role that materialism and, in 
particular, morality play in the human rights and security relation and how through it 
state actors, non-state actors, mixed actors and within state actors can inflict change 
on the norm implementation dynamics of the Arms Trade Treaty. This coupled with 
the CMV lens is what allows to display the moral constellation of the human rights 
and security relationship.  Particular examples of non-state actors, like Redd Barna, 
Control Arms- ATT Monitor and CAAT, and within state actors, like the SV with the 
“boomerang effect” (Keck and Sikkink, 1998) which exerts pressure on the state from 
above and from below to bring human rights change.  
 
Chapter 4, although not a case study per se, has detailed the functioning of the Arms 
Trade Treaty, the faults in implementation that it is starting to show and the unequal 
human rights and security relationship that was set with the creation of the Treaty 
and that continues to persevere with its application. This chapter has been important 
as a basis for the understanding of the case studies for this thesis. Through an 
explanation of the norms lifecycle and particularly through the explanation of the 
Treaty´s humanitarian core and the influence that previous human rights instruments 
have had upon it, this chapter sought to demonstrate the already present human 
rights and security relationship within the Treaty. With this, it showed the multilevel 
game that actors have played in order to achieve it as well as the casuistic nature of 
the international and domestic issues that represent the dynamics of global 
governance that actors have in the human rights and security relationship. These 
dynamics continue to be appreciated in the interaction between structure and agency 
that is reflected within the sphere of the multiple authorities of the Treaty´s 
implementation. The only official requirements, the delivery of the annual report and 
presence at the annual Conference of State Parties (CSP) as well as the ATT Secretariat 
have no direct authority of enforcement of the Treaty. The Treaty´s political direction, 
most importantly, as Amb. Korhonen said: “comes from state parties” (Korhonen, 
2018). This shows the preponderance of state interests, particularly Western state 
interests. States give rights, by agreeing to treaties like the ATT, but they continue to 
control the means of violence. Chapter 4 has been an example of how the norm 
internalization of human rights and security laws have been permeating and 
constructing a just space for human rights, but also how there is still a loft-sided 
relationship between state and non-state actors and even on the human rights and 
security relationship. However, because the Treaty does not specify formal 
mechanisms of control it has left the door open for NGOs to do so, as was the focus 
of chapter 5.  
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Chapters 5, 6 and 7 have been the case study chapters. Together they have exposed 
specific human rights and security relationships as well as norm implementation 
dynamics hidden amongst indirect and direct application of the Arms Trade Treaty. 
They have exposed how the human rights and security relationship is also changing 
actors, this reflected in how the historically constructed nexus of material and moral 
interests is affecting their current decisions. The Arms Trade Treaty is not the only 
Treaty that the actors in these cases are seeking to implement, at least in the case of 
chapter 6 and 7, the UK and Norway. However, the Arms Trade Treaty being the latest 
of the humanitarian security norms is always present in the background, in the 
foreground and beyond. In general, this thesis matters because it makes a 
contribution to the field of International Relations by adding upon the existing and 
growing theoretical background that understands non-state actors or global civil 
society (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Chandler, 2004b; Chandler, 2004a) further than their 
diverse roles in the stages of the norm lifecycle (Anheier et al., 2005; Kaldor, 2013a; 
Avant et al., 2010; Risse et al., 1999; Risse et al., 2013). Also, it focuses on the role 
these non-state actors have past the negotiation and creation of regimes of arms 
control in general (Muller and Wunderlich, 2013) and specifically (Garcia, 2014; 
Garcia, 2006; Garcia, 2011; Mathur, 2011) to achieve an understanding of the norm 
implementation dynamics on human rights based treaties through the conception 
that states give rights whilst controlling the means of violence (Cooper and Mutimer, 
2011).   
 
In particular, this study is significant because its contribution to the field is unique. 
Through an analytical framework based on genealogy and constitutive causality it 
looked at human rights and security in symbiosis, as well as delving into how their 
relationship is defined and defines by the construction of the nexus of moral and 
material interests of diverse actors. This thesis´s findings matter because they are new 
and because they prove that seeing norm implementation dynamics through the lens 
of a human rights and security relationship displays an understanding useful for policy 
makers, practitioners and internationalist to be prepared for future implementation 
of human rights based security norms. The claims in this thesis, overall, are a 
contribution to constructivist theory based on its contingent nature. The summarized 
findings are:  
 
(1) The newly defined constructivist human rights and security relationship is 
constantly changing and therefore revealing the strains between actors, between 
morality and materialism and of course, between human rights and security.  
 
(2) Norm implementers, a novel definition of actors, tend to be non-state actors, like 
transformative NGOs-CAAT or reformative NGOs- Redd Barna and Control Arms-ATT 
Monitor that operate to seek implementation of the norm through the promotion of 
cultures of peace that avoid embedded militarism. Norm implementers can also be 
within- state actors or mixed actors, like the SV in Norway or the special advocates in 
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the UK. The variety of types of norm implementers reflect the semi-permeated 
boundaries of the state and non-state actors.    
 
(3) The distinctive nexus of moral and material interests is composed consciously or 
subconsciously from a set of historical, political, strategical and economical values 
born from constructed social process and interactions.  
 
 (3.1) Material interests and material survival obtrudes stability and therefore 
 morality. Like in the case of Control Arms-ATT Monitor´s funding.  
 
 (3.2) Morality can be false or neighbouring falsehood, as based on Carr, Bull, 
 Mill and Kant. This does not imply a failed or false construction of the human 
 rights and security relationship, but it does show how it can be manipulated. 
 Like in all of the cases, to different extents 
 
(4) The original conception of norm implementation dynamics shows that the human 
rights and security relationship has multiple layers and multiple levels that give it is 
uniqueness.  
 
(5) Independent NGOs, like CAAT, have a greater chance of successfully pushing for 
better implementation of international humanitarian law.  
 
(6) States give rights but continue controlling the means of violence.  
 
In detail, these findings can also be found within the case study chapters. Chapter 5 
presented Control Arms-ATT Monitor as its main character. This chapter showed the 
complexity of the constitutive causality and the construction of the human rights and 
security relationship that is in constant change. The concept of NGOs dependant or 
not to the state was introduced. Based on Stavrianakis and Scholte (2011; 2002) NGOs 
can be reformist or transformative. Reformist are those civil society organisations that 
want to correct flaws without changing the structure; while transformative seek 
structural change. More than that, reformative organisations have some sort of 
dependency to the state, financial or otherwise, and transformative organisations are 
independent. Control Arms-ATT Monitor has been found to be constructing and 
developing a new role, beyond its norm entrepreneur role and into norm 
implementing. Control Arms has become legally a norm implementer and through the 
yearly reports made by ATT Monitor it is seeking the ATT implementation while 
keeping a fluid and defined human rights and security relationship. The materiality 
and morality of the actor in this case, is found to be more politically effective when it 
extends further than morality and into materiality. Control Arms- ATT Monitor has 
morally shamed those states that are not fully following the rules. However, the 
analysis of the Reports demonstrates a certain carefulness to shame. The case of 
Yemen has exposed that, for example, the UK has been indirectly shamed in only one 
report but is no longer mentioned in the successive two reports, giving a sense of lack 
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of continuity. This was not to say that morality is lacking but that it is more 
neighbouring false morality.  
 
Chapter 5 also demonstrated how materiality in this case is contingent to the 
organisations stability, especially when elucidating the organisations financial 
dependency to states. The main funding states, tend to repeat themselves and tend 
to be the so called progressive states. These fund Control Arms and also ATT Monitor. 
These states,  like Australia, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, 
etc, tend to be more likely to participate due to either international reputation 
(Erickson, 2015; Erickson, 2009) and status seeking (de Carvalho and Neumann, 2014). 
Dependency can go both ways, and in many senses NGOs are at times described as 
“benign parasites”(Heins, 2008) that seek to infect and change the behaviour of their 
hosts. This is two-way effect is perceived in the specific overlay of the human rights 
and security relationship that Control Arms-ATT Monitor has in opposition to the ATT 
member states. Particularly visible is the tension between state and non-state actors 
and the multilayer causes of the interactions. The complexity of the morality in 
particular gives a sense of how the human rights side of the relationship struggles 
against the security side. How flirting with false morality is something some non-state 
actors have to endure in order to inflect change on state actions whilst also displaying 
the dynamics that certain progressive states sustain to persist in the international 
scene. What the human rights and security relationship exemplifies is how both types 
of actors are seeking to maintain but at the same time define their roles in the 
advancement of the Treaty whilst maintaining, to a certain extent, the status quo and 
without any real provocation of large exporting states that might be to blame for the 
lack of improvement in the compliance. With this, both the progressive states and 
Control Arms are defining their identity and their role within the realm of the Arms 
Trade Treaty by giving some rights but still controlling the means of violence.  
 
Chapter 5, also introduced and properly defined norm implementers and false 
morality. Norm implementers are organisations that go beyond norm 
entrepreneurship and into implementation of the norm. Norm implementers, as 
explained above are similar to Rawl´s agents, because they should be free, mutually 
disinterested and fair. False morality, as explained above, is partially based on Mill´s 
consequentialism. It can also be understood as the combination of a Realist view of 
morality (Carr, 1945) and an English School view (Bull, 1977). Carr saw morality as a 
cloak for great power interests, while Bull criticised this and asked for focus on moral 
beliefs that influence the whole international society. In this sense, false morality has 
been used as a diversion from natural law into non-moral and material interests.  
 
Chapter 6, presented a different set of actors that led to a different accommodation 
of the human rights and security relationship. The case of the UK and the 
implementation of the ATT allows to recognise further constituted causalities of the 
actors involved, of the treaty and its norm phases. The case of the UK selling arms to 
Saudi Arabia was a case of a broken implementation of the Treaty, especially when 
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considering the 2017 decision of the High Court. However, CAAT´s role in continuing 
the appeal and receiving favourable news in June 2019 became an instance that 
showed the diverse roles of actors seeking to balance the human rights and security 
relationship. Despite the UK government resuming sales to Saudi Arabia in summer 
2020, this case study has empowered NGOs role past the negotiation phase of the 
norm and into actual application and operation. CAAT´s actions reside in multiple 
levels, by acting domestically in favour of IHL and HRL and seeking international 
change. CAAT, as a transformative NGO is then seen as a norm implementer, that acts 
within the state boundaries as a local non-state independent actor. The special 
advocates and DfID-Oxfam become mixed actors that can be carriers of morality and 
human rights as well as, in an indirect manner, norm implementers. Both the 
government and civil society become agents that have the power of constitutive 
causality in defining reality of national and international morality. Moral interests are 
not the sole owners of the human rights side of the relationship, just like material 
interests are not completely void of morality. In fact, the UK uses material interests in 
the name of moral ones, leading to a clear case of false morality. Morality, or false 
morality, of the UK, has a connection with material interests, just like in between 
these interests there is a correlation as well. Material interests are ever-changing 
constructions of the nexus of economic, strategic (i.e. foreign policy, security and 
military), historical and sociological interests that collide and develop constantly.  
 
What the particular overlay of the human rights and security relationship represents 
in the case of the UK, the 2017 decision and the 2019 appeal is different from the one 
in chapter 5 but at the same time the same. The multilayerness and multilevel nature 
of the relationship are what has allowed for norm implementers to exert pressure 
from below, from above and from everywhere in between. Much like Keck and 
Sikkink´s “boomerang effect” (1998), but enlarged.  Despite the new sales of arms of 
summer 2020, this particular relationship gives civil society a stronger sense of 
agency, past the negotiation phase of the norm, like most of the current scholarship 
detail, but making it a crucial moderator in the implementation of the norm 
domestically with international effects. Norm implementers, in this case can also be 
an example of the continuous actions made to give rights and actually seek to avoid 
the control of the means of violence. Norm implementers seek to enhance and 
promote cultures of peace in a global and local manner, whilst avoiding compliance 
with the military agenda. What is true is that due to the false morality of the state, 
material interests prevailed and the fight for centre stage between human rights and 
security becomes even tougher than in other cases. The human rights and security 
relationship, much like the core of constructivist theory (Kessler, 2016) is contingent 
to actors changes and circumstances. Norm implementers seeking the adherence to 
norms, are aiming towards controlling this contingent (Onuf, 2009) nature of the 
human rights and security relationship.  
 
Chapter 7, the case of Norway halting arms licenses to Saudi Arabia, allowed to 
understand that its defence, security and foreign policy strategies coupled with a 
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historic sense of material and moral peace engagement are at the centre of the state´s 
decision. The particular twist of this case is the open involvement of the state in issues 
like safeguarding the military industry and support for civil society through the so 
called Norwegian Model. This has meant that the limits between state and non-state 
actors become difficult to identify and easily undefined at times. Moreover, that the 
boundaries of these actors are semi-permeable enhancing a multi-layered human 
rights and security relationship. Norm implementers in this case come from inside the 
state, like the Socialist Left Party as a representative of a within- state actor. Such 
actor, works in cooperation with non-state actors, especially with a reformist NGO 
like Redd Barna (Save the Children Norway). In this case, the reformist NGO, despite 
having obvious state funding due to the Norwegian Model, acts in direct opposition 
to the state and even engages with actors within the state to achieve its objectives. 
These norm implementers are an example of actors seeking to create cultures of 
peace in order to not be complacent with the military agenda.  
 
Moral and material interests are severely intertwined, whether purposefully or by 
chance. Norway´s material interests stem from the construction of a peace rhetoric 
that has been built in relation to its relation to global and domestic actors and 
therefore closely related to the definition of its identity. Because of this, protecting 
its interests becomes a matter of protecting its identity. Throughout this, it can be 
seen that Norway is consciously or subconsciously, basing its strategies on the peace 
discourse, interested in maintaining the status quo specifically the UN and the 
upcoming candidacy to the Security Council, and involving itself successfully in NATO. 
This with aims of up keeping its global status. Because of this a paradoxical morality 
comes into play, or more like a false morality. It is as if the state seems to be the 
ultimate carrier of morality internationally, through its peace engagement, but not as 
much internally when it comes to arms control export licensing decisions and the 
ruthless prioritization of strategic interest. The specific human rights and security 
relationship of Norway in this case represents constant change exemplified by the 
continuous push and pull between moral and ethical ideas over sovereignty and state 
preponderance coupled with the nexus of key interests that allow for a close 
interaction between structure and agency. The key moral and material interests can 
be seen to have a role not only in how the overlap looks today but also on the 
evolution of the implementation of the ATT domestically and internationally. Also, 
this case study represents a continuous enhancement of non-state actors and within-
state actors in the norm implementation dynamics of the Arms Trade Treaty. 
 
Put together, the findings discussed above have demonstrated the fluidity and 
complexity of the human rights and security relationship. They also demonstrate the 
benefits of viewing actor´s actions within the realm of human rights based security 
treaties as human rights and security and not as separate beings. The three case 
studies have different perspectives on the different set of actors, norm implementers 
and nexus of material and moral interests that can exists. They expose distinctive 
views on materialism and on diverse levels of false morality. They contribute to 
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improving the weaknesses of constructivist theory by bringing a CMV lens that allows 
for a focus on the moral constellation of the relationship. These cases are not the only 
combinations available, but they do represent key interactions that allow for an 
enhanced appreciation of the multilayer strains between structure and agency that 
enrich the understanding of the norm implementation dynamics of the Arms Trade 
Treaty and other similar treaties. By highlighting norm implementation dynamics 
within the realm of arms control, this study advocates the continued importance of 
actors beyond the state, within the state and in the state as well as their semi-
permeable boundaries. More than this, this study implies that the particular 
framework of analysis based on genealogy and constitutive causality allows to obtain 
a unique view of the implementation of a human rights based treaty and with it 
promoted a better understanding of the diverse actors involved.  
 
Thinking into the limitations of this thesis, I understand that the circumstances in each 
of the cases are special and that the human rights and security relationship could 
behave differently across other actors and in other scenarios. It would have made this 
study richer if access to NGO funding and financing was easier to obtain and with it 
the direct and indirect conditions that organisations suffer with it. It would be 
interesting to also focus on importing member states and on how the norm 
implementation dynamics are affecting their control of the Treaty. Thinking even 
further, this study would become richer by further understanding false morality and 
how it is used in the realm of arms control. Also, new crisis or wars, might arise and 
bring new challenges to the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty that have not 
yet being taken into consideration in this study. That is why, further research of this 
study would like to focus on more cases, as well as revisiting these cases when the 
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